Assurance that IAEA Safeguards are Applied to all Nuclear Activities under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

 The capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities is in large measure dependent upon the information being made available to it. IAEA inspectors cannot roam about a State in a 'blind search' for hidden nuclear material or clandestine nuclear activities. They must be directed to specific sites on the basis of information obtained by, or provided to, the IAEA. More information on a State's nuclear programme, and the proposed design of new plants, together with increased access for IAEA inspectors to operating records and to all locations within declared facilities, will contribute to greater confidence that nuclear materials and facilities are not being used for undeclared purposes (see picture: Mass spectrometers used for uranium and plutonium analysis).

Access to locations in addition to declared facilities would allow environmental monitoring to be carried out to further contribute to assurance of the absence of undeclared activities. Also, access to sites apart from those declared would enable the IAEA to confirm either the presence or absence of undeclared activities at specific locations (see picture: Environmental measurements -- an additional tool to strengthen safeguards inspections).

The IAEA has instituted measures to obtain and analyse the information required for these purposes. Measures now in place include:
  1. The early provision of information on the design of new and modified plants. Provision of this information by the State should prevent surprises, create confidence in the peaceful purpose of the facility and make it easier to prepare for its safeguarding.

  2. Systematic collection and analysis of the information which appears in the media and elsewhere about nuclear activities in the State and imports and exports of nuclear related equipment and materials. This information will complement that voluntarily provided by Member States.

  3. The voluntary reporting by Member States of exports and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear materials used in the nuclear industry. Most exports of such items can be reported to the IAEA by the exporting State as a result of its export control system. The IAEA will correlate such information with the information which it obtains from the importing State about its declared nuclear programme.

  4. The voluntary reporting by Member States, over and above the requirements in their safeguards agreements, of their imports, exports and production of nuclear material. This information, together with that provided under the terms of the safeguards agreement, will give the IAEA up-to-date knowledge of the total quantity of nuclear material in the State which is subject to the agreement. Correlation of this information with the State's declared nuclear activities and its accounting reports might give an indication of the possible existence of undeclared activities.

  5. The provision by Member States to the IAEA of information obtained from satellites and other means. The dominant view is that the IAEA should not ignore any safeguards relevant information from any source, but must critically examine and check such information before it makes any use of it.
If any of the measures outlined above suggest that undeclared activities are taking place, the IAEA must make further investigations. The first step will be to ask the State for an explanation. If this is unsatisfactory, additional inspection may become necessary. This could be in the form of a special inspection initiated by the IAEA, as foreseen under the safeguards agreement, or a visit at the invitation of the State.
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