Securing Nuclear & Radiological Material

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Partners for Nuclear Security?

Protecting the Olympic Games

Imagine the potential for disaster. Greece has 22 medical clinics that use radioactive sources for cancer treatment and blood irradiation. These clinics are located in 18 hospitals in six major cities. In addition to these radioactive sources one large industrial-scale irradiator in an Athens suburb is using a large radioactive source array to get medical equipment sterilized.?

Clearly, the Greeks needed tamper-proof security systems to preclude the possibility of a disaster during the Athens 2004 Summer Olympic Games. Thus, with funding from the US Department of Energy and technical assistance from the Sandia National Laboratories, the IAEA and the Greek Atomic Energy Commission initiated a major security upgrade to all 22 of Greece's medical facilities using radioactive sources. It is part of a far-reaching and comprehensive effort to ensure that nothing but sports would occur during the Athens Olympic ceremonies.

The comprehensive nuclear security action plan was designed to protect facilities and materials, to detect illicit trafficking and malicious use of radioactive materials, and to ensure that emergency response forces are effective and efficient.

Radiation detection equipment was installed at borders and other entry points into Greece, and mobile detection equipment deployed elsewhere. Hand-held radiation monitors were distributed amongst the thousands of security personnel and customs officials who were involved in the security for the Games. The equipment was deployed to detect radioactive materials that might be used as a weapon by terrorists in a radiological dispersal device, a so-called "dirty bomb".

The IAEA takes a lead role in providing international standards and guidance on both security and related safety issues. And it provides advisory services, training, technical assistance and information support. Since it was established, the IAEA nuclear security programme has provided assistance and support to dozens of States across the globe.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) contains new measures to provide international support for countries' national programs to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of vulnerable nuclear and other radiological materials and equipment around the world - as quickly and expeditiously as possible - that pose a threat to the international community. We are doing this because we are dedicated to securing dangerous, unsecured materials, and because we are equally dedicated to ensuring the continued peaceful use of nuclear power.

There are four elements that comprise this initiative.

  1. We will work in partnership to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel by the end of 2005. We will also work with Russia to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010.


  2. We will likewise take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under our existing program from locations around the world within a decade. Our aim is to undertake these on a priority basis, with priority given to cases involving the greatest security threats and situations in which diplomatic and cooperative opportunities present themselves.


  3. We will work to convert the cores of targeted civilian research reactors that use HEU to use low enriched uranium fuel instead. We will do this not just in the United States, but also throughout the entire world. Indeed, let me stress that we are not urging nations to take up any work - whether securing materials or converting reactor cores - that we are not committed to doing at home in the United States.


  4. The fourth and final leg of the GTRI is working to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts. The first task we must undertake involves creating an official inventory of high-risk materials worldwide, which includes, but is not limited to, material located at enrichment plants, conversion facilities, reprocessing plants, research reactor sites, fuel fabrication plants, and temporary storage facilities. It also includes the kinds of materials that could be used in an RDD. This fourth element is absolutely critical to this concept of GTRI, because it is, arguably, the most challenging aspect. The challenge of this portion of GTRI lies in the fact it is so open-ended. It requires us to think creatively, to predict the unforeseen, and to stay several steps ahead of a determined and imaginative enemy. And it requires much greater international participation.


For our part, I am pleased to announce that the US Department of Energy will contribute $3 million to the IAEA to help implement GTRI. This contribution will support important technical cooperation efforts under GTRI.

We are pleased that other Member States are committing resources to enhance security over nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Australian Government recently established a new program to secure radioactive sources in the Asia Pacific Region and committed approximately $3.1 million to this effort. We welcome this important financial commitment by Australia and encourage other countries to make similar commitments to the extent possible.

Spencer Abraham was the United States' 10th and longest-serving Secretary of Energy. He resigned in November 2004. Abraham said acceleration of nuclear non-proliferation programs aimed at keeping nuclear materials away from terrorists "heads the list of important accomplishments" of the past four years. His article is based on his address to the GTRI Conference. For more information on conference, go to: www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/GTRI_conference.html.

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