Assurance Given by IAEA Safeguards

 The main aim of safeguards applied by the IAEA is the provision of assurance to the international community that a State is complying with non-proliferation and 'peaceful use' undertakings to which the State has committed itself in its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

BASIC UNDERTAKING BY THE STATE--A comprehensive safeguards agreement between the State and the IAEA contains "an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities...

In the case of comprehensive safeguards agreements, safeguards apply to all of the nuclear material in peaceful uses in the State for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In the case of INFClRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements safeguards apply to the specific nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material and facilities specified in the agreement for the purpose of verifying that such items are not used for military purposes. In both cases the State has an obligation to declare to the IAEA, at the time the agreement enters into force, all of the items which are subject to the agreement. The State also has an obligation to update this information and to declare all items which subsequently become subject to the terms of the safeguards agreement.

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE IAEA--A comprehensive safeguards agreement between the State and the IAEA provides "for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities..."

A principal result of the independent verification by the IAEA safeguards inspectorate is the provision of assurance that no diversion of the items declared by the State has taken place. IAEA verification is also intended to have the effect of deterring diversions by the risk of early detection. The assurance obtained from the IAEA as an effective and objective auditor increases confidence among States and helps to allay concerns which could provide the political motivation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, INFClRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements apply only to specified facilities, equipment, and/or material, and the State is not obliged to declare all its nuclear activities to the IAEA, but only those which arise from the terms of the particular safeguards agreement. For example, nuclear material which is generated as a result of the use of safeguarded nuclear material becomes subject to IAEA safeguards, but uranium mined and produced within such a State need not be declared to the IAEA or subjected to safeguards unless the State unilaterally decides to do so.

In the case of comprehensive safeguards agreements the State undertakes to inform the IAEA of nuclear material which it imports or produces domestically, and to provide advice on all locations at which such nuclear material exists. Another major element of the independent verification work of IAEA safeguards inspectors is an assessment of the completeness of the State's declarations concerning such material and locations.
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