Introduction
What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons?
Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important?
What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide?
How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented?
What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification?
Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened?
What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification?
Comprehensive IAEA safeguards have been applied since the 1970s, and no diversion of any significant quantity of nuclear material placed under safeguards has been detected, although minor discrepancies are often detected and resolved. The uncovering in Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf War, of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme was nonetheless a watershed in the history of IAEA safeguards. Also significant to safeguards evolution was the positive experience gained regarding the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear programme with full co-operation of the Government, and the experience of the IAEA in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) without similar Government co-operation.
Beginning in the 1980s, Iraq undertook an extensive programme to
develop the capability to produce weapons usable nuclear materials.
Although Iraq's major effort was in the production of enriched
uranium, it also separated several grams of plutonium from declared
irradiated nuclear material. Iraq's declared holdings of enriched
uranium were under IAEA safeguards, and it was only at a late stage
that Iraq decided to undertake a crash programme to divert some of
the safeguarded uranium. This programme was brought to an end by the
destruction of related facilities during the Gulf War.
The discovery of the secret Iraqi nuclear weapons programme has led to a substantial strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system to provide assurance not only that declared material is not diverted, but also that undeclared nuclear activities are not taking place in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements.
Important experience was also gained in South Africa. Following that country's announcement that it had abandoned its nuclear weapons programme before joining the NPT in 1991, the IAEA examined the relevant facilities and their associated historical data to verify that the programme had indeed been terminated and to ensure that all the nuclear material had been accounted for and placed under IAEA safeguards. Following South Africa's accession to the NPT in 1992, the IAEA General Conference requested the Director General to report on the IAEA's verification of the completeness and correctness of the inventory of nuclear installations and material included in the country's initial report to the IAEA. Many IAEA teams visited South Africa to examine the historical records of all nuclear-related facilities, and a large number of measurements were made of various types of nuclear material. The IAEA found no evidence that the list of facilities and locations outside facilities provided by South Africa in its Initial Report was incomplete. Moreover, the IAEA was not in possession of any other information suggesting the existence of any undeclared facilities or nuclear material.
Another important case is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). By the end of 1992, the Agency was able to alert the international community to the possibility of undeclared plutonium in the DPRK. In reaching that conclusion, the IAEA made use of all the tools available to it: enhanced analysis of data, including information provided from a third party; a request for a special inspection of additional sites and additional information; and interaction and dialogue with the Security Council.
Subsequent bilateral negotiations between the United States and
the DPRK resulted in an "Agreed Framework" in 1994 under which the
DPRK would "freeze" further development and operation of its key
nuclear facilities, including its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors
and related facilities, and would receive two light-water nuclear
power reactors. The UN Security Council assigned the IAEA the duty of
monitoring the "freeze" and it has carried out this task ever since.
Although the DPRK withdrew its membership from the IAEA, the Security Council confirmed that the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA remained binding and in force. Under that agreement, the IAEA is obliged to verify the correctness and completeness of DPRK's initial report in respect of all nuclear material in the country. Several rounds of technical discussions between 1994 and the present have made only limited progress. The DPRK has accepted some verification activities, such as IAEA containment and surveillance measures to verify the freeze. But it has rejected sampling and measurements requested by the Agency. As of mid-1997, the IAEA is still not able to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial safeguards declaration, and the UN Security Council is fully apprised of the situation.
Thus, while the case of Iraq can be characterized as late detection of undeclared activities in the context of prompt military action by the international community, the case of the DPRK was one of prompt detection of undeclared activities followed by a measured international diplomatic response.
