



IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Security

**IAEA Safeguards Agreements
and Additional Protocols**



May 2005





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FOREWORD:

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei



One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen its safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realizing the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto.


IAEA safeguards are generally acknowledged to be a credible means by which the international community can be assured that nuclear material and facilities are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. An effective safeguards system functions as a confidence building measure, an early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the international community. It does not prevent States from acquiring nuclear material, facilities or technology. In fact, adhering to the Agency's safeguards system is a responsibility to be assumed by all States wishing to benefit from applications of nuclear techniques and technology for such diverse purposes as treating cancer, optimizing the use of scarce water resources, developing high yield varieties of crops, eradicating insect pests and boosting industrial performance.



Today, nearly 50 years after the Agency's founding, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered in recent years with regard to verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour. I believe that, for the Agency to be able to fulfil its verification responsibilities in a credible manner, the additional protocol must become the standard for all countries that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.



“The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities.”





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


1. The Important Role of IAEA Safeguards

Ever since the Agency was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has provided an indispensable instrument for nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all of their source or special fissionable material. Article III of the NPT provides that all NNWS must “accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under [the NPT]...”. Such negotiations are to be initiated no later than on the day that the State deposits its instrument of ratification or accession to the NPT, and concluded within 18 months.

In the context of the NPT, the IAEA is thus charged with providing the international community with credible assurance that any nuclear material in peaceful use is not being diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In addition, the Agency, through its safeguards system, verifies compliance in the context of the different regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. This task can only be realized in States that have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, for the Agency to ensure the absence of possible undeclared material and activities, States should have in force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements, based on the model approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. Calls for wider adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols have been made in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, by States parties to the NPT in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and by Member States of the Agency in resolutions of the IAEA General Conference.

The events of 11 September 2001 focused States’ attention on the importance of preventing terrorist or other criminal misuse of nuclear material or other radioactive material, as used in hospitals, research facilities or industry. The system of IAEA safeguards and related domestic measures constitutes a fire-wall against such threats. However, IAEA safeguards alone cannot ensure the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, or of nuclear facilities, from terrorists. It is the responsibility of States to undertake all the necessary safety and security measures, and to ensure adequate control of such material and facilities. But there is no doubt that bringing into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in this regard.



2. Strengthening the Safeguards System



Although safeguards have developed progressively since their inception, until recently the IAEA system focused mainly on nuclear material and activities declared by the State. However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme (despite an existing comprehensive safeguards agreement between Iraq and the IAEA), as well as subsequent events in the DPRK, demonstrated that an effective verification regime must also focus on possible undeclared material and activities. A number of measures to strengthen the safeguards system could be applied within the framework of existing comprehensive safeguards agreements. For others, the IAEA required additional legal authority.

In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which contains a number of provisions conferring upon the Agency the legal authority to implement further strengthening measures. The additional protocol is integral to the strengthened system. Its principal aim is to equip the system with better tools to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Model Additional Protocol, States are required to provide the Agency with an expanded declaration that contains information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear fuel cycle activities. The States must also grant the Agency broader rights of access and enable it to use the most advanced technologies.

Previously, routine access was generally limited to specific "strategic points" in declared facilities. An additional protocol requires a State to provide access to any place on a nuclear site and to other locations where nuclear material is, or may be, present. The State is required to provide access to all locations that are, or could be, engaged in activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle and, in cases where such access may not be possible, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements without delay through other means. The Model Additional Protocol also provides for certain improved administrative procedures including streamlined procedures for designating inspectors and providing them with visas; and improved means by which inspectors may communicate with Agency Headquarters.



The strengthened system is based on a political commitment to support an "intelligent" verification system — one where qualitative assessment takes place alongside quantitative accounting measures. States have recognized and committed themselves to a common, societal objective; bound themselves to certain material obligations; and granted an impartial inspectorate the necessary authority to verify compliance with the commitments.

INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS

In States that have both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force, the Agency will, in due course, be able to implement an optimal combination of all safeguards measures. Towards that end, it is giving priority to the development of "integrated safeguards", which will result from integrating "traditional" safeguards measures, based on nuclear material accountancy, with the new safeguards strengthening measures, so as to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. The process of defining the optimum combination of measures is being developed on a non-discriminatory basis for each State that has a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol in force.

SOUTH AFRICA REJECTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Following its historical decision voluntarily to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and dismantle its existing nuclear weapons, South Africa adhered to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State on 10 July 1991. It promptly concluded an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 16 September the same year. The IAEA performed the task of verifying South Africa's dismantlement undertakings, and was tasked by the 1992 General Conference to report on the correctness and completeness of South Africa's initial NPT declarations. The South African experience gave the Agency important operational experience, and contributed positively to the development of strengthened safeguards.

Consistent with its strong commitment to global disarmament and non-proliferation, South Africa took the decision, in 2002, that it would adhere to the additional protocol, making it one of the first African countries with such a protocol. In June 2002, South Africa hosted a regional IAEA seminar on the importance of safeguards agreements and additional protocols for nuclear non-proliferation, attended by nearly 100 participants, including from 36 African countries. In her opening address to that meeting, the South African Minister Susan Shabango said, *"If the Agency is to be able to perform its responsibilities it must be given the corresponding authority. We believe all African states should embrace the safeguards agreements and additional protocols"*. To date, nearly a third of all States in Africa have heeded her call.



Nelson Mandela addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations

3. Rationale for Participating in the Safeguards System



Fulfillment of international obligations: All non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are required under international law to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Only through the widest possible adherence to the strengthened safeguards system based on safeguards agreements and additional protocols will the full potential of the IAEA safeguards system be realized.

International security: With its verification role under the NPT, the IAEA's safeguards system is an indispensable part of the international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United Nations General Assembly, the NPT Review Conference and the IAEA General Conference have made repeated calls for its universal application. Strengthened safeguards also play an important role in the efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, and it is generally agreed that the Agency has an important role to play in this regard. By bringing into force a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, each State strengthens its ability to contribute to multilateral efforts towards the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Regional and national security: The importance of safeguards to regional security is demonstrated by the fact that all the existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties¹ require State parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Safeguards contribute to greater nuclear transparency, and fulfil the role of a confidence building measure in the context of regional and international security. The implementation of strengthened safeguards will enable the Agency to provide greater assurance with regard to the absence of any undeclared nuclear material and activities. This will help build trust in and between States, thereby contributing to greater stability and security. Members of the safeguards system may also be eligible to receive assistance from the Agency in order to develop a national system for better control of nuclear and other radioactive material. This will decrease the risk of such material becoming a health hazard or falling into the hands of individuals with malevolent intent.

Pursuit of development: Practically all States benefit in one way or another from the use of nuclear energy for development purposes. Isotopes and radiation are used in, for instance, health services, water resource management and agricultural production. Nuclear applications also improve industrial competitiveness in many sectors of development. Member States of the IAEA are eligible to receive assistance, through the Agency's technical cooperation programme, in developing national capacity to adapt these techniques to priority development needs, with the possibility for non-members to take part in some regional projects. Effective implementation of IAEA safeguards is vitally important for facilitating cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, it is generally agreed that such a pursuit carries with it certain responsibilities in terms of safety, security and effective oversight. Bringing into force a safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in order to achieve those objectives.



¹ Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific), Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia), Pelindaba Treaty (Africa).



“Bringing into force a safeguards agreement with an additional protocol is a fundamental measure in order to achieve safety, security and effective oversight.”



4. Reporting and Access Requirements

NUCLEAR MATERIAL REPORTING

The safeguards system aims to detect and prevent diversion, in violation of safeguards agreements, of the type of nuclear material that could potentially be misused for nuclear weapons purposes. Such “special fissionable material” comprises, *inter alia*, enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233. Other radioactive material, such as most radioactive sources and isotopes used in medicine, industry, agriculture, water resource management *etc.* are not the subject of safeguards.

Declarations pursuant to safeguards agreements and additional protocols for States that do not have facilities containing nuclear material are expected to be short and simple. The Agency has prepared a document providing guidance on the reporting requirements for such States. More elaborate guidelines have been prepared for States that do have facilities subject to routine safeguards inspections.

INSPECTIONS AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS

Through its activities in the field, the Agency seeks to verify the correctness and completeness of States’ reports and declarations regarding nuclear material. Inspections are used to verify States nuclear material accounts and design information on declared facilities. In addition, the Agency uses “complementary access” — a tool of the Model Additional Protocol — to help verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and related activities and the decommissioned status of facilities. In cases of questions or inconsistencies, such complementary access may sometimes be carried out at a wider range of locations. However, both inspections and complementary access can be expected to be rare or non-existent in States that have no or only very small quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear facilities.



5. Drawing Conclusions

For all States with safeguards agreements, the Agency draws an annual conclusion on the non-diversion of nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards. For States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, the Agency aims to provide broader assurances regarding not only non-diversion of nuclear material under safeguards, but also on the absence of any undeclared nuclear material or activities under the control or jurisdiction of the State. Such assurances are based on the Agency's evaluations, taking into account all information on a State available to it, including analyses of samples collected in nuclear or nuclear-related facilities during complementary access. The Agency's safeguards system provides the State with a means to demonstrate transparency in its nuclear activities and that it is complying with its non-proliferation undertakings.



6. IAEA Cooperation and Assistance

The Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination is focal point for the Agency's efforts to achieve the conclusion and entry into force of more safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Once a State has decided to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency, the IAEA is able to help the country with the implementation of related legal and technical requirements. Legislative assistance can be provided by the Office of Legal Affairs, for instance, in response to requests within the framework of the national and regional technical cooperation programmes. The Department of Safeguards may help States carry out some of the necessary steps for national implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols thereto (preparing initial declarations *etc.*).

7. Status of NPT Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

As of 1 March 2005, the IAEA had comprehensive safeguards agreements with 145 of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. There were 39 States that had yet to fulfil their legal obligations to bring such agreements into force. 90 States had signed additional protocols to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. For 67 of those States, the protocols had either entered into force, or were being otherwise applied. Progress with regard to the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT, as of 1 March 2005, is summarized in Annex 1 and the status of additional protocols can be found in Annex 2.



APPENDIX

How to Conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol

(based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) and INFCIRC/540 (Corr.))

Concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA generally requires two or three steps:

1. The State notifies the Agency of its intention to conclude a safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol, and asks the Agency to submit the draft text(s) to the IAEA Board of Governors for the Board to authorize the Director General to sign and implement it. The notification should contain information on the applicable entry into force procedure (see step 3 below). The text(s) will then be submitted to the Board of Governors, which needs to authorize the Director General to sign, and subsequently implement the agreement or protocol. The Board meets five times per year, generally in March, June, September (twice) and November. After this, the documents are open for signature. Model letters are provided in Annexes 3 and 4.
2. A representative of the State and the Director General sign the text(s). This may be done by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs or by any other Government official — such as the Resident Representative to the Agency — with full powers to sign.
3. The State has two options to bring into force its safeguards agreement/protocol: either upon signature or on the date the Agency receives from the State written confirmation that its domestic requirements for entry into force have been met. If the latter option is applied, the third step required is for the State to provide such a notification to the Agency. A model letter is provided in Annex 5.

ANNEX 1

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States without NPT Safeguards Agreements in Force

Status as of 1 March 2005

Of the **39** Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) party to the NPT that have not yet brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency (*italics* indicate that the State has had an additional protocol approved by the Board):

* There are **9** NNWS with which such agreements have been signed but are not yet in force.

<i>Andorra</i>	<i>Gabon</i>	<i>Haiti</i>
<i>Mauritania</i>	<i>Niger</i>	<i>Oman</i>
<i>Rep. Moldova</i>	<i>Sierra Leone</i>	<i>Togo</i>

* There are **6** NNWS for which such agreements have been approved by the Board of Governors but have not yet been signed.

<i>Benin</i>	<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	<i>Marshall Islands</i>
<i>Palau</i>	<i>Turkmenistan</i>	<i>Uganda</i>

* There are **24** NNWS that have not yet submitted comprehensive safeguards agreements to the Board of Governors for its consideration.

Angola	Bahrain	Botswana
Burundi	Cape Verde	Central African Rep.
Chad	Comoros	Congo, Rep. of the
Djibouti	Eritrea	Guinea
Guinea Bissau	Kenya	Liberia
Micronesia	Mozambique	Qatar
Rwanda	Sao Tome & Principe	Saudi Arabia
Somalia	Timor-Leste	Vanuatu

ANNEX 2

Status of the Conclusion of Additional Protocols

Status as of
1 March 2005

STATE	BOG APPROVAL	SIGNED	IN FORCE
1 Afghanistan	1-Mar-05		
2 Albania	16-Jun-04	2-Dec-04	
3 Algeria	14-Sep-04		
4 Andorra	7-Dec-00	9-Jan-01	
5 Armenia	23-Sep-97	29-Sep-97	28-Jun-04
6 Australia	23-Sep-97	23-Sep-97	12-Dec-97
7 Austria	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
8 Azerbaijan	7-Jun-00	5-Jul-00	29-Nov-00
9 Bangladesh	25-Sep-00	30-Mar-01	30-Mar-01
10 Belgium	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
11 Benin	17-Sep-04		
12 Bulgaria	14-Sep-98	24-Sep-98	10-Oct-00
13 Burkina Faso	18-Mar-03	17-Apr-03	17-Apr-03
14 Cameroon	16-Jun-04	16-Dec-04	
15 Canada	11-Jun-98	24-Sep-98	8-Sep-00
16 Chile	10-Sep-02	19-Sep-02	3-Nov-03
17 China	25-Nov-98	31-Dec-98	28-Mar-02
18 Costa Rica	29-Nov-01	12-Dec-01	
19 Colombia	25-Nov-04		
20 Croatia	14-Sep-98	22-Sep-98	6-Jul-00
21 Cuba	9-Sep-03	18-Sep-03	3-Jun-04
22 Cyprus	25-Nov-98	29-Jul-99	19-Feb-03
23 Czech Republic	20-Sep-99	28-Sep-99	1-Jul-02
24 D.R. Congo	28-Nov-02	9-Apr-03	9-Apr-03
25 Denmark	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
26 Ecuador	20-Sep-99	1-Oct-99	24-Oct-01
27 El Salvador	23-Sep-02	5-Sep-03	24-May-04
28 Estonia	21-Mar-00	13-Apr-00	
29 Finland	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
30 France	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
31 Gabon	18-Mar-03		
32 Georgia	23-Sep-97	29-Sep-97	3-Jun-03
33 Germany	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
34 Ghana	11-Jun-98	12-Jun-98	11-Jun-04
35 Greece	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
36 Guatemala	29-Nov-01	14-Dec-01	
37 Haiti	20-Mar-02	10-Jul-02	
38 Holy See	14-Sep-98	24-Sep-98	24-Sep-98
39 Hungary	25-Nov-98	26-Nov-98	4-Apr-00
40 Iceland	9-Sep-03	12-Sep-03	12-Sep-03
41 Indonesia	20-Sep-99	29-Sep-99	29-Sep-99
42 Iran, Islamic Rep of	21-Nov-03	18-Dec-03	*
43 Ireland	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
44 Italy	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
45 Jamaica	12-Jun-02	19-Mar-03	19-Mar-03
46 Japan	25-Nov-98	4-Dec-98	16-Dec-99
47 Jordan	18-Mar-98	28-Jul-98	28-Jul-98
48 Kazakhstan	18-Jun-03	6-Feb-04	
49 Kiribati	10-Sep-02	9-Nov-04	
50 Kuwait	12-Jun-02	19-Jun-02	2-Jun-03
51 Latvia	7-Dec-00	12-Jul-01	12-Jul-01
52 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	9-Mar-04	10-Mar-04	*
53 Lithuania	8-Dec-97	11-Mar-98	5-Jul-00
54 Luxembourg	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
55 Madagascar	18-Jun-03	18-Sep-03	18-Sep-03
56 Mali	10-Sep-02	12-Sep-02	12-Sep-02
57 Malta	28-Nov-02	24-Apr-03	
58 Marshall Islands	1-Mar-05		
59 Mauritania	18-Mar-03	2-Jun-03	
60 Mauritius	14-Sep-04	9-Dec-04	
61 Mexico	12-Mar-04	29-Mar-04	
62 Monaco	25-Nov-98	30-Sep-99	30-Sep-99
63 Mongolia	11-Sep-01	5-Dec-01	12-May-03
64 Morocco	16-Jun-04	22-Sep-04	
65 Namibia	21-Mar-00	22-Mar-00	
66 Netherlands	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
67 New Zealand	14-Sep-98	24-Sep-98	24-Sep-98
68 Nicaragua	12-Jun-02	18-Jul-02	18-Feb-05
69 Niger	9-Mar-04	11-Jun-04	
70 Nigeria	7-Jun-00	20-Sep-01	
71 Norway	24-Mar-99	29-Sep-99	16-May-00
72 Palau	1-Mar-05		
73 Panama	29-Nov-01	11-Dec-01	11-Dec-01
74 Paraguay	12-Jun-02	24-Mar-03	14-Sep-04
75 Peru	10-Dec-99	22-Mar-00	23-Jul-01
76 Philippines	23-Sep-97	30-Sep-97	
77 Poland	23-Sep-97	30-Sep-97	5-May-00
78 Portugal	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
79 ROK	24-Mar-99	21-Jun-99	19-Feb-04
80 Romania	9-Jun-99	11-Jun-99	7-Jul-00
81 Russia	21-Mar-00	22-Mar-00	
82 Senegal	1-Mar-05		
83 Serbia and Montenegro	14-Sep-04		
84 Seychelles	18-Mar-03	7-Apr-04	13-Oct-04
85 Slovakia	14-Sep-98	27-Sep-99	
86 Slovenia	25-Nov-98	26-Nov-98	22-Aug-00
87 South Africa	12-Jun-02	13-Sep-02	13-Sep-02
88 Spain	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
89 Sweden	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
90 Switzerland	7-Jun-00	16-Jun-00	1-Feb-05
91 Tajikistan	12-Jun-02	7-Jul-03	14-Dec-04
92 Tanzania	16-Jun-04	23-Sep-04	7-Feb-05
93 Togo	22-Sep-03	26-Sep-03	
94 Tunisia	1-Mar-05		
95 Turkey	7-Jun-00	6-Jul-00	17-Jul-01
96 Turkmenistan	1-Mar-05		
97 Uganda	25-Nov-04		
98 Ukraine	7-Jun-00	15-Aug-00	
99 UK	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
100 US	11-Jun-98	12-Jun-98	
101 Uruguay	23-Sep-97	29-Sep-97	30-Apr-04
102 Uzbekistan	14-Sep-98	22-Sep-98	21-Dec-98
TOTAL	102	90	65

* The Islamic Republic of Iran and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have pledged to apply their Additional Protocols pending entry into force.

1) The Agency also applies safeguards, including the measures foreseen in the Model Additional Protocol, in Taiwan, China. Pursuant to a decision by the Board, the relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan, China are non-governmental.

OTHER PARTIES ¹	BOG APPROVAL	SIGNED	IN FORCE
1 Euratom	11-Jun-98	22-Sep-98	30-Apr-04
TOTAL	1	1	1

ANNEX 3

Model Notification Letter

Conclusion of a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol

(date)

I refer to your letter of (date), and have the honour to inform you that the Government of (State) has decided to conclude a safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for to the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT and an additional protocol on the basis of the model approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997.

Accordingly, I would request that the Secretariat submit the drafts, as contained in the letter of (date), to the Board of Governors for its consideration [at its (mm, yy) session].

Entry into force will take place [on the date on which the Agency receives from (State) written notification that (State)'s statutory and/or constitutions requirements for entry into force have been met] [upon signature by the representatives of (State) and the Agency].

(Signed)

Government Representative

ANNEX 4

Model Notification Letter

Conclusion of an additional protocol to an existing safeguards agreement

(date)

I refer to your letter of (date), and have the honour to inform you that the Government of (State) has decided to conclude an additional protocol to the safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for to the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT [and the Tlatelolco Treaty], on the basis of the model approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May, 1997.

Accordingly, I would request that the Secretariat submit the draft, as contained in the letter of (date), to the Board of Governors for its consideration [at its (mm, yy) session].

Entry into force will take place [on the date on which the Agency receives from (State) written notification that (State)'s statutory and/or constitutions requirements for entry into force have been met] [upon signature by the representatives of (State) and the Agency].

(Signed)

Government Representative

ANNEX 5

Model Notification Letter

Entry into force of a safeguards agreement and/or an additional protocol

The [Permanent Mission][Ministry for Foreign Affairs] of (State) presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to notify it that the constitutional and statutory requirements for entry into force of the [protocol additional to the] comprehensive safeguards agreement between (State) and the International Atomic Energy Agency [and the protocol additional thereto] have been met.

The [Permanent Mission][Ministry for Foreign Affairs] of (State) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest consideration.



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The IAEA contact point for information on the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols is the Office for External Relations and Policy Coordination. Queries may be addressed to:

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More information can also be obtained on the
Agency's Home Page: www.iaea.org



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