The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

 Efforts over the past forty years or so to prevent more countries from acquiring nuclear weapons have been based on several independent, but mutually reinforcing elements. The most crucial element is the political disincentive for a State to acquire nuclear weapons or to assist other States in doing so. The individual and collective effort to allay national security concerns which might encourage the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the most important means of preventing nuclear proliferation, because it seeks to eliminate the motivation to acquire these weapons. Similarly, States may be provided with incentives expressly to renounce the nuclear weapons option. Such incentives may include guarantees by nuclear weapons States not to use nuclear force and positive offers of assistance in the event of the threat or the use of force against the State concerned. Historically, such incentives have played a major role in limiting the number of States acquiring nuclear weapons. Another important incentive has been the prospect that a State may obtain improved access to nuclear technology if it makes a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. This has been important to countries which have wished to make use of nuclear power, and to developing countries which have sought improved access to the medical, agricultural, industrial and environmental applications of nuclear technology.

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)--Opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970 after it had been ratified by the depositaries (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and forty other States signatory to the Treaty.

As of 1 October 1993, 160 States have signed the NPT.

Central to the non-proliferation regime is the body of legally binding agreements (multilateral, regional and/or bilateral)--with the NPT being the pre-eminent multilateral agreement--in which non-proliferation commitments by States are enshrined. Coupled with such non-proliferation commitments is the verification carried out, on behalf of the international community, by independent inspectors from the IAEA. There are also regional and bilateral inspection arrangements such as those instituted by Euratom, the Brazilian/Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and various bilateral agreements concerning safeguards and co-operation between States. A further element is the system of controls which the majority of States apply to exports of materials and equipment which could be used not only in the civil nuclear industry but also in the production of nuclear weapons. Most exporting States require that governmental approval be obtained before such items are exported, in other words that the appropriate export licence has been applied for and obtained, and that IAEA safeguards will be applied either to the specific exported item or to the entire nuclear industry in the receiving State.

In addition, some States have national technical means, such as satellites, which collect information that can be used to alert the international community about possible breaches of non-proliferation obligations.
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