Obstacles & Opportunities
US & Russian Academies Forge Ties for Nuclear Security
Because some of the existing regulatory and legal structures in both countries occasionally create barriers to cooperation, and because needed regulations have not been enacted in other cases, participants also encouraged both governments to update relevant laws and regulations to facilitate cooperation. Finally, some emphasized the need to create mechanisms for disseminating the benefits of experience through training programs so that lessons that are learned in one program do not have to be learned again in another.
Sharing Best Practices
Because they are responsible for the protection, management, and accounting of the materials and components used in a State's nuclear energy or weapons program, the scientists, engineers, and technicians who oversee and operate MPC&A programs around the world are on the front lines of the struggle against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The workshop on MPC&A therefore convened to broaden the body of professional knowledge upon which these experts can draw in carrying out their duties by exposing them to different approaches and ideas. Participants learned about current MPC&A practice in several countries and explored the role of MPC&A in supporting the international nuclear non-proliferation regime that is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
This workshop benefited from an especially high level of participation by representatives of the IAEA and its Member States. Presentations highlighted not only the differing perspectives of the represented nations but also their common goals of minimizing the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. IAEA Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety and Security, Mr. Tomihiro Taniguchi, outlined the IAEA's plan of action for addressing the threats of nuclear terrorism. Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, discussed the challenges facing the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The workshop agenda featured three main components: overarching issues, national MPC&A systems, and international safeguards against nuclear proliferation. Presentations on overarching issues covered a variety of challenges and perspectives, but the need for collective action against the threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation was a strong theme throughout. During the sessions on national MPC&A systems, participants gave presentations on practices in several specific countries as well as on broader challenges that all such national systems face. It was evident that each nation was striving to create an effective MPC&A system within its own political, economic, and cultural context. Discussions of challenges that all national systems face explored not only the technical but also the human and organizational factors involved in managing nuclear facilities underscoring the need to develop a more complex understanding of the role such non-technical processes play.
The session on international safeguards depicted the global landscape of nuclear non-proliferation efforts and the IAEA's role in them. Papers on technical advances described trends in IAEA inspection and verification technology as well as in MPC&A systems. Presentations on political challenges in Russia, the USA and Japan summarized the non-proliferation programs and treaties supported by each government, offering three different perspectives on the problems and priorities of the international non-proliferation regime.
Working Toward Common Goals
Several important themes emerged during the workshops. First, they underscored the high value of international dialogue among experts who are working toward common goals. Discussions enabled participants to identify problems, consider possible solutions, and strengthen their collaborative efforts by sharing their knowledge. Second, participants benefited from learning about each other's differences. Certainly this was an important factor during discussions of the US-Russian cooperative relationship, but it was also extremely valuable in the MPC&A workshop. During those discussions, it became clear that the US and Russia can learn as much from other nations that are taking a fresh look at the challenges of MPC&A as those nations can benefit from the long and vast nuclear experience of the two former rivals. Third, discussions highlighted the increasingly international nature of nuclear non-proliferation challenges, and put new emphasis on the need to address global problems through global solutions. Finally, the workshops demonstrated that scientific and technical decisions with implications for domestic and international policy are best understood not only as rational choices among scientific options, but also within the political, economic, and cultural contexts in which they are taken.
Christopher Eldridge is a Program Officer for the Policy and Global Affairs Division of the US National Academies. He has managed several joint programs of the National Academies and the Russian Academy of Sciences on nuclear non-proliferation. E-mail: celdridg@nas.edu.
- CONTENTS
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2005
- What next for the NPT?
- The World's Non-Proliferation Regime in Time
- Nuclear Law & Disorder
- Farewell to Arms
- Reframing the Debate Against Nuclear Weapons
- The IAEA & the NPT
- Upgrading Nuclear Safeguards in Kazakhstan
- IAEA Technical Cooperation & the NPT
- Nuclear Export Controls
- The Right Moves for Nuclear & Global Security
- A Race We Can Win
- Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- GTRI Moves Ahead
- Obstacles & Opportunities
- Nuclear Technology & the Developing World
- Fast Forward for the United Nations
- End the Nuclear Threat
- How We Think About Peace & Security
- Rethinking a Dangerous Game of Chance
- Shared Pledge, Shared Vision
- Text & Members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
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