IAEA & NPT - The Verification Challenge

Challenging Nuclear Issues Point the Way Forward

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by Jan Lodding & Tariq Rauf

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Iraq

The NPT Final Document in 2000 noted the Agency's inability to perform its Security Council verification mandate in Iraq and called upon Iraq to comply with its obligations. At the time, the IAEA's NPT-related activities in Iraq were limited to a yearly physical inventory verification pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. This situation prevailed until the resumption of the Security Council inspection mandate in September 2002 and NPT inspections continued up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

At that time, the IAEA assessed that Iraq's former nuclear weapon programme, which the IAEA had previously rendered harmless, had not been re-generated and that only a few outstanding issues remained to be addressed. Today, the IAEA continues to have a dual mandate in Iraq - under relevant Security Council resolutions and under Iraq's safeguards agreement - and remains ready to resume verification activities once the security situation in Iraq improves.

Islamic Republic of Iran

In August 2002, following media reports on previously unknown nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA requested a visit to the alleged sites of such activities. Iran eventually agreed, and in the related discussions, informed the Agency of a number of activities that should have been reported earlier under Iran's NPT safeguards agreement. Iran reiterated that it had embarked on a civilian nuclear power programme, and explained that it had refrained from declaring its activities in order to circumvent attempts to deny it technology.

To help restore confidence following these breaches of Iran's obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board subsequently called on Iran, as a confidence-building measure, to suspend voluntarily all further reprocessing and uranium enrichment-related activities pending provision of the assurances required by Member States and pending satisfactory application of the provisions of the additional protocol. Iran signed an additional protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement in December 2003 and pledged to apply it pending formal entry into force.

Acknowledged as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the IAEA's Verification system plays a fundamental role in the NPT's implementation.

Following consultations with France, Germany and the United Kingdom on a "grand bargain", Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment programme, and this pledge was eventually expanded to a full suspension of all enrichment-related activities in Iran. In November 2004, the Agency concluded that there was no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material. However, it also cautioned that, given past concealment efforts, it would take a long time to reach a conclusion on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The IAEA is continuing its efforts to reach such a conclusion through Iran's safeguards agreement and additional protocol, and, as requested by Iran and the IAEA Board, is also verifying the suspension of all enrichment activities in Iran.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

In December 2003, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya informed the IAEA that it had been conducting a clandestine nuclear-weapon acquisition programme, and asked the Agency to verify its dismantlement. Later that month, the IAEA Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, met with President Ghadaffi, and Libya pledged to act as if the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement were already in force.

In February 2004, the Director General reported that Libya, over an extended period of time, had failed to report nuclear material, facilities and activities, including such related to uranium enrichment. He characterized Libya's breach of its safeguards obligations, and its acquisition of nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents, as matters of the utmost concern.

According to Libya, a foreign expert had helped the country gain experience in the design and operation of centrifuge equipment in the 1980s, and in 1995 Libya made a strategic decision to pursue gas centrifuge enrichment technology. Related components were procured from abroad, although Libya had intended to establish domestic capabilities. Research was also conducted into uranium separation and weaponization.

In March 2004, the IAEA Board requested the Director General to inform the UN Security Council of Libya's past non-compliance. By September 2004, the Director General reported that, with the good cooperation of Libyan authorities, the IAEA had built an understanding of Libya's previously undeclared nuclear programme.

The report pointed out that the IAEA's analysis of Libya's nuclear programme had brought to light a covert network, through which Libya and other States gained access to nuclear technology and know-how.

Republic of Korea

In August 2004, in connection with the submission of its initial declaration under the additional protocol, the Republic of Korea announced that in 2000, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute had conducted uranium enrichment experiments, without the Government's knowledge, that should have been reported to the Agency. It later emerged that experiments on uranium and plutonium separation had also taken place about 25 years ago. The IAEA Director General reported these findings to the Board, in November 2004, expressing serious concern with the failure to report such undeclared activities, but underlining that there were no indications that these experiments had continued. The Board shared the Director General's serious concerns with regard to failures to report information under the Republic of Korea's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

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