The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected)

Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage

6.1.   General

6.1.1.   The concept of physical protection is one which requires a designed mixture of hardware (security devices), procedures (including the organization of guards and the performance of their duties) and facility design (including layout). The level of the physical protection measures should be specifically designed to take into account the nuclear material or nuclear facility and the State's design basis threat. Emergency procedures should be prepared to counter effectively the State's design basis threat.

6.1.2.   Achievement of the objectives of the physical protection system should be assisted by:

  1. Taking into account physical protection of nuclear material in the design of the facility as early as possible;

  2. Limiting access to nuclear material or facilities to a minimum number of individuals. To accomplish this aim the State s competent authority should validate the operator s designation of protected areas, and inner areas. In designating such areas, the operator should give consideration to the plant safety design, the location of the plant and the design basis threat. Access to these areas should be limited and controlled; and

  3. Requiring predetermination of the trustworthiness of all individuals permitted unescorted access to nuclear material or facilities.

6.1.3.   Potential conflicting requirements, resulting from safety and physical protection considerations, should be carefully analyzed to ensure that they do not jeopardize nuclear safety, including during emergency conditions.

6.2.   Requirements for Category I Nuclear Material

6.2.1.   Category I nuclear material should be used or stored only within an inner area or inner areas, located in a protected area. The ceiling, walls and floor of inner areas should provide penetration delay against unauthorized removal of nuclear material.

6.2.2.   Access to and the number of access points into the protected area and inner areas should be kept to the minimum necessary. Persons authorized unescorted access to the protected area or inner areas should be limited to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined. Persons whose trustworthiness has not been determined such as temporary repair, service or construction workers and visitors should be escorted by a person authorized unescorted access. The identity of all persons entering such areas should be verified and they should be issued with appropriately registered passes or badges.

6.2.3.   All persons and packages entering or leaving inner areas should be subject to search to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. Instruments for the detection of nuclear material and metals can be used for such searches.

6.2.4.   Entry of private motor vehicles into protected areas should be strictly minimized and limited to designated parking areas. All vehicles entering and leaving the protected area should be subject to search. Private motor vehicles should be prohibited access to inner areas.

6.2.5.   Whenever persons are present in inner areas, those areas should be under constant surveillance. The surveillance can be effected by mutual observation between two or more co-workers (e.g. two-man rule).

6.2.6.   All employees should be informed at least annually of the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in their implementation as appropriate.

6.2.7.   Every nuclear material handler should be required to conform to procedures for transferring custody of the nuclear material to the succeeding handler. Additionally, nuclear material handlers should endeavor to ascertain on reporting for duty that no interference with or unauthorized removal of nuclear material has taken place, and report to a senior authority whenever they have reason to suspect that a discrepancy exists.

6.2.8.   A record should be kept of all persons having access to or possession of keys or key-cards concerned with the containment or storage of nuclear material. Arrangements should be made for:

(a) The checking and custody of keys or key-cards, particularly to minimize the possibility of duplication;
(b) The changing of combination settings at suitable intervals; and
(c) The changing of locks, keys, or combinations whenever there is evidence or suspicion that they have been compromised.

6.2.9.   Movements of nuclear material within the inner area and the protected area should be the responsibility of the operator who should apply all prudent and necessary physical protection measures. Movements out of or between two protected areas should be treated in full compliance with the requirements for nuclear material during transport, after taking account of prevailing conditions.

6.2.10.   Intrusion detection should be performed at the physical barrier surrounding the protected area and timely assessment should be carried out. Clear areas should be provided on both sides of the physical barrier with illumination sufficient for assessment. To protect against unauthorized access or malevolent acts, special attention should be paid to all points of potential access. The perimeter of the protected area should normally consist of a physical barrier in addition to and outside the building walls. In cases where the walls of a building are of a specially solid construction, these walls may be designated as being the perimeter of the protected area under conditions specified by a security survey.

6.2.11.   Inner areas should be so arranged that the number of entries and exits is minimized (ideally only one). All emergency exits should be fitted with intrusion detection sensors. Other points of potential access should be appropriately secured and alarmed . Inner areas should not be sited close to public thoroughfares.

6.2.12.    Storage areas should be of the "strong room" type in design and should be located within an inner area. They should be continuously locked and alarms activated when not occupied. The issuing of keys or key-cards should be closely controlled and keys or key-cards should remain within the protected area. Access to storage should be strictly limited to assigned persons and to others only when under their escort. Where nuclear material is held in an unmanned work area, e.g., overnight, specially authorized procedures should be used to protect the nuclear material. Intrusion detection and assessment or patrols can satisfy this requirement.

6.2.13.   All intrusion detection sensors should annunciate and be recorded in a continuously staffed central alarm station to provide for monitoring and assessment of alarms, initiation of response and communication with the guards, facility management and, response force. The central alarm station should normally be located in the protected area unless its function will be more effectively performed in another area nearby. The central alarm station should be hardened so that its functions can continue in the presence of the design basis threat.

6.2.14.   A 24-hour guarding service should be provided. The guard force or the central alarm station personnel should report at scheduled intervals to the off-site response forces during non-working hours. Guards should be trained and adequately equipped for their function in accordance with national laws and regulations. When guards are not armed, compensating measures should be applied. The objective should be the arrival of adequately armed response forces in time to counter armed attacks and prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material.

6.2.15.   Patrols of the protected area should be provided.

6.2.16.    Dedicated, tamper-indicating transmission systems and independent power supplies, should be provided between the intrusion detection sensors and the central alarm station. Alarms generated by intrusion detection sensors should be promptly assessed and appropriate action taken.

6.2.17.   Dedicated, redundant and diverse transmission systems for two-way voice communication between the central alarm station and the response force should be provided for activities involving detection, assessment and response. Also, dedicated two-way voice communication should be provided between guards and the central alarm station.

6.2.18.   Emergency plans of action should be prepared to counter effectively any attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material. Such plans should provide for the training of guards and response forces in their actions in case of an emergency. They should also provide for appropriate response by guards or response forces to attempted intrusion into the protected area and inner areas. The close co-ordination between guards and response forces should be regularly exercised. In addition, other facility personnel should be trained and prepared to act in full co-ordination with the guards, response forces and safety response teams for implementation of emergency plans.

6.2.19.    Arrangements should be made to ensure that during emergency evacuation conditions (including exercises) unauthorized removal of nuclear material does not occur.

6.2.20.   Evaluations of the overall implemented physical protection system, procedures and the timely response of the guards and response forces should be conducted at least annually by the operator to determine their reliability and effectiveness.

6.2.21.   Operators should regularly test intrusion detection, assessment and communications systems as well as other physical protection functions to determine their continued operability. When deficiencies are identified, corrective actions should be taken as soon as possible.

6.3.   Requirements for Category II Nuclear Material

6.3.1.   Category II nuclear material should be used or stored only within a protected area.

6.3.2.   Access to and the number of access points into the protected area should be kept to the minimum necessary. Persons authorized unescorted access to the protected area should be limited to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined. Persons whose trustworthiness has not been determined such as temporary repair, service or construction workers and visitors should be escorted by a person authorized unescorted access. The identity of all persons entering such areas should be verified and they should be issued with appropriately registered passes or badges.

6.3.3.   Vehicles, persons and packages entering or leaving the protected area should be subject to search.

6.3.4.   Entry of private motor vehicles into the protected area should be minimized and limited to designated parking areas.

6.3.5.   All employees should be informed at least annually of the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in their implementation, as appropriate.

6.3.6.   Every nuclear material handler should be required to conform to procedures for transferring custody of the nuclear material to the succeeding handler. Additionally, nuclear material handlers should endeavor to ascertain on reporting for duty that no interference with or unauthorized removal of nuclear material has taken place, and report to a senior authority whenever they have reason to suspect that a discrepancy exists.

6.3.7.   A record should be kept of all persons having access to or possession of keys or key-cards concerned with the containment or storage of nuclear material. Arrangements should be made for:

  1. The checking and custody of keys or key-cards, particularly to minimize the possibility of duplication;

  2. The changing of combination settings at suitable intervals; and

  3. The changing of locks, keys, or combinations whenever there is evidence or suspicion that they have been compromised.

6.3.8.   Movements of nuclear material within a protected area should be the responsibility of the operator who should apply all prudent and necessary physical protection measures. Movements out of or between two protected areas should be treated in full compliance with the requirements for nuclear material during transport, due account should be taken of prevailing conditions.

6.3.9.    Intrusion detection should be performed at the physical barrier surrounding the protected area and timely assessment should be carried out. Clear areas should be provided on both sides of the perimeter of the protected area with illumination sufficient for assessment. To protect against unauthorized access or malevolent acts, special attention should be paid to all points of potential access. The perimeter of the protected area should normally consist of a physical barrier in addition to and outside the building walls. In cases where the walls of a building are of a specially solid construction, these walls may be designated as being the perimeter of the protected area under conditions specified by a security survey.

6.3.10.   All intrusion detection sensors should annunciate and be recorded in a continuously staffed central alarm station to provide for monitoring and assessment of alarms, initiation of response and communication with the guards, facility management and, response force. The central alarm station should normally be located in the protected area unless its function will be more effectively performed in another area nearby. The central alarm station should be hardened so that its functions can continue in the presence of the design basis threat.

6.3.11.   Dedicated, tamper indicating transmission systems, and independent power supplies, should be provided between the intrusion detection sensors and the central alarm station. Alarms generated by intrusion detection sensors should be promptly assessed and appropriate action taken.

6.3.12.   Dedicated, redundant and diverse transmission systems for two-way voice communication between the central alarm station and the response force should be provided for activities involving detection, assessment and response. Also, dedicated two-way voice communication should be provided between guards and the central alarm station.

6.3.13.   Emergency plans of action should be prepared to counter effectively any attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material. Such plans should provide for the training of guards and response forces in their actions in case of an emergency. They should also provide for appropriate response by guards or response forces to attempted intrusion into the protected area. The close co-ordination between guards and response force should be periodically exercised. In addition, other facility personnel should be trained and prepared to act in full co-ordination with the guards, response forces and safety response teams for implementation of emergency plans.

6.3.14.   Arrangements should be made to ensure that during emergency evacuation conditions (including exercises) unauthorized removal of nuclear material does not occur.

6.3.15.    Evaluations of the overall implemented physical protection system, procedures and the timely response of the guards and response forces should be conducted periodically by the operator to determine their reliability and effectiveness.

6.3.16.   Operators should regularly test intrusion detection, assessment and communications systems as well as other physical protection functions to determine their continued operability. When deficiencies are identified, corrective actions should be taken as soon as possible.

6.4.   Requirements for Category III Nuclear Material

6.4.1.   Category III nuclear material should be used or stored only within an area to which access is controlled.

6.4.2.   All employees should be frequently (about annually) informed of the importance of effective physical protection measures and be trained in their implementation.

6.4.3.    Movements of nuclear material should be the responsibility of the operator, who should apply all prudent and necessary physical protection measures.

6.4.4.    Provision should be made for detecting unauthorized intrusion and for appropriate action by guards or response forces to attempted intrusions.

6.4.5.    Emergency plans of action should be prepared to counter effectively any attempted unauthorized removal of nuclear material. Such plans should provide for the training of facility personnel in their actions in case of an emergency. They should also provide for appropriate response by guards or response forces to attempted intrusion.

6.4.6.   Evaluations of the implemented physical protection system and the timely response of the guards and response forces should be conducted periodically by the operator to determine their reliability and effectiveness. When deficiencies are identified, corrective action should be taken, as soon as possible.

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