Safeguarding Nuclear Materials

Only five countries — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — are formally declared and acknowledged by international treaties as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), first signed in 1970 and made permanent in 1995, is the global agreement which aims to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting disarmament negotiations among the five NWSs. Today, the NPT has 185 State parties adhering to it and, together with several similar regional treaties, constitutes the basis for legally binding non-proliferation commitments by countries around the world.

To ensure that countries are meeting their obligations, the international community has mandated the IAEA to establish and implement a strong and impartial verification mechanism — known as the IAEA Safeguards System. Safeguards are a set of activities whereby the Agency seeks to verify that a State is not diverting nuclear material or equipment to develop or produce nuclear weapons. These activities include placing seals, installing cameras and verifying inventories, receipts and shipments.

Each non-NWS that signs the NPT agrees to conclude a "Comprehensive" Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities — and it should have no others. The IAEA had to establish a system adaptable to both simple nuclear programmes and the complex nuclear fuel cycles of advanced industrialized countries. Assessments and on-site verification by the IAEA seek to provide assurance that no diversion or misuse of items subject to the agreement has taken place. In 1996, about 2,500 individual inspections were carried out at 574 facilities and other locations in 68 countries. In theory, the material safeguarded by the IAEA could be enough to make approximately 65,000 nuclear bombs, although most of this material is not in a form that could be used for this purpose without considerable further processing.

Comprehensive safeguards have been applied since the 1970s, and no diversion of any significant quantity of nuclear material (enough for a weapon) has been detected, although minor discrepancies are often identified and resolved. The discovery in Iraq, after the 1991 Gulf War, of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme was nonetheless a watershed in the history of IAEA safeguards. It has led to a substantial strengthening of the system to provide assurance not only that declared material is not diverted, but also that undeclared nuclear activities are not taking place in States that have signed a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the Agency.

Today, Member States of the IAEA have proven their willingness to accept new obligations and associated advanced analytical measures that will greatly strengthen the system's capabilities. This includes the provision of more information about all aspects of a country's nuclear and related activities and facilities, and the collection of environmental samples. Some strengthening measures are being implemented under existing safeguards agreements, while others are based on new legal authority provided for in a "Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements" approved by IAEA's Board of Governors in 1997. With the adoption of the new Protocol by Member States, as anticipated, IAEA's Safeguards System will have much greater capabilities to detect both clandestine diversion and production of nuclear materials.