Introduction
What is Being Done to Halt the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons?
Why Are IAEA Safeguards Important?
What Assurances Do Safeguards Seek to Provide?
How Are Safeguards Agreements Implemented?
What Specific Challenges Have There Been for IAEA Verification?
Can the IAEA Prevent the Diversion of Declared Material?
How Has the Safeguards System Been Strengthened?
Stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons is a complex task requiring international co-operation and confidence-building at all levels - bilateral, regional and global. Today, more than half a century after the tremendous destructive power of nuclear explosives was first demonstrated, a number of international political and legal mechanisms - including treaties and other agreements, physical security measures and export control systems - have been firmly instituted to help stop the spread of nuclear arms. Among these, the strengthened safeguards system of the IAEA plays an instrumental verification role.
Practically all countries around the world use nuclear techniques for a variety of peaceful purposes - for electric power generation, industrial applications, food production and medicine. Currently, some 44 countries have nuclear reactors, and scores of major facilities containing nuclear materials that are accounted for and safeguarded under agreements with the IAEA now operate in some 68 developed and developing countries.
Currently, only five countries are formally declared and acknowledged by the NPT as Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. A second group of countries have not joined NPT nor accepted "comprehensive" IAEA safeguards, but have well-developed nuclear programmes and the technological capability to build nuclear explosive devices.This group, commonly referred to as "threshold" States, consists of India, Israel and Pakistan. One country - the Republic of South Africa - had assembled nuclear weapons, but subsequently renounced and dismantled them. To date, only one country party to the NPT - Iraq - has been revealed as having had a clandestine weapons programme. After the 1991 Gulf War, the UN Security Council requested the IAEA to neutralize this programme. Finally, one other country - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) - has, over several years, prevented the IAEA from determining whether nuclear material was diverted from its reactor, and has not fully complied with the safeguards obligations it accepted as a party to the NPT.
There are several factors which can discourage countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The most crucial is removing or diminishing the political incentives for a State to acquire nuclear weapons. This may be accomplished through formal mili-tary alliances, security guarantees, regional nuclear weapons treaties, undertakings by NWSs not to use nuclear force against those not possessing them and offers of assistance in the event of the threat or the use of force against a given State.
Another positive factor has been the prospect that a country can obtain improved access to nuclear technology if it makes a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. This may have a bearing for countries wishing to make use of nuclear power and to those seeking improved access to the medical, agricultural, industrial and environmental applications of nuclear technology.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the global international agreement formalizing some of these incentives. It entered into force in March 1970 after being ratified by the three depositaries (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) and signed by 40 other States. The NPT was made permanent in 1995 at a meeting of States adhering to it. It currently has 185 State parties and provides - together with several complementary regional treaties - the foundations of legally binding non-proliferation commitments by countries around the world.
Like the NPT, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco, actually concluded before the NPT in 1967) requires its members to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985) also requires each participating country to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA that will be equivalent in scope and effect to an NPT-type agreement. This is likewise the case with the Treaty of Pelindaba (for Africa, 1995) and the Treaty of Bangkok (for Southeast Asia, 1995).
According to Article VI of the NPT, the five NWSs have agreed to undertake negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament. They have pledged to discontinue all tests of nuclear weapons by adhering to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature in 1996. Although not obliged to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements, the NWSs have agreed that IAEA safeguards may be applied to all or part of their civil nuclear activities in order to demonstrate that they will not derive any commercial advantage by not making these facilities subject to inspection.
A further element of the non-proliferation regime is restraints that many States apply to exports of materials and equipment which could be of use in the production of nuclear weapons. Most nuclear exporting States require that IAEA safeguards be applied to the entire nuclear industry in the receiving country.
Properly securing nuclear materials and facilities (doors, locks, alarms etc.) is also of paramount importance in the non-proliferation regime. It is the main deterrent and preventive measure against theft of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. Some protection measures used by the IAEA in safeguards activities, such as containment and surveillance, may be similar to physical protection measures used by the IAEA. But physical protection remains primarily a national, rather than an international, responsibility.
