Farewell to Arms
What's Blocking Nuclear Disarmament?
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by Harald Müller
Page 2 of 2
13 Steps.and Counting
The 13 practical steps adopted by NPT States in 2000 consist of 21 individual measures:
- The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
- The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
- The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
- The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
- An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
- The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
- The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
- Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.
- Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
- Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
- The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Just as clearly, there is no need for these options in humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions. To the contrary, considering the employment of nuclear weapons in such contingencies would contradict the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The Court said that, if at all, the use of nuclear weapons was only justifiable if national survival were at stake.
Neither are nuclear weapons needed for keeping a hostile leadership at bay or eliminating it, as the Yugoslav, Afghan, and Iraqi experiences demonstrate. And conventional options are also available to counter the threat of biological or chemical weapons.
Even if nuclear deterrence were seen as a needed option, sharply reduced arsenals would still suffice to do the job. And against the scourge of our time, transnational terrorism, nuclear weapons have no use at all.
Restoring Confidence
What, then, is holding up nuclear disarmament? In my view, residual distrust is one problem. It persuades some nuclear-weapon States to keep the option for larger arsenals open if ballistic missile defences are introduced. Beyond this specific strategic concern, it appears that keeping freedom of action as such is valued highly by some - so highly that even legal and political undertakings are pushed aside.
The fear of a "slippery slope" is another problem. Fears that disarmament could lead uncontrollably to the untimely elimination of all nuclear weapons run strong. Even the completely reasonable and beneficial measures agreed in 2000 appear as such a big risk that nuclear-weapon States are not willing to take the first step. And of course, the members of the nuclear weapon complexes are happy to supply new notions of threats to which nuclear answers such as "bunker busters" or "mini-nukes" that have been on their wish-list for decades - with shifting targets, to be sure are then warmly recommended.
The United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has tried to identify the priorities in the field of nuclear disarmament. A report to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his High-Level Panel sets priorities with the objective of preventing nuclear terrorism. It recommended further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons; the prompt start of negotiations for a verifiable treaty to provide for the cut-off of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and a convention for the ban of radiological weapons and warfare.
In connection with the "thirteen steps", this list of priorities provides a good program of action that could be tackled immediately. Such an initiative could restore some of the confidence lost by the international community in the validity of the disarmament undertakings of nuclear-weapon States.
Without such a move forward, recriminations within the NPT family may mount - weakening the determination to confront the double risks of more nuclear proliferation and terrorist access to the most horrible weapons of our time.