The 2000 NPT Review Conference urged all concerned NPT States to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA as soon as possible. It endorsed the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol, and encouraged all NPT States, in particular those with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols and bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible. It proposed a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols.
The same year, the IAEA's General Conference outlined five "elements" of such an Action Plan, including intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols, assistance by the IAEA and Member States on the implementation of additional protocols, and reinforced coordination of these efforts.
Guided by this mandate and its own outreach plan, the IAEA has been engaged since 2001 in an ambitious programme to inform national decision-makers about the policy, legal and technical aspects of the strengthened safeguards system.
The aim is to conclude, by the end of 2005, safeguards agreements with many of remaining NPT parties, and additional protocols with the majority of States and almost all States with significant nuclear activities. A number of States have assisted in these efforts through extrabudgetary contributions and in-kind support, including Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Finland, France, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Peru, South Africa, Sweden, the United States and Uzbekistan. Japan has taken a leading role in international outreach efforts.
More than 150 States have been engaged in consultations on the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols through IAEA regional, interregional and national seminars since December 2001.
In the IAEA Secretariat's estimation, remaining obstacles encountered by States to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols can be divided into four groups:
Since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, 14 States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and 55 States party to the NPT have brought into force additional protocols. At the start of 2005, 40 NPT States had outstanding obligations to bring into force safeguards agreements.
About half of the NPT States have submitted additional protocols for signature. Though still below expectations in the late 1990s, the accelerated rate of adherence to the strengthened safeguards system is a key area where progress has been achieved since the last Review Conference.
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The NPT Final Document in 2000 included steps toward nuclear disarmament, some of which made reference to verification issues. Specifically cited was the completion and implementation of a "Trilateral Initiative" between the USA, the Russian Federation and the IAEA and arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place excess fissile material under IAEA or other relevant international verification.
Since then, studies and workshops continued within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative, until September 2002, when the three parties declared that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 had been fulfilled. At that stage, the Trilateral Initiative had demonstrated technical approaches for multilateral verification of irreversible removal of excess plutonium from military programmes, developed a legal framework for verification arrangements to be applied to ex-weapon and other excess material, and proposed possible models to finance such arrangements.
Other disarmament steps agreed by NPT States in 2000 might potentially influence the IAEA's work. They include the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the agreement to apply the principles of irreversibility and transparency to nuclear disarmament measures.
Although formal negotiations on a Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have not taken place, the IAEA has continued to participate in - and Agency experts have provided information - to informal discussions in Geneva to consider the technical aspects of an eventual treaty.
The IAEA remains ready to consider any request to undertake verification tasks related to excess fissile material but so far has not received any such requests.
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