Introduction What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important? What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide? How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented? What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification? Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material? How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened? How Much Do Safeguards Cost? What is the Future of IAEA Verification? Conclusion Further Reading		How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented? Each non-nuclear-weapon State that signs the NPT or similar regional treaties agrees to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA for application to all its peaceful nuclear activities - and it should have no other - with a view to verifying the fulfilment of its obligations (Article III). To meet the requirements of the NPT, the IAEA needed to devise and put into place a safeguards system suitable for application to both simple nuclear programmes and to the complex nuclear fuel cycles of the advanced industrial countries that were expected to join the Treaty, i.e. a system applicable to reactors and to the conversion, enrichment, fabrication and reprocessing plants which supply and process the reactor fuel. This comprehensive safeguards system, devised in 1970, was set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The NPT, and the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok Treaties each require that all of the nuclear material in a signatory State be declared and submitted to safeguards. The Treaties also require that any nuclear material which the State subsequently acquires be also declared and safeguarded. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements the State undertakes to inform the IAEA of nuclear material which it imports or produces domestically. A critical element of the verification work of IAEA safeguards inspectors is assessing the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations concerning such material and locations. The IAEA uses "nuclear material accountancy" as its basic measure for the safeguarding of declared material. This control system serves to establish the quantities of nuclear material present in a nuclear facility and the changes in these quantities that take place over time, and is comparable, both in concept and procedures, to a financial accounting system. In some respects, the role of the inspectorate is analogous to that of an independent financial auditor. Both systems have the objective of building confidence: just as financial accounting builds confidence in the investing community, the safeguards system builds confidence in the global community that States are complying with their non-proliferation commitments. In terms of procedures, the basic elements of the safeguards system include facility design review and verification; maintenance of facility operating records; reports on facility operations; and on-site inspections. Facility operators maintain accountancy records for each facility and report them to IAEA at regular intervals. These data provide the basis for the IAEA's own independent verification activities, which include on-site inspections involving activities such as record checking and the taking of measurements. Two kinds of reports are made by the facility operators, through the national State System of Accounting and Controls (SSAC) of nuclear material to the IAEA: an Inventory Change Report (ICR) that provides details of all receipts and shipments of nuclear material in each category; and a Physical Inventory Taking (PIT) which includes a detailed list of the nuclear material existing in a facility's inventory at a given point in time. These data provide the basis for the IAEA's own independent verification activities. The safeguards methodology for a given country depends primarily on the design and type of nuclear facility and the type and quantities of material being handled there. The frequency and extent of IAEA verification activities is determined by technical parameters such as timeliness and "significant quantity" - defined by the IAEA as the amount of a particular material (e.g. plutonium or highly enriched uranium) needed to make a nuclear explosive device. Special measures - the use of seals on containers or doors, and surveillance by cameras and other devices - are used to monitor access to and use of the nuclear material, and provide complementary measures to material accountancy. In the past, the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities was limited. The State concerned was required to provide information only about material and activities it had declared. IAEA inspectors have never been permitted to roam about a State in a random search for hidden nuclear material or clandestine nuclear activities. Until recently, moreover, the Agency had no information available to it suggesting the need for a special inspection at an "undeclared" location. With access to greater information and broader access to locations (as provided for in a new Model Protocol recently adopted as an addition to existing safeguards agreements), the Agency's capability to detect any undeclared nuclear activities will be significantly enhanced. (For more on strengthened safeguards see Question VII). Member States also report to the IAEA exports and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear materials used in the nuclear industry. The IAEA correlates such information with the information obtained from the importing State about its declared nuclear programme. Such reporting has been done on a voluntary basis since the early 1990s. Under the new Protocol, States will accept a legal obligation to report such information. The reporting by Member States under the terms of the safeguards agreement gives the IAEA up-to-date knowledge of the total quantity of nuclear material in the State which is subject to the agreement. Correlation of this information with the State's declared nuclear activities is intended to provide the Agency with early indications of any diversion of declared nuclear material or the existence of undeclared activities. IAEA also systematically collects and reviews information appearing in the media and elsewhere about nuclear activities around the world, and about imports and exports of nuclear related equipment and materials. The Agency may also employ information from satellites or other means; it does not ignore any safeguards relevant information from any source, but it critically examines and corroborates such information with its own to assess its relevance. If any of the measures outlined above point in the direction that undeclared activities might be taking place, the IAEA undertakes further investigations. The first step might well be to ask the State for an explanation. If that is insufficient to permit the Agency to fulfil its obligations, additional access to information or locations may be requested in the form of a "special inspection."