Introduction
What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons?
Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important?
What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide?
How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented?
What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification?
Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened?
Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
The IAEA's verification system cannot physically prevent diversion of nuclear materials or the setting up of an undeclared or clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Under its current mandate, the IAEA acts not as an executive force but as an inspection, detection and alarm mechanism. It can neither force countries to sign the NPT or similar treaties, nor can it prevent a country from withdrawing from such treaties and IAEA membership. Moreover, the IAEA cannot prevent States which have signed only INFClRC/66/Rev.2 agreements from building and operating unsafeguarded facilities.
The ability of the safeguards system to detect diversion of declared material or the existence of clandestine nuclear activities is limited by technical considerations, by the resources made available by the IAEA Member States and by the extent of the verification which States are prepared to accept. The IAEA aims to have a high level of assurance that the safeguards system in a non-nuclear weapon State would detect the diversion of a "significant" quantity of nuclear material that could be used to produce a nuclear explosive device.
IAEA accountancy begins with the determination by the operator of the stock of nuclear material in a facility and the recording of that stock to which subsequent changes are also added. The results of periodic stock-taking by the operator and their relation to the corresponding inventory record are fundamental to nuclear material accountancy and to subsequent verifications by the IAEA. Any difference between the book stock and the physical stock is called "material unaccounted for" (MUF). MUF may arise from measurement uncertainties or other explicable technical reasons. If the MUF cannot reasonably be attributed to such causes, the IAEA must consider the possibility that a diversion has taken place.
The conclusions drawn from the nuclear material accountancy and the other measures used by the IAEA inspectors are sent by the IAEA to the State concerned. If there were evidence that a diversion of nuclear material might have occurred, a report would be made by the Director General to the Board of Governors. If the Board finds that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the agreement, the Board may take the actions provided for in the safeguards agreement, such as reporting to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to the Security Council, the only UN body with executive power to impose sanctions.
