Introduction What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important? What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide? How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented? What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification? Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material? How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened? How Much Do Safeguards Cost? What is the Future of IAEA Verification? Conclusion Further Reading		How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened? Ever since its inception over 30 years ago, the IAEA safeguards system has evolved and been strengthened by the regular introduction of new methods and techniques, improving both its effectiveness and efficiency. With the end of the Cold War, the international community has undertaken a number of actions with the goal of eliminating the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction. Against this backdrop and prompted by experience in Iraq and the DPRK, the Member States of the IAEA have indicated their willingness to accept new obligations and associated technical measures that greatly strengthen the nuclear safeguards system. Ultimately the strength of the safeguards system depends upon three interrelated elements: the extent to which the IAEA is aware of the nature and locations of States' nuclear and nuclear-related activities; the extent to which IAEA inspectors have physical access to relevant locations for the purpose of providing independent verification of the exclusively peaceful intent of a State's nuclear programme; the will of the international community, through IAEA access to the United Nations Security Council, to take action against States that are not complying with their non-proliferation commitments. Since 1991, IAEA access to the Security Council has been re-affirmed, and the IAEA Board of Governors has approved a number of specific measures that greatly increase IAEA access to information and to locations. Some of the new measures are being implemented under existing safeguards agrements. Other measures require new legal authority provided for in a Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997. Measures being implemented under existing legal authority include additional information from States regarding facilities that once contained or will, in the future, contain nuclear material subject to safeguards, the expanded use of unannounced inspections, the collection of environmental samples at locations where inspectors now have access and the use of advanced technology to remotely monitor the movements of nuclear material. Measures provided for in the newly approved Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements include: information about, and inspector access to, all aspects of States' nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and any other locations where nuclear material intended for non-nuclear uses is present; information about, and inspection mechanisms for, fuel cycle-related research and development; information on, and short-notice inspector access to, all buildings on a nuclear site; information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies and inspection mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations; collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by the IAEA; and administrative arrangements that improve the process of designating inspectors, issuance of multi-entry visas (necessary for unannounced inspections) and IAEA access to modern means of communication. Parties to safeguards agreements will subscribe to the Additional Protocol through the same process used for the safeguards agreements. The measures as practiced before 1992, the measures subsequently implemented under existing authority and those provided for in the Additional Protocol are being integrated into a strengthened safeguards system. Safeguards has always required concerted actions by the IAEA Inspectorate, State authorities and nuclear facility operators. The strengthened safeguards system places an even greater emphasis on co-operation. It is still too soon to predict just how rapidly parties to safeguards agreements will subscribe to and implement the Additional Protocol. However, the ingredients are now in hand for a greatly strengthened and more efficient safeguards system. Environmental Sampling: Powerful New Tool Sensitive environmental sampling techniques can help to detect the presence of certain types of undeclared activities. Samples can be taken from surfaces of equipment and buildings and may also be taken from air, water, sediments and vegetation. Their applicability to the detection of undeclared activities, especially those relating to uranium conversion, fabrication and enrichment, is being steadily improved through the enhanced capabilities of the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in Seibersdorf, Austria. Field trials carried out by IAEA in a dozen Member States in the early 1990s have demonstrated that they are technically feasible, reliable and extremely sensitive. Sample analysis at SAL provides key information for IAEA's environmental monitoring activities.