International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular (Unofficial electronic edition)

INFCIRC/419 8 April 1993 GENERAL Distr. Original: ENGLISH

1. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met on 31 March and 1 April 1993 to consider a "Report by the Director General on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Board on 25 February 1993 (GOV/2636) and of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403)".

2. On 1 April, the Board adopted the resolution reproduced in Annex 1. In operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Board,

   "Finds, based on the Report of the Director General, that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. "

   In operative paragraph 2, the Board,

   "Further finds, pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

   In operative paragraph 4, the Board,

   "Decides, as required by Article XII.C. of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations,"

   and in operative paragraph 5,

   "Requests the Director General to make the report referred to in operative paragraph 4 above on behalf of the Board. "

3. The present report is made pursuant to operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution. It sets out the background to and basis on which the Board of Governors, through the Director General of the Agency, now brings its findings to the attention of all Members of the Agency.

   (A) Implementation of the DPRK's Agreement with the Agency

4. The DPRK acceded to the NPT in December 1985. Article III.1 of the Treaty provides that

   "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices"..........

   "The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere".

5. The Agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the NPT (Annex 2) entered into force on 10 April 1992. Pursuant to Article 62 of the Agreement, the DPRK submitted on 4 May 1992 an Initial Report on nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. Pursuant to Article 71(a), ad hoc inspections were begun in May 1992 to verify the correctness of the information contained in the Initial Report and to assess its completeness.

6. Among the activities carried out during the ad hoc inspections was the sampling of material presented for verification at a nearly-completed spent fuel reprocessing facility referred to as the Radiochemical Laboratory. The material had been declared by the DPRK as the plutonium product and associated waste solutions resulting from a campaign carried out in 1990, involving the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements from the DPRK's 5 MWe Experimental Power Reactor. The DPRK stated that only one reprocessing campaign had been carried out at the Radiochemical Laboratory.

7. As a result of inspection activities, apparent inconsistencies began to emerge in July 1992. In particular, it was not possible to reconcile information declared by the DPRK regarding the irradiation history of the reprocessed fuel and the details of the reprocessing campaign with the findings of the Agency's verification activities. The specific differences included:
   1. The characteristics of the declared and presented plutonium product are not consistent with the irradiation history of the fuel declared by the DPRK to have been processed during the single reprocessing campaign;

   2. The characteristics of the presented plutonium product and waste and the declared irradiation history of the reprocessed fuel are mutually inconsistent and inconsistent with the declaration that they resulted from the single campaign.

8. In an effort to resolve these and related inconsistencies, the Agency undertook additional sampling activities, requested access to operating records of the relevant facilities, solicited clarifications from the DPRK authorities and requested that Agency officials be permitted to visit two sites located in the Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Centre that the Agency had reason to believe were related to nuclear waste. During the brief visits permitted, respectively, on 11 and 14 September, following the third ad hoc inspection, one of the sites was found not to be nuclear-related. The visit to the other site was limited to the visible part of what appeared to be a one-storey building under military control. However, subsequent information indicates that the building has an additional below-ground level which was not visited.

9. Additional information was obtained during the fourth inspection, but the significant inconsistencies remained unresolved. In response to the Director General's proposal in November to send senior Agency officials to the DPRK for discussions, the DPRK proposed instead that these be held in Vienna.

10. In a meeting in Vienna from 30 November to 1 December 1992, the DPRK Minister of Atomic Energy, Minister Choi, was advised in detail of the Agency's concerns: there was an urgent need to clarify the inconsistencies between the information which the DPRK had provided on the spent fuel said to have been reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory and the Agency's findings; the Agency needed to revisit the site visited by Agency officials on 14 September, in particular, to obtain access to and take samples from the below-ground level of the building. At the meeting it was understood that the DPRK would provide to the sixth IAEA inspection team (January 1993) the information necessary to resolve the inconsistencies and that the DPRK would respond to the Agency's request to revisit the building site. In this connection, in a cable dated 22 December 1992, the Director General, inter alia, made clear that, although the DPRK had stressed that the building was under military control, the Agency's interest in it was confined to ascertaining the purpose and use of the spaces under the floor of the building. The Director General also indicated the possible need to visit a second site in the Nyongbyon Centre.

11. In a series of exchanges between Minister Choi and the Director General, the DPRK objected to such a visit and the taking of samples, emphasizing in particular that the location previously visited was on a military site not relevant to the DPRK's nuclear activities. The Director General reiterated that the Agency had no interest in military, non-nuclear aspects of any site to be visited, but that a site could not be exempted from visits or inspections on the basis of its military character if, as was the case in this instance, the Agency had reason to believe such access to be relevant to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.

12. All these points were again emphasized during the visit of a team of senior Agency officials to the DPRK from 20-22 January 1993. The Agency team also explained that, in the absence of clarification of the inconsistencies, the Agency could not exclude the possibility that material from either the IRT Research Reactor or the 5 MWe Experimental Power Reactor had been reprocessed but not declared to the IAEA. In the light of this, the presence in the DPRK of additional plutonium -- grams or kilograms -- could not be precluded. The team underlined the Agency's need for prompt access to the two sites, having specified during the consultations the location of the second site in the Nyongbyon Centre, and indicated its preparedness to carry out such a visit.

13. The DPRK objected to and declined to permit the proposed visits not only on the grounds that they would require access to military non-nuclear sites but also because in requesting access to them the Agency had made use of information from a third party. The Agency team explained that inconsistencies identified as a result of the analysis of samples of nuclear material and waste and of information provided by the DPRK had cast doubts on the completeness of the Initial Report of the DPRK and that, against this background, the information in the possession of the Agency with regard to the two sites could not be ignored.

14. The inconsistencies were again discussed in depth during the visit of the sixth Agency inspection team to the DPRK (January 1993). Although some additional information was provided by the DPRK, satisfactory explanations and adequate documentary evidence were not offered. Nor was the inspection team's offer of its availability for any visits to the two apparently nuclear waste-related sites accepted.

15. On the basis of the results of verification activities carried out over a period of many months, and taking into account the consultations held with the DPRK in extensive but unsuccessful efforts to resolve the inconsistencies identified by the Agency, it was concluded that the information made available by the DPRK, including explanations, was not adequate to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement, in particular, to confirm the correctness and completeness of the Initial Report on the inventory of nuclear material in the DPRK.

16. Against this background, the Director General, on 9 February 1993, requested the DPRK to provide access under Article 73(b) to additional information and locations relating to the following:
    1. With respect to additional information, the Agency needed clarification of the inconsistencies between the information provided by the DPRK and the Agency's findings concerning the plutonium product which had been declared and presented, as well as the associated wastes and their characteristics. Further information was necessary to clarify the inconsistencies noted, such as relevant historical records, and records concerning waste and waste disposal sites. The list of principal inconsistencies was attached.

    2. With respect to additional locations, and as a part of the necessary clarification, it was essential to obtain access to, and take samples from, two sites which the Secretariat has reason to believe are nuclear waste-related:
       1. The site which Agency officials had visited on 14 September 1992 and which was located east of the Radiochemical Laboratory; and

       2. A site on the opposite side of the road from a nuclear waste storage site shown to Agency inspectors.

17. On 15 February 1993, a reply was received in which the Minister of Atomic Energy of the DPRK said that he would come to Vienna with experts to present further clarification. However, despite the Agency's lengthy discussions with Minister Choi and his delegation on 20-21 February, no meaningful progress was made.

    (B) Meetings of the IAEA Bboard of Governors

18. On 22 February 1993 the Director General submitted a report on the matter to the Board of Governors, which on 25 February 1993, adopted resolution GOV/2636 (Annex 3) inter alia calling upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full cooperation to the IAEA to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of 9 February 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites. The Board of Governors decided that access to the additional information and sites was essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403. The Director General was requested to continue dialogue with the DPRK with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of the resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose.

19. On 26 February, the Director General forwarded the text of the resolution to the DPRK, requesting the co-operation of the DPRK in its implementation (Annex 4). In particular, the Director General asked that the DPRK receive an inspection mission to seek additional information required by the Agency and to secure access to the two additional sites referred to in the resolution.

20. On 10 March, the DPRK informed the Director General that the Government of the DPRK reserved its consideration of the receipt of the inspection team, referring to the resumption of the joint military exercise "Team Spirit" by the United States and the Republic of Korea and the "state of semi war" ordered by the Supreme Commander of the DPRK from 9 March. (Annex 5).

21. On the same day, the Director General replied to this communication, advising the DPRK that the "state of semi war" could not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement. (Annex 6). He further requested the DPRK to consider positively the receipt of the inspection team at the earliest possible date.

22. The Agency subsequently received the statement of 12 March by the Government of the DPRK declaring its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a measure to defend its supreme interests. (Annex 7). In its statement, the DPRK indicated that this stand would remain unchanged "until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the DPRK and the IAEA Secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality".

23. On 12 March, the Director General wrote to the DPRK advising that the Safeguards Agreement remained in force until any withdrawal from the NPT took effect (Annex 8) and that a declaration of intention to withdraw from the Treaty shall not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement^*/.

24. On 16 March, the DPRK replied to the Director General's communication of 12 March stating that because - inter alia - "some officials of the IAEA Secretariat departed from the objectivity and impartiality and joined in a plot of a party in hostilities towards [the DPRK] which is trying to strangle our socialist system", the DPRK "cannot receive the Agency inspection teams". (Annex 9).

25. On 16 March 1993 the Director General reported these developments to the Board of Governors which, on 18 March, adopted a further resolution GOV/2639 (Annex 10) which, inter alia, approved the efforts of the Secretariat to implement the Board's resolution, confirmed that the safeguards agreement between DPRK and the Agency remained in force and that it was essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, requested the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue, taking all the appropriate contacts, and to report further on the response of the DPRK to the resolution of 25 February at a meeting of the Board to be held on 31 March 1993.

26. On 19 March 1993, the Director General forwarded to the DPRK the resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March, reiterating his request that the DPRK arrange for access by Agency inspection teams. He further advised the DPRK that, if access were not to be obtained, he would have no choice but to report non-compliance when the Board met again on 31 March. (Annex 11). The Director General further indicated that the DPRK's characterization of the two sites which the Agency wishes to visit as military sites, in no way immunizes them from inspection. However the IAEA was ready to discuss arrangements which might minimize security concerns, if such could be found that did not reduce the effectiveness of the inspection, including sample taking. Finally, the Director General expressed his regret about the statements in the DPRK telex of 16 March 1993 concerning the impartiality and objectivity of the IAEA Secretariat, stating that, in his view and the view of the Board, such statements were unfair. He added that the Secretariat consistently endeavoured to implement safeguards in the DPRK as elsewhere with objectivity and impartiality. This would continue to be its policy.

27. On 30 March, the Director General received a telex from the Minister of Atomic Energy of the DPRK regarding the telex transmitting the Board resolution of 18 March. (Annex 12). Although in that telex the DPRK has expressed a readiness to consult "on the implementation of the agreement" it has not granted access either to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with the safeguards agreement. In this context, the telex contains a reaffirmation that the issue of special inspections cannot be a matter for discussion.

28. In the light of the above the Director General reported to the Board on 31 March 1993 that "as of now, the DPRK continues to be in non-compliance with its general obligation to co-operate in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement provided for in Article 3^* of that Agreement. More specifically, it continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77^* and Article 71^* of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403 (Articles 18, 73 and 77) and also to deny the access required for the purpose of ad hoc inspections (Article 71). As a result, the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices." On the basis of that report the Board adopted the resolution reproduced in Annex 1.

INFCIRC/419
Attachment

Article XII.C of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

".....[Agency's staff of] inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations."

Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/403)

"If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Statute") and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Democratic People's Republic of Korea every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance."

The Board of Governors,

1. Recalling its Resolution (GOV/2636) of 25 February 1993 and Resolution (GOV/2639) of 18 March 1993,

2. Noting that there has been no positive response from the DPRK by the end of March,

3. Having considered the Report of the Director General (GOV/2643) and, in particular, the conclusions in paragraph 12, that the DPRK is in non-compliance with the terms of its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency and,

4. Taking account of the rights and obligations under that Agreement,

1. Finds, based on the Report of the Director General, that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency;

2. Further finds, pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

3. Calls upon the DPRK to remedy forthwith its non-compliance, including by granting without further delay access to specific additional information and to two locations as set out in the Director General's request to the DPRK of 9 February 1993;

4. Decides, as required by Article XII.C. of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;

5. Requests the Director General to make the report referred to in paragraph 4 above on behalf of the Board;

6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue to implement fully the Agreement and to keep the Board informed of any significant developments;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 2
INFCIRC/403
May 1992

Annex 2

Agreement of 30 January 1992 Between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

See INFCIRC/403

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 3
GOV/2636
26 February 1993

Annex 3

Report on the Implementation of the Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Resolution adopted by the Board on 25 February 1993^*/

The Board of Governors,

1. Having considered the Report of the Director General and the statements by the Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

2. Taking account of the rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/403),

3. Taking serious note of the significant inconsistencies between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declarations and the Secretariat's findings resulting from ad hoc inspections and sample analysis which remain unresolved despite extensive discussions,

4. Noting that on February 9, 1993 the Director General, acting on the basis of Articles 73(b) and 77 concerning special inspections, has formally requested the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to grant access to specific additional information and to two locations,

5. Recalling that at its December 1992 session, the Board reiterated the need for full and effective implementation of the Safeguards Agreement voluntarily entered into by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had called for full cooperation on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's authorities,

1. Calls for full and prompt implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

2. Stresses that it is essential to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Initial Report;

3. Supports the actions already taken by the Director General in this regard;

4. Calls upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of February 9, 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites;

5. Decides that access to additional information and two additional sites, referred to in paragraph 4, is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403;

6. Requests the Director General to transmit this Resolution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to continue dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues above, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of this resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further measures as provided for in the Safeguards Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

^*/ The resolution was adopted in closed session. At the same time the Board decided to issue it as a normal Board document available to all Member States.

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 4

Annex 4

Communication Dated 1993-02-26 from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK

As you are aware, the Board of Governors met on 22, 23 and 25 February to consider its agenda item, "Report on the implementation of the agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". At the end of its deliberations, the Board adopted the attached resolution without a vote.

Operative paragraph 4 reads as follows:

"Calls upon the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urgently to extend full cooperation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement and to respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request of February 9, 1993 for access to additional information and two additional sites".

In operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Board

"Decides that access to additional information and two additional sites, referred to in paragraph 4, is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403".

Operative paragraph 6 of the resolution

"Requests the Director General to transmit this Resolution to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to continue dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues above, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter not later than one month from the date of adoption of this resolution at a further meeting of the Board of Governors to be convened for this purpose".

I am addressing this telex to you to seek your co-operation in the implementation of that resolution. In particular, I ask you to receive an inspection mission that would leave Vienna on 13 March and arrive in Pyongyang on 16 March. Its principal focus will be to seek additional information required by the Agency as part of its efforts to clarify inconsistencies noted between the DPRK's declarations and the Agency's findings. The information now being sought was discussed in Vienna on 20 and 21 February between a DPRK delegation led by yourself and an Agency delegation led by me. The specifics are contained in a letter of 25 February from Mr. Schuricht, Director of Division of Operations A, Department of Safeguards to Mr. Choi Jong Sun, Director of External Relations, Ministry of Atomic Energy. In order to help prepare for the mission, it would be helpful if, to the extent possible, the requested information could be provided by facsimile to the Agency in advance.

The inspection mission will also be authorized to visit the two sites identified in my telex of 9 February to you, namely:

1. the site which Agency officials visited on 14 September 1992 and which is located east of the Radiochemical Laboratory

2. the site described in my letter of 15 January to you.

I would appreciate an early response to this cable. I very much hope that continuing dialogue between the agency and the DPRK authorities and full co-operation by the DPRK will lead to full and prompt implementation of the safeguards agreement as called for by the Agency's Board of Governors.

Yours sincerely
Hans Blix

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 5

Annex 5

Communication Dated 1993-03-10 from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK to the Director General of the IAEA

Dear Mr. Blix,

It is to acknowledge the receipt of your telex dated Feb. 26.

I have several times mentioned our view, position and the solution regarding clarification of "inconsistencies" and access of two additional sites requested by you. Nevertheless some officials in the IAEA Secretariat involved in the superpower's strategy against Korea presented the problems which could have been solved without any difficulties through the ad hoc inspections exaggeratedly in difference with reality to the February Board meeting, and thereby Board adopted the unjust resolution. It is very regretful for us.

Now the U.S. and South Korean authorities reopened the joint military exercise "Team Spirit" which was ceased and they are conducting the nuclear war exercise mobilizing the large-scale armed forces against us.

In this context our country has been put in the state of the semi-war by the order of the Supreme Commander on March 8, 1993, from March 9.

I have to inform you under the such political and military circumstances created in our country that we could not but reserve consideration of the receipt of the inspection team concerning the implementation of the unjust resolution of the February Board meeting.

Yours sincerely,

Choi Hak Gun
Minister, Ministry of Atomic Energy

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 6

Annex 6

Communication Dated 1993-03-10 from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK

Dear Minister Choi,

I thank you for your telex of 10 March 1993 replying to my telex of 26 February.

I understand your telex to mean that, as your country has been "put in the state of semi-war", you are not in a position to consider receiving an IAEA inspection team. I am bound to note that this cannot impede the implementation of the safeguards agreement.

In its resolution of 26 February, the Board decided that access to additional information and to the two locations referred to in my telex to you of 9 February "is essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification compliance".

In view of the above, I ask you to consider positively the receipt of the IAEA inspection team at the earliest possible date. As you are aware, I am to report again on the matter to the Board not later than one month from the date of the adoption of the resolution.

Yours sincerely,

Hans Blix

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 7

Annex 7

statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Pyongyang, 12 March 1993

A grave situation has been created today in our country, which threatens its national sovereignty and the security of our state.

The United States and the south Korean authorities have defiantly resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and, in coincidence with this, some officials of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and certain member nations following the lead of the United States had a "resolution" adopted at the February 25 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, demanding a special inspection of our military sites unrelated to nuclear activities.

This is an encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK, an interference in its internal affairs and a hostile act aimed at stifling our socialism.

The DPRK government sharply condemns the reckless nuclear war machinations of the United States and the south Korean authorities against the Korean people and decisively rejects the unjust resolution of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Proceeding from its anti-nuclear, peace policy, the DPRK Government joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has since fulfilled its obligations under the NPT in good faith. It was on the premise that the depository states of the NPT should neither deploy their nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsular nor pose any nuclear threat against the DPRK that the DRPK government signed the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and accepted the IAEA inspections.

Nevertheless, the Unites States remains unchanged in continuing its nuclear war threats against the DPRK, far from fulfilling its obligations under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state to withdraw its nuclear weapons from south Korea and remove its nuclear war threats against the DPRK.

The United States still maintains its nuclear weapons in south Korea and continues to reinforce its nuclear storages there with modernized nuclear weapons and equipment.

This serves to prove that the "statements" such as the so-called announcement on the "complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons" by the United States and the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" by the south Korean authorities were all nothing but a trickery to deceive our people and the world peoples.

Although an agreement on non-aggression was reached between the north and the south and the DPRK has been faithfully fulfilling its international obligations under the NPT and Safeguards Agreement, the proposed inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea remains yet to be carried out and our people's misgivings about the U.S. nuclear threats have not yet been dispelled.

Despite the strong opposition by our people and the world peoples, the United States resumed when the inspection of our country by the IAEA was going on the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, which it had suspended before the IAEA inspections of the DPRK started, thus openly increasing its nuclear threats.

The "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres run downright counter to the idea and purposes of the NPT which calls for respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty and stop to nuclear threat. The resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvres, a nuclear war rehearsal targeted against the DPRK, is driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to such an unpredictable extreme, which has compelled our country to entry a semi-war state.

Still more grave is the fact that the IAEA passed a resolution aimed at forcing a "special inspection" of our military installations, thus joining the United States in its anti-DPRK machinations to "internationalize" the so-called "nuclear problem" of the DPRK and to impose "collective sanctions" and "pressure" on it.

It is on the basis of the "intelligence information" fabricated by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the DPRK, that some officials of the IAEA secretariat are trying to enforce the inspection of our major military installations which are unrelated to nuclear activities.

As for an inspection of the military installation in question, it has nothing to do at all with the inspections under the Safeguards Agreement, and it is a matter outside the competency of the IAEA.

If we submissively accept an unjust inspection by the IAEA, it would legitimize the espionage acts by the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the DPRK, and set the beginning of the full exposure of all our military installations. Under our specific conditions in which the country still remains divided and exposed to the constant nuclear threats from the United States, it will be totally inconceivable to lay our military sites open to the enemies.

It is an old method of the United States to satisfy its demands one by one, that is, to demand the opening of one military site today and another tomorrow.

If we refuse to accept the "special inspection" of our military sites, the United States plans to charge the DPRK with ''non-implementation of the special inspection" and take the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations so as to impose "collective sanctions" on the DPRK. This is the very scenario which the United States has written in advance.

If we failed to hold in check such conspiracy of the United States and its followers, our entire nation would be driven into confrontation and war and be made a victim of the big powers.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat have broken away from their original standpoint of supervising the implementation of the NPT on the basis of impartiality and strict neutrality. Therefore they can never evade the responsibility for joining the United States in its anti-DPRK manoeuvres.

Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat insist so stubbornly on the "inspection" of our military bases, as dictated by the United States, while ignoring our demand for an inspection of the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the United States in south Korea. This is obviously an act biased in favour of the United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the DPRK.

Moreover, we can hardly repress our indignation at the application of dual criteria by the IAEA, which is putting pressure to bear upon the DPRK on charges of the alleged "nuclear weapons development", while tacitly approving the moves of Japan and south Korea for their nuclear armament.

The accession to the NPT by the DPRK government was intended to remove the nuclear threats of the United States against the DPRK, never to sacrifice its sovereignty and security for someone's benefit.

Because of the imprudent machinations on the part of the United States and its adherent force, each time we undergo an inspection of the IAEA the nuclear threats against the DPRK increase, and the peace and security on the Korean peninsular is not ensured but disturbed.

All these facts evidently show that the United States, those forces hostile to the DPRK and some officials of the IAEA secretariat are misapplying the NPT to jeopardize the sovereignty and security of our country, a non-nuclear-weapon state, and stifle our socialist system.

Under such abnormal situation prevailing at present, we are no longer able to fulfil our obligations under the NPT.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declares its decision to withdraw unavoidably from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a measure to defend its supreme interests.

The withdrawal from the NPT is a well-justified self-defensive measure against the nuclear war manoeuvres of the United States and the unjust act of some officials of the IAEA Secretariat against the DPRK. The DPRK's principled stand will remain unchanged until the United States stops its nuclear threats against the DPRK and the IAEA Secretariat returns to its principle of independence and impartiality.

The United States must give up its outdated way of thinking of the cold war era and immediately stop the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal, and refrain from manipulating the IAEA to discredit and strangle the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Even if the United States, the forces hostile to the DPRK and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat threaten us with the "special inspection" or a certain "measure", we will never be frightened in the least. No robber-like argument and strong-arm acts will go down with us. Whatever "military threat", "political and ideological offensive" or "blockade" cannot block the march of our people.

The DPRK government's policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purpose remains unchanged and our people will continue to make every effort to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our thanks to many IAEA member states and a number of the members of the IAEA Board of Governors cherishing international justice for their support and sympathy for the just stand of the DPRK.

Our rejection of unjust "resolution" forced by the United States upon the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is meant to defend our country's sovereignty and at the same time to safeguard the common interests of the developing countries.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people are convinced that the governments and peoples of the countries of the world that value peace and justice will pay a profound attention to the serious situation on the Korean peninsular and extend their support and solidarity to the self-defensive measure of the DPRK government.

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 8

Annex 8

Communication Dated 1993 03-12 from the Director General of the IAEA to the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK

1993-03-12

Dear Minister Choi,

The Agency has received, from the DPRK Permanent Mission in Vienna, a copy of your Government's statement of 12 March declaring its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT).

I expect to report very soon to the Board of Governors of the IAEA on the implications for the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK of such a grave step. The justification for a withdrawal will certainly be seriously considered by the Parties to the Treaty. For the IAEA, which is responsible for the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, under the Agreement concluded pursuant to Article III of the NPT, I am bound to point out that the Treaty and the Safeguards Agreement remain duly in force until any withdrawal takes effect, i.e. after three months advance notice to all other Parties and to the United Nations Security Council.

It follows that a declaration of intention to withdraw from the NPT shall not impede the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement. My request contained in my telex of 10 March that you "consider positively the receipt of the IAEA Inspection Team at the earliest possible date" therefore still stands

I can assure you that the Agency will continue as always to implement the Safeguards Agreement with objectivity and impartiality The sole objective is to seek clarity about the nuclear activities in the DPRK subject to safeguards.

Yours sincerely,

Hans Blix

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 9

Annex 9

Communication Dated 1993-03-16 from the Minister for Atomic Energy of the DPRK to the Director General of the Agency

Dear Dr. Blix,

I acknowledge the receipt of your telex of 12 March. It was agreed at our several meetings that the problems raised in the implementation of the safeguards agreement should be solved through consultations, and at that time, you recognized that any mistake could be made in Agency inspection and said that Agency would review it again since "principal inconsistencies" are not the matter unable to be clarified.

Nevertheless, before doing reviews and consultations you submitted "inconsistencies" which do not exist to some Member States without agreement with us and thus internationalized the matter of the implementation of our safeguards agreement, neglecting our sincere efforts for clarification of the "inconsistencies".

Moreover the nuclear threat by the U.S. against our country is being increased and "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war manoeuvre which was suspended are resumed and in coincidence with this, you submitted to the February Board meeting the report which is quite different from the real situation using the "intelligence information" fabricated by a third party and thus enabled the Board of Governors to adopt the unjust resolution of "special inspection" concerning our military sites not relevant to nuclear activity. This is a clear evidence showing that you joined in the plot of hostile country, a party in hostilities towards us which is trying to make our military sites open, to disarm us and thereby to strangle our socialist system.

The Government of the DPRK declared solemnly to withdraw from NPT on 12 March, because the increased nuclear threat by the U.S. against our country and unjust resolution adopted at the February Board meeting jeopardized the sovereignty of our nation and the supreme interests of our country. One of the major reasons for withdrawal from NPT is that some officials of the IAEA Secretariat departed from the objectivity and impartiality and joined in a plot of a party in hostilities towards us which is trying to strangle our socialist system.

In such circumstances, I make it clear that we cannot receive the Agency inspection teams.

I think you can never extricate yourself from the responsibility for all consequences resulting from this.

I ask you to circulate to the Governor's Member States this letter including my letters to you dated 14 and 27 January, 15 February and 10 March.

Yours sincerely,

Choi Hak Gun
Minister of Atomic Energy, DPRK

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 10
GOV/2639
19 March 1993

Annex 10

Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the Resolution Adopted by the Board on 25 February 1993 (GOV/2636) and of the Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403)

Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March 1993

The Board of Governors,

1. Recalling its Resolution of 25 February in which the Board called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to give the IAEA access to additional information and to two additional sites with a view to implementing the Safeguards Agreement of May 1992 (INFCIRC/403),

2. Regretting the absence, so far, of a positive response by the DPRK,

3. Noting the recent announcement of the DPRK regarding its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the implications for the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the DPRK if such withdrawal were to take effect,

4. Concerned, in particular, that this announcement comes at a time when the IAEA is seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material submitted by the DPRK,

1. Approves the efforts of the Secretariat to implement the Board's Resolution as reported in GOV/INF/683;

2. Reaffirms its full confidence in the Director General and the Secretariat, and its support for the actions they have taken to implement the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK in an impartial and an objective manner;

3. Confirms that INFCIRC/403 remains in force and that it is essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with that Safeguards Agreement;

4. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue, taking all the appropriate contacts, and to report further on the response of the DPRK to the Resolution of 25 February at a meeting of the Board to be held on 31 March 1993.

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 11

Annex 11

Telex from the Director General to the Minister of Atomic Energy, DPRK on 19-03-1993

Dear Minister Choi,

As you know, the Board of Governors meeting was convened on 18 March to consider my report on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Board on 25 February 1993 and of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK.

Attached is the resolution adopted by the Board on 18 March. As you can see, the Board confirmed that the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA contained in INFCIRC/403 remains in force and that it is essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with that safeguards agreement. To that end the Board requested the Director General to continue his efforts and dialogue, taking all the appropriate contacts.

I would therefore ask you again to arrange for access by Agency inspection teams to DPRK. If access were not to be obtained I would have no other choice than to report non-compliance when the Board meets again on 31 March.

I am aware of your statements that the two additional sites which we wish to visit are military. While this in no way immunizes them from inspection, we are ready to discuss arrangements which might minimize security concerns, if such can be found that do not reduce the effectiveness of the inspection, including sample taking.

I regret the statements in your telex of 1993-03-16 concerning the impartiality and objectivity of the IAEA Secretariat. I find them unfair and the resolution of the Board - adopted without a vote - took the same view. The Secretariat consistently endeavours to implement safeguards in the DPRK as elsewhere with objectivity and impartiality. This will continue to be our policy.

Yours sincerely,

Hans Blix

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INFCIRC/419
Annex 12

Annex 12

Telex from Minister of Atomic Energy of DPRK, Choi Hak Gun to Director General Blix

1993-03-30

Dear Mr. Blix,

I acknowledge the receipt of your telex dated March 19. As for the March 18 "resolution", referred to in your telex, I would like to make clear once again our principal position that we categorically reject it because the "resolution" is considered as an urging the implementation of the last February 25 "resolution".

In your telex you pointed out quote if access were not to be obtained I would have no other choice than to report non-compliance when the Board meets again on 31 March unquote, and it is another unjust act that you departed from the impartiality and objectivity and you are trying to solve our problem through pressure. In particular, recently you and some Agency's officials including the IAEA's spokesman are making the impression as if we were rejecting to implement the safeguards agreement as a whole. This is an act of talking black into white, and therefore we cannot but draw the attention of you and the IAEA Secretariat to unfair handling aimed at seeking other purpose by branding us as the "non-compliance".

It is the mutually recognized fact that we, so far, has not only fulfilled our obligation under the safeguards agreement in good faith but also provided all possible convenience and cooperation to the Agency even by granting access to important military sites so that the IAEA could discharge its responsibilities fully. All the facts show that there are neither justification nor reasons whatsoever for imposing on us the "false charge" and failure to comply with safeguards agreement is not us but some Agency's officials.

On this opportunity, I would like to reaffirm that the issue of "special inspection" you insist could not be a matter of discussion.

However I would like to make it clear that we are always ready to response to it if the Agency's Secretariat wishes to consult with us on the implementation of the safeguards agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Choi Hak Gun
Minister of Atomic Energy, DPRK

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^*/ Article 26 of the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK provides that the Agreement shall remain in force for as long as the DRPK is a party to the NPT. Having regard to the terms of Article X.1 of the NPT, it is clear that the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK remains in force for three months after notice has been given by the DPRK in accordance with Article X.1 of the NPT.

^* Footnotes:

Article 3

"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement."

Article 18

"If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute."

Article 73

"Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 77, the Agency may make special inspections:

1. in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or

2. if the Agency considers that information made available by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including explanations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 78-82 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both. "

Article 77

"In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 73 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may:

1. make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 78-82; and

2. obtain access, in agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply."

Article 71

"The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

1. verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;

2. identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the initial report; and

3. identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in accordance with Articles 93 and 96, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. "

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