Introduction
What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons?
Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important?
What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide?
How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented?
What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification?
Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened?
How Much Do Safeguards Cost?
Despite a regular increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities to be safeguarded, IAEA Member States have essentially applied a policy of zero real growth to the IAEA's budget, which has not increased in real terms since 1985. The 1996 budget for safeguards, however, rose to US$86 million; in addition some US$14 million in extra-budgetary resources was contributed by individual Member States (See chart: Growth in the Amount of Nuclear Material under IAEA Safeguards and the Number of Safeguards Staff). A number of Member States also continue to offer valuable voluntary extra-budgetary support to safeguards in the form of expertise, equipment and analytical services.
In 1996, the IAEA's Department of Safeguards consisted of approximately 250 professional staff and 216 supporting staff. About 200 were field inspectors; the rest carried out a variety of support activities. Approximately 2,500 individual inspections were carried out at 574 facilities and other locations in 68 countries.
In theory, the material safeguarded could be enough to make approximately 65,000 nuclear explosive devices; but it must be noted that most of the material was not in a form that could be used for this purpose without considerable further processing.
Increases in the amount of material under safeguards, the requirement to apply safeguards under additional comprehensive safeguards agreements (e.g. in the newly independent States of the former USSR) and the enhanced measures to detect undeclared nuclear activities will initially require more resources. These will be sought, as far as possible, from resource reallocation while ensuring that there is no diminution in either the effectiveness of the safeguards system or the confidence that States are complying with their non-proliferation commitments.
