Nuclear Technology & the Developing World

In a globalizing world economy, stronger proliferation controls are in everyone's best interests

« Previous | Next »

by Kathleen Walsh

Page 2 of 2

A New "Grand Bargain"

In effect, globalization and the IT revolution have provided the basis for a new, if informal, "grand bargain" that promotes the interests of all States: in exploiting IT as a means toward greater prosperity, rapid economic modernization, and knowledge-based societies, developing countries will likely find, as China has, that they require more effective proliferation controls. The latter will increasingly determine developing States' rate of high-tech development by either facilitating or undermining their export potential, particularly to Western economies (the major destination for high-tech exports).

Developing States will also wish to lessen the economic costs increasingly associated with proliferation, whether inadvertent, illicit, or in some cases State-supported. Economic costs of proliferation-related activities have risen as international counter-proliferation efforts (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative) have expanded in the aftermath of 9/11. Efforts such as these are likely to grow in number and support over time.

As a result, it is increasingly in the interest of both developing countries (seeking to bolster their high-tech development and export potential) and developed economies (seeking new low-cost investment opportunities around the world) to have in place more effective as well as harmonized, worldwide proliferation controls.

Achieving this result will certainly not address all outstanding proliferation concerns nor resolve persistent security dilemmas prompted by nuclear weapons development. But greater effort is clearly needed to study and to highlight these seemingly coinciding economic interests and to accelerate their potentially positive, near-term impact on nonproliferation. Enhanced controls instituted in response to enlightened self interest are far more likely to be enforced, sustained, and ultimately effective than those implemented merely to meet imposed international mandates.

Looking ahead, China's rising influence in global economic and security affairs may provide an historic opportunity. The PRC could serve as a leading example to the developing world on how to institute more effective, modern export controls. Beijing has recently dealt with many of the logistical, legal, financial, institutional and technological concerns raised in attempting to institute modern export control policies, practices, regulations, and review processes. China's growing cadre of experts could aid and advise other developing countries seeking to improve their trade, border, and licensing systems in ways that also meet the demands of a global economy.

China also could play a more critical role in promoting international cooperative nonproliferation activities. Although China's reform efforts remain a work in progress, the PRC's recent entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and revised view of export controls as complementary to national security and sustainable economic development should help assure leaders in other developing countries that their long-term economic and security interests similarly lie in promoting nonproliferation and enhanced export controls. Libya's own recent reversal of its nuclear development efforts also reinforces the growing economic rationale for - rather than against- a nonproliferation norm among developing countries.

It is incumbent even more so, however, on the international community to recognize, promote, and engage efforts by China and other developing States to institute improved trade controls, even though these are made in the countries' own national self interest. In this endeavor, the interests of the international community and the state intersect.

Support for such activities should be given high priority in the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and Nuclear Security Fund, among other international nonproliferation efforts and organizations. Although much training and assistance is available to developing countries on a bilateral and regional basis on ways to improve export controls and nuclear security, far more can be done on an international scale to help offset the costs involved in implementing basic elements of a modern export control system (e.g., computerized tracking of licenses and customs records).

Yet, recognizing the growing economic rationale that underlies the incentives and the need for enhanced, universal export controls will not suffice to effect significant change. The international community historically has been unable to summon the collective political will to act cooperatively to address new proliferation challenges until the threat of non-action has been demonstrated. The recent discoveries of proliferation to and from Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan, however, should serve this purpose, having demonstrated the ease with which nuclear and other forms of proliferation can occur in today's globalized economy.

It is incumbent on the international community to recognize, promote, and engage efforts by China and other developing States to institute improved trade controls.

These cases also make clear that the threat is only likely to be met through universal support for, and implementation of, nonproliferation controls. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 recognizes this fact as do other recent declarations, such as the June 2004 US-European Union Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. But these are only first steps; they must be acted upon forthwith and not be made contingent on developing states gaining formal entry into nonproliferation control regimes.

Much of the attention of the United States and the international community is focused on counter-proliferation, preventive action, and coercive diplomacy. These efforts are intended to thwart the determination of a number of states to develop nuclear capabilities, which is both understandable and necessary given recent events.

Non-proliferation experts and officials, however, should not lose sight of new opportunities to foster a more universal non-proliferation norm, which represents the best means of preventing proliferation over the long run. Nor should economic considerations and positive, development-oriented incentives be overlooked in preparation for the NPT Review Conference, set for May 2005. If the NPT and other non-proliferation mechanisms are to effectively address 21st century security concerns, they must also respond to today's global economic realities.

Kathleen (Kate) Walsh is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a private, independent, nonpartisan, foreign and national security policy research institution in Washington, DC. Ms. Walsh is author of Foreign High-Tech Research and Development in the PRC: Implications for US-China Relations, a year-long study published by the Stimson Center in July 2003. See the project's homepage at www.stimson.org/techtransfer. E-mail: kwalsh@stimson.org.

« Previous | Next »

Page 2 of 2