Origin of IAEA Safeguards
The IAEA was established in 1957 as an independent intergovernmental organization in the United Nations family. By October 1993
it had 117 Member States. Their interests are represented through the lAEA's two principal policy-making organs--the General
Conference, which consists of all Member States, and the Board of Governors (see
IAEA at a glance) in WorldAtom.
Their decisions shape the lAEA's resources, programmes, and priorities. The aim of the IAEA as set out in Article ll of the Statute is to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". Article III.A.5 of its Statute authorized the IAEA "to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy".
The first section of Article III.A.5 refers to the original concept of the IAEA as a major supplier of nuclear material and equipment. However, IAEA safeguards are based largely on the second part of Article III.A.5. They are, broadly speaking, a set of activities by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a State is not using nuclear material or equipment to develop or produce nuclear weapons. Safeguards are not linked with either nuclear safety or the physical security of nuclear material. In both of these areas the States themselves have the primary responsibility even though the IAEA is given a growing role in these matters, e.g. in issuing standards, providing assistance and services and arranging for the exchange of experience.
The legal basis for safeguards which are applied to specific material and equipment only and not to the entirety of the State's nuclear activity is described in an Information Circular identified as INFClRC/66/Rev.2. Many of the States which have concluded INFClRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreements with the IAEA did so because States supplying nuclear material or equipment to them would only do so if IAEA safeguards were applied to the material or equipment in the recipient State. In the case of some countries, INFClRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements have come to cover all known nuclear material and plants in the State concerned. However, such States have no legal obligation to make known all their nuclear activities.
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