The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)

Requirements for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material During Transport

8.1.   General

8.1.1.   The transport of nuclear material is probably the operation most vulnerable to an attempted act of unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage. Therefore, taking into account the State's design basis threat, the physical protection provided should be "in depth" and particular attention should be given to the recovery of missing nuclear material. Emergency procedures should be prepared to counter effectively the State's design basis threat.

8.1.2.   Achievement of the objectives of physical protection should be assisted by:

  1. Minimizing the total time during which the nuclear material remains in transport;

  2. Minimizing the number and duration of nuclear material transfers, i.e. transfer from one conveyance to another, transfer to and from temporary storage and temporary storage while awaiting the arrival of a vehicle, etc.;

  3. Protecting nuclear material during transport and in temporary storage in a manner consistent with the category of that material;

  4. Avoiding the use of regular movement schedules;

  5. Requiring predetermination of the trustworthiness of all individuals involved during transport of nuclear material; and

  6. Limiting advance knowledge of transport information to the minimum number of persons necessary.

8.1.3.   Appropriate measures, consistent with national requirements, should be taken to protect the confidentiality of information relating to transport operations, including detailed information on the schedule and route, and particular consideration should be given to those operations involving Category I and II nuclear material. This requires great restraint in the use of any special markings on vehicles, and also in the use of open channels for transmission of messages concerning shipments of nuclear material. When a message is required by safeguards or radiological safety regulations, measures such as coding and appropriate routing to the extent practicable should be taken; care should be exercised in the handling of such information. These considerations should apply also to any subsequent communications.

8.1.4.    An evaluation of the potential for sabotage and associated radiological consequences of a package design with respect to its mode of transport may be required by the State's competent authority. This should be done in close consultation with safety specialists.

8.1.5.    Before an international shipment is made the shipper should ensure that the arrangements are in accordance with the physical protection regulations of the receiving State and of other States which are transited.

8.2.   Requirements for Category I Nuclear Material

8.2.1.   Advance notification to receiver

8.2.1.1.    The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the planned shipment specifying the mode of transport (road/rail/sea/air), the estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact point of hand-over if this is to be done at some intermediate point before the ultimate destination.

8.2.1.2.    The receiver should confirm his readiness to accept delivery immediately (and hand-over, if applicable) at the expected time, prior to commencement of the shipment.

8.2.2.   Advance authorization

8.2.2.1.    Advance authorization by the competent authority is required. This implies the performance of a security survey in advance. The consent to a transport operation can include specific limitations and conditions related to the particular circumstances and to whatever emergency plans have been prepared.

8.2.3.   Selection of mode of transport and routing

8.2.3.1.   In choosing the route, consideration should be given to the security of passage, in particular, arranging the route in such a way as to avoid areas of natural disasters or civil disorders and taking into consideration the capabilities of the response forces. The mode of transport for any given consignment should be such as to keep to a minimum the number of cargo transfers and the length of time the cargo remains in transport. The co-operation of the carrier concerning the implementation of physical protection measures should be ensured in advance.

8.2.3.2.   Competent authorities should approve the route, including alternate routing as appropriate, stopping places, destination hand-over arrangements, identification of persons authorized to take delivery, accident procedures and reporting procedures, both routine and emergency.

8.2.4.   Provision of locks and seals

8.2.4.1.   Unless there are overriding safety considerations, the packages containing nuclear material should be carried in closed, locked vehicles, compartments or freight containers. However, carriage of packages weighing more than 2000 kg that are locked or sealed should be allowed in open vehicles. Subject to safety considerations, the package should be tied down or attached to the vehicle or freight container.

8.2.4.2.   Checks should be made before dispatch to confirm the integrity of the locks and seals on the package, vehicle, compartment or freight container.

8.2.5.   Search of load vehicle

8.2.5.1.   There should be a detailed search of the load vehicle prior to loading and shipment, to ensure that sabotage devices have not been implanted or that sabotage has not been initiated.

8.2.6.   Written instructions

8.2.6.1.   Personnel with physical protection responsibilities should be given written instructions detailing their responsibilities during the transport which have been approved by the competent authority.

8.2.7.   Measures after shipment

8.2.7.1.   The receiver should check the integrity of the packages, locks and seals and accept the shipment immediately upon arrival. The receiver should notify the shipper of the arrival of the shipment immediately or of non-arrival within a reasonable interval after the estimated time of arrival at its destination. In addition, the guard should be instructed to report by two-way voice communications to the transport control centre his arrival at his destination and each overnight stopping place and place of hand-over of the shipment.

8.2.8.   Communication

8.2.8.1.   Physical protection measures should include provision of a continuous two-way voice communication system between the vehicle, its escort and the transport control centre. Redundant and diverse communication systems should be utilized, where available.

8.2.8.2.    For shipments by road, rail or sea, there should be a transport control centre for the purpose of keeping track of the current position and security status of the shipment of nuclear material, alerting response forces in case of an attack and maintaining continuous two-way communication with the shipment and the response forces. The transport control centre should be hardened so that its function can continue in the presence of the design basis threat. While the shipment is in progress, the transport control centre should be staffed by qualified shipper or State designees, whose trustworthiness has been predetermined.

8.2.9.   Guards

8.2.9.1.   Guards, who are appropriately equipped and trained, should accompany each shipment to protect the nuclear material against unauthorized removal or sabotage. Continuous, effective surveillance of the packages or locked cargo hold, or compartment holding the packages is to be maintained by the guard at all times, especially when the transport is not in motion. States are encouraged to use armed guards to the extent that laws and regulations permit. When guards are not armed, compensating measures should be applied.

8.2.10.   Emergency action

8.2.10.1.   Arrangements should be made to provide an adequately sized, equipped and trained response force to deal with emergencies. The objective should be the arrival of the response force in time to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage.

8.2.11.   Arrangements for international transport

8.2.11.1.   In contracts or agreements between shippers and receivers involving international transport of nuclear material, the point at which responsibility for physical protection is transferred from the shipper to the receiver should be clearly stated.

8.2.11.2.   When the contract or agreement involving international transport provides for delivery to a destination in the receiving State in the vehicle of the shipping State, this contract or agreement should provide that information be supplied in time to enable the receiver to make adequate physical protection arrangements.

8.3.   Requirements for Category I Nuclear Material Related to the Mode of Transport

8.3.1.   General

8.3.1.1.   In addition to the requirements mentioned above, there should be further detailed requirements for Category I material related to the mode of transport as set out below.

8.3.2.   Shipment by road

8.3.2.1.   Designated load vehicle(s) should be used exclusively for each consignment and should preferably be specially designed to resist attack and equipped with a vehicle disabling device. Each load vehicle should carry a guard for that vehicle.

8.3.2.2    Each load vehicle should be accompanied by at least one vehicle manned by one or more guards.

8.3.2.3   If the transport cannot be completed in one day, prior arrangements should be made for overnight stay at a stopping place approved by the competent authority. During such overnight stays the load vehicle should be immobilized or parked in a locked and guarded building or compound.

8.3.2.4   There should be two-way communication between the load vehicle and the escort vehicle in addition to communication between these vehicles and the transport control centre.

8.3.3.   Shipment by rail

8.3.3.1   Shipment should be in a freight train in an exclusive use wagon.

8.3.3.2   Accompanying guards should travel in the carriage nearest to the shipment.

8.3.4.   Shipment by sea

8.3.4.1.   Shipment should be carried out by a dedicated transport ship.

8.3.4.2.   The shipment should be placed in a secure compartment or container which is locked and sealed.

8.3.5.   Shipment by air

8.3.5.1   Shipment should be by aircraft designated for cargo only and for which the nuclear material is its sole cargo.

8.4.   Requirements for Category II Nuclear Material

8.4.1.   Advance notification to receiver

8.4.1.1.   The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the planned shipment specifying the mode of transport (road/rail/sea/air), estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact point of hand-over if this is to be done at some intermediate point before the ultimate destination.

8.4.2.   Selection of mode of transport and routing

8.4.2.1.   In choosing the route, consideration should be given to the security of passage, in particular, arranging the route in such a way as to avoid areas of natural disasters or civil disorders, and taking into consideration the capabilities of the response force. The transport method for any given consignment should be such as to keep to a minimum the number of cargo transfers and the length of time the cargo remains in transport. The co-operation of the carrier concerning the implementation of physical protection measures should be ensured in advance.

8.4.2.2.   Competent authorities should approve the route, including alternate routing as appropriate, stopping places, destination hand-over arrangements, identification of persons authorized to take delivery, accident procedures, and reporting procedures, both routine and emergency.

8.4.3.   Provision of locks and seals

8.4.3.1.   Unless there are overriding safety considerations, the packages containing nuclear material should be carried inclosed, locked vehicles, compartments or freight containers. However, carriage of packages weighing mor e than 2000 kg that are locked or sealed shall be allowed in open vehicles. Subject to safety considerations, the package should be tied down or attached to the vehicle or freight container.

8.4.3.2.    Checks should be made before dispatch to confirm the integrity of the locks and seals on the package, vehicle, compartment or freight container.

8.4.4.   Search of load vehicle

8.4.4.1.   There should be a detailed search of the load vehicle prior to loading and shipment to ensure that sabotage devices have not been implanted or that sabotage has not been initiated.

8.4.5.   Written instructions

8.4.5.1.   Personnel with physical protection responsibilities should be given written instructions detailing their responsibilities during transport which have been approved by the competent authority.

8.4.6.   Measures after shipment

8.4.6.1.   The receiver should check the integrity of the packages, locks and seals and accept the shipment immediately upon arrival. The receiver should notify the shipper of the arrival of the shipment immediately or of non-arrival within a reasonable interval after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

8.4.7.   Communication

8.4.7.1.   Physical protection measures should include provision of frequent communication between the vehicle and the shipper, receiver and/or shipper/receiver/State designee.

8.4.8.   Arrangements for international transport

8.4.8.1.   In contracts or agreements between shippers and receivers involving international transport of nuclear material, the point at which responsibility for physical protection is transferred from the shipper to the receiver should be clearly stated.

8.4.8.2.   When the contract or agreement involving international transport provides for delivery to a destination in the receiving State in a vehicle of the shipping State, this contract or agreement should provide that information be supplied in time to enable the receiver to make adequate physical protection arrangements.

8.5.   Requirements for Category III Nuclear Material

8.5.1.   Advance notification to receiver

8.5.1.1.   The shipper should give the receiver advance notification of the planned shipment specifying the mode of transport (road/rail/sea/air), the estimated time of arrival of the shipment and the exact point of hand-over if this is to be done at some intermediate point before the ultimate destination.

8.5.2.   Provision of locks and seals

8.5.2.1.   Where practicable, locks and seals should be applied to vehicles or freight containers.

8.5.3.   Search of load vehicle

8.5.3.1.   There should be a detailed search of the load vehicle prior to loading and shipment, to ensure that sabotage devices have not been implanted or that sabotage has not been initiated.

8.5.4.   Measures after shipment

8.5.4.1.   The receiver should notify the shipper of the arrival of the shipment immediately or of non-arrival within a reasonable interval after the estimated time of arrival at the destination.


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