The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)

Elements of a State's System of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

4.1   General

4.1.1   A State's system of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities should include the elements described in Sections 4.2. - 4.4. below.

4.1.2   The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection system within a State rests entirely with that State.

4.1.3   The State's physical protection system should be based on the State's evaluation of the threat. Other factors should also be considered, including the State's emergency response capabilities and the existing and relevant measures of the State's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. The recommended physical protection measures are intended for all nuclear material in use and storage and during transport and for all nuclear facilities.

4.1.4   A design basis threat developed from an evaluation by the State of the threat of unauthorized removal of nuclear material and of sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is an essential element of a State's system of physical protection. The State should continuously review the threat, and evaluate the implications of any changes in that threat for the levels and the methods of physical protection.

4.1.5   It is essential that the State's system of physical protection for nuclear material and nuclear facilities be reviewed and updated periodically to reflect advances made in the state of the art in physical protection hardware and systems or introduction of new types of facilities. Further, the design of a physical protection system for a specific facility may vary from these recommendations when prevailing circumstances indicate a need for a different level of physical protection.

4.1.6   The State should develop and implement emergency plans for any needed response to unauthorized removal and subsequent unauthorized use of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear material or nuclear facilities to support and supplement, when needed, those emergency plans prepared by operators.

4.1.7   The recommended measures are in all cases additional to, and not a substitute for, other measures established for safety purposes for nuclear material in use and storage and during transport and for nuclear facilities.

4.2   Legislation and Regulations

4.2.1   The State's legislation should provide for the regulation of physical protection and include a licensing requirement. The State should promulgate and review regularly its comprehensive regulations for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities whether in State or private possession.

4.2.2   The State should define requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in use and storage and during transport and for nuclear facilities depending on the associated consequences of either unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage. For protection against unauthorized removal of nuclear material, the State should regulate the categorization of nuclear material (see Chapter 5) in order to ensure an appropriate relationship between the nuclear material of concern and the protection measures. For protection against sabotage (Chapter 7), the State should establish the design objectives pertaining to off-site radiological consequences in order to determine an appropriate level of physical protection measures (e.g., making use of existing nuclear safety or radiological protection standards). Based on these analyses, the State should apply the more stringent requirements for physical protection, either those against unauthorized removal of nuclear material or those against sabotage.

4.2.3   Responsibility, authority and sanctions

4.2.3.1.    A State should take appropriate measures within the framework of its national law to establish and ensure the proper implementation of the State's system of physical protection. The State should be responsible for verifying continued compliance with the physical protection regulations and licence conditions through periodic inspections and ensuring that corrective actions are taken, when needed.

4.2.3.2.    A State should designate a competent authority under its legislation which is empowered to establish and ensure the proper implementation of the State's system of physical protection. If the elements of the State's system of physical protection are divided between two or more authorities, arrangements should be made for overall co-ordination. Clear lines of responsibility should be established and recorded between the relevant entities.

4.2.3.3.   The State's competent authority should have a clearly defined legal status and independence from the applicant(s)/operator(s) and have the legal authority to enable it to perform its responsibilities and functions effectively.

4.2.3.4.   The State's competent authority should have access to information from other State authorities on present and foreseeable threats to nuclear activities.

4.2.3.5.   The State's competent authority should have access to information from the State's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

4.2.3.6.   Enforcement of physical protection regulations is a necessary part of a State's physical protection system. Sanctions against the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and against sabotage are important to an effective State system of physical protection.

4.2.3   Licensing and other procedures to grant authorization

4.2.4.1.   The State should define a design basis threat as a common basis for physical protection planning by the operator and its approval by the competent authority. In the event of any change to the design basis threat, the State's competent authority should ensure that the change is sufficiently reflected in the regulations and by the operator's rotective measures.

4.2.4.2.   Physical protection measures can be implemented by the State itself, the operator or any other entity duly authorized by the State.

4.2.4.3.   The State should license activities only when they comply with its physical protection regulations. The State's system of physical protection should make provisions for a security survey of these activities prior to licensing, and whenever a significant change takes place, to ensure continued compliance with physical protection regulations. It should be noted that other regulations such as those relating to radiological protection and nuclear safety may also apply.

4.2.5.   Physical protection requirements for nuclear material in use and storage and during transport and for nuclear facilities

4.2.5.1.   State requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material should take into account the category of nuclear material, its location (use, storage, during transport) and the particular circumstances prevailing either in the State or along the transportation route. When considering the measures required for the physical protection of nuclear material against unauthorized removal or sabotage, the State should take into account the attractiveness and self-protecting nature of the material, the radiological consequences, and the containment measures used for safety reasons.

4.2.5.2.   State requirements for physical protection should be based on the concept of defence in depth for preventive and protective measures. The concept of physical protection is one which requires a designed mixture of hardware (security devices), procedures (including the organization of guards and the performance of their duties) and facility design (including layout). The physical protection system is designed specifically for each facility taking into account the State's design basis threat.

4.2.5.3.   The State's competent authority should ensure that the operator prepares emergency plans of action to counter effectively the design basis threat, including attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage taking into consideration actions of the response force.

4.2.5.4.   Several types of nuclear facilities pose a hazard to the environment in case of sabotage because of the potential for release of radioactivity. Therefore, it is important that the level of protection of the facility should take the radiological consequences into consideration.

4.2.5.5.   The State should define requirements for the physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage. They should take into account possible releases of radioactivity, the location of the nuclear facility, and the particular circumstances prevailing in the State. Adequate physical protection measures should be implemented for nuclear facilities which may be subject to sabotage regardless of the categorization of nuclear materials therein contained.

4.2.5.6.   The State's evaluation of the threat should determine if there is a credible threat to disperse nuclear material malevolently. The State should then apply the level of physical protection measures needed to ensure protection against the acts leading to radiological consequences without regard to the categorisation of the material.

4.2.6.   Additional physical protection requirements for nuclear material during transport

4.2.6.1.    During international transport of nuclear material the responsibility for physical protection measures should be the subject of agreement between the States concerned. The shipping State should consider, before allowing the international transport, if the States involved in the transport, including the transit States:

-  are Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274 Rev.1); or

-  have concluded with it a formal agreement which ensures that physical protection arrangements are implemented; or

-  formally declare that their physical protection arrangements are implemented according to internationally accepted guidelines; or

-  have issued licences which contain appropriate physical protection provisions for the transport of the nuclear material.

4.2.6.2.   During international transport between two States sharing a common border, the State's responsibility for physical protection and the point at which physical protection responsibilities are transferred from one State to another should be the subject of an agreement between the States. However, with respect to the maintenance of communication regarding the continuing integrity of the shipment and with respect to the responsibility for carrying out physical protection measures and recovery actions in the event that a shipment becomes lost, the agreement between the States should provide that this responsibility will rest with the shipping State up to the border and will then be transferred to the receiving State.

4.2.6.3.   When international shipments transit the territory of States other than the shipping State and the receiving State, the arrangements between the shipping and receiving States should identify the other States involved in such transit with a view to informing them and securing in advance their co- operation and assistance for adequate physical protection measures and for recovery actions on the territory of such States in case of loss of an international shipment thereon.

4.2.6.4.   In the case of a Category I nuclear material international shipment transiting international waters or air space, the shipping and receiving States should establish specific measures to ensure the maintenance of communication regarding the continued integrity of the shipment and to ensure that responsibility for response planning and capabilities is defined and fulfilled.

4.2.7.   Reporting of information

4.2.7.1.   The State's system of physical protection should include reporting of events and information which enables the State's competent authority to be informed of any change at nuclear facilities or related to transport of nuclear material which may affect implementation of physical protection measures.

4.3.   Confidentiality

4.3.1.   The State should take steps to ensure appropriate protection of specific or detailed information the unauthorized disclosure of which could compromise the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. It should define requirements for the confidentiality of physical protection systems and associated documentation.

4.3.2.   Management of physical protection systems should limit access to sensitive information to those who need to know for the performance of their duties. Information addressing possible vulnerabilities in physical protection systems should be highly protected as it could indicate means of successfully removing nuclear material or of carrying out sabotage.

4.3.3.   Sanctions against persons violating confidentiality should be part of the State s legislative or regulatory system.

4.4.   Evaluation of the Implementation of Physical Protection Measures

4.4.1.   To ensure that physical protection measures are maintained in a condition capable of meeting the State's regulations and of effectively responding to the design basis threat, the State's competent authority should ensure that evaluations are conducted by operators at nuclear facilities and for transport. Such evaluations, which should be reviewed by the State's competent authority, should include administrative and technical measures, such as testing of detection, assessment and communications systems and reviews of the implementation of physical protection procedures. Such evaluations should also include exercises to test the training and readiness of guards and/or response forces. When deficiencies are identified, the State should ensure that corrective actions are taken by the operator.

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