NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS - Closing the Gaps
In individual cases this concern may be totally different. When the IAEA is reviewing a particular country because of certain doubts or inconsistencies, information on DU items can be of importance. Agency inspectors may have encountered inconsistencies like extraordinary equipment, or may have found equipment from a particular country and want to know if other related equipment has been exported to the same country. In such cases inquiries with particular exporting countries are useful and necessary, as information of transfer of DU items would be an additional means to complete or at least improve the picture for the IAEA. In such cases Member States should provide all information needed by the IAEA on individual goods and on procurement practices of such countries. This is in line with the decision of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, as reaffirmed in 2000, that all support should be given to the IAEA to enhance its capability in safeguards.
But this would not take away the fact that the value of DU information would still be minor compared with the level of information the Agency would receive from a good reporting system on trigger list items on the basis of Annex II of the Additional Protocol. It is therefore necessary for the Agency to focus on the establishment and continuous improvement of its means for information treatment on Annex II reporting, as well as to consider how to improve the possibilities on import information, in particular on the standardisation of import reporting equal to export reporting. At the same time it is important for the Agency to review and, when necessary, update the list of Annex II.
What is needed to close major gaps in export controls?
Export control regimes set up the security requirements for recipient countries. They harmonize these requirements on a wide international basis, contribute to their universality by demanding them as a condition of supply, promote the knowledge of security requirements through outreach activities and can serve as a basis, together with the IAEA, for co-ordination and co-operation in technology transfer. As the list of items and activities in Annexes I and II of the Additional Protocol are based on the Committee trigger list, the Committee can advise the IAEA on these technologies.
Looking toward internationally agreed standards, current deficiencies are mainly related to State implementation.
- As to the Additional Protocol, some NPT States claim that there is no obligation to conclude such an instrument. This is not in line with the concept of NPT Art. III: The Treaty's non-nuclear-weapon-States (NNWS) have the obligation to negotiate with the IAEA an Additional Protocol, just as they are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement. NPT Article III.1 stipulates two tasks: (a) the IAEA has to establish and maintain a system for safeguards that meets the purposes of the Treaty; (b) non-nuclear-weapon States have to embark upon negotiations with the IAEA to enable the Agency to fulfill its verification task according to its safeguards system for NPT purposes. This concept clearly shows that there is only one safeguards system for NPT purposes. Any improvement or strengthening of this system requires the Agency to implement the system to its last state-of-the-art. NNWS have to embark upon negotiations with the IAEA whenever there is a need to enable the Agency to fulfill its safeguards task.
- From this logic it is neither understandable nor acceptable why NPT States should have difficulties to accept their Additional Protocols. The IAEA Director General has stressed the fact that for the Agency to be able to fulfill its verification responsibilities in a credible manner, the Additional Protocol must become the standard for all countries that are party to the NPT. Do Member States really want the Agency to be deficient in its capabilities, in particular if we take it that the Additional Protocol was adopted by consensus in the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997 and - also by consensus - confirmed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences? Why is this consensus support missing when it comes to implementation? In physical protection of nuclear material, the critical question is how this requirement can be verified. Only a few supplier States have appropriate inspection teams to check physical protection systems in recipient States. In strengthening of this export control requirement the IAEA can play an important role through its voluntary International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). As a condition of supply the supplier could demand that the recipient State invites an IPPAS mission and provides its findings to the exporter. In order to observe the necessary confidentiality for national security information, the mission's report should provide an executive summary that describes in general terms whether the national measures are adequate for the nuclear programme according to the IAEA's guidelines and recommendations.
- In the area of national rules and regulations for export controls, States may need assistance in establishing appropriate nuclear legislation. Export control groups such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group stand ready, through their outreach programmes, to assist individual States, directly or through the IAEA, with the establishment and adaptation of rules and regulations on the national level.
The 2005 NPT Review Conference will be an opportunity to review developments in export controls over the last five years, and in particular to address the question of standards and their implementation by Member States. This will be an opportunity for the Zangger Committee to present its report to the Conference and also to seek guidance for its future work. Since 2000, in line with the NPT's "enhanced review mechanism", the Committee has been reviewing its understandings in order to include all standards described above. It will present the status of this review to the Conference.
The Conference should guide the Committee in order to make sure that its understandings comprise the most recent state of the art of export control requirements. As the Committee wishes to meet its function as "faithful interpreter" of the NPT export control provisions, it takes account of such guidance by the NPT States.
Fritz W. Schmidt was Director of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Authority in the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economy and Labour and Chair of the Zangger Committee (NPT Exporters' Committee). He dealt with nuclear non-proliferation matters since 1971 and participated in all six NPT Review Conferences to date. Dr. Schmidt passed away in early 2005, a loss mourned by the international community.
- CONTENTS
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2005
- What next for the NPT?
- The World's Non-Proliferation Regime in Time
- Nuclear Law & Disorder
- Farewell to Arms
- Reframing the Debate Against Nuclear Weapons
- The IAEA & the NPT
- Upgrading Nuclear Safeguards in Kazakhstan
- IAEA Technical Cooperation & the NPT
- Nuclear Export Controls
- The Right Moves for Nuclear & Global Security
- A Race We Can Win
- Nuclear Fuel Cycle
- GTRI Moves Ahead
- Obstacles & Opportunities
- Nuclear Technology & the Developing World
- Fast Forward for the United Nations
- End the Nuclear Threat
- How We Think About Peace & Security
- Rethinking a Dangerous Game of Chance
- Shared Pledge, Shared Vision
- Text & Members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
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