Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Which Way Forward For Multilateral Approaches?

An International Expert Group Examines Options

« Previous | Next »

by Bruno Pellaud

Page 3 of 3

Apart from the crosscutting factors related to the implementation of MNAs, such as the technical, legal, institutional and safeguards, there are a number of overarching issues, primarily of a broad political nature, that may have a bearing on perceptions as to the feasibility and desirability of MNAs. These issues may well be decisive in any future endeavour to develop, assess and implement such approaches at the national and international level:

  1. Article IV of the NPT. Specifically relevant are the references contained therein to the "inalienable right" of non-nuclear weapon States to develop nuclear energy and the obligations by all to "facilitate" and "cooperate in" the development of nuclear energy.


  2. Safeguards and export controls.
  3. Some have argued that, if the objective of MNAs is merely to strengthen the non-proliferation regime then, rather than focussing on MNAs, it may be better to concentrate instead on the existing elements of the regime itself, for example, by seeking the universality of the Additional Protocol (AP) to IAEA safeguards agreements and by the strengthening of export controls.


  4. Voluntary participation in MNAs versus binding norm. There is no existing legal norm requiring participation in MNAs. Thus, the establishment of one rests upon voluntary participation. States will enter into such multilateral arrangements on the basis of economic and political incentives and disincentives offered by these arrangements. A verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty is likely to be viewed by non-nuclear weapon States as a precondition for a subsequent universal and binding acceptance of MNAs.


  5. Nuclear-Weapon States. As long as MNAs remain voluntary, nothing would preclude commercial and government entities in nuclear-weapon States from participating in an MNA with non-nuclear weapon States. In fact, France (in the frame of the EURODIF arrangement) and the United Kingdom (in connection with Urenco) are examples of such participation.


  6. Breakout from the NPT. Whether voluntary or binding, multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres share a potential weakness with their national counterparts, namely the risk of the host country "breaking out" by creating a political emergency, expelling multinational staff, withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility without international control. For multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres to be acceptable, this risk would need to be addressed, even though MNAs offer in that case a better protection than national facilities, thanks to the intertwining multilateral activities.


A joint facility with multinational staff puts all participants under a greater scrutiny from peers and partners, a fact that strengthens non-proliferation and security. This is the fundamental non-proliferation benefit of MNAs.

The potential benefits of MNAs for the non-proliferation regime are both intangible and tangible. As a confidence-building measure, multilateral approaches have the potential to provide enhanced assurance to the international community that the most sensitive parts of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for weapons purposes. Moreover, multilateral approaches also have the potential to facilitate the continued use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and enhance the prospects for the safe and environmentally sound storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Multilateral approaches can also provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness and economies of scale for smaller countries or those with limited resources, while ensuring the benefits of the use of nuclear technology. Similar benefits have been derived in other advanced technologies and high security sectors, such as aviation, aerospace and high-speed computing.

Indeed, non-proliferation and economic considerations can coincide and be mutually reinforcing. The acceptance of restraints in order to achieve a broader based assurance of supply can work to a State's advantage, both economic and non-proliferation advantage. In the final analysis, the decision will amount to a question of political will: the political will to consider alternatives to the development of independent national fuel cycles.

The lack of political will was the main reason for the failure of previous similar initiatives. Proliferation concerns were perceived as not serious enough. Economic incentives were seldom decisive enough. Concerns about assurances of supply were overriding. National pride also played a role, alongside great expectations about the technological and economic spin-offs to be derived from nuclear activities. Many of those considerations may still be pertinent. Nonetheless, the political environment is possibly more conducive today towards voluntary, confidence-building MNAs.

On the horizon, there is the likely scenario of a strong expansion of nuclear energy around the world. This will ultimately call for a new world system with a more orderly nuclear fuel cycle, with strong multinational and multilateral arrangements - by region or by continent - and a stronger degree of international cooperation, involving the IAEA, the NPT community and even the Security Council.

Bruno Pellaud was Deputy Director General of the IAEA in the period 1993-99 and head of its Department of Safeguards. Since 2001, he is president of the Swiss Nuclear Forum. In June 2004, the Director General of the IAEA appointed him chairman of an international expert group entrusted with the evaluation of multilateral approaches for the nuclear fuel cycle. E-mail: pellaud@bluewin.ch.

« Previous | Next »

Pge 3 of 3