



PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

PART 1: Status of Implementation – 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010

1. General Conference Resolution

In 2009, in GC(53)/RES/14, the IAEA General Conference:

“[Noted] the commendable efforts of some Member States, notably Japan, and the Agency Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency’s updated plan of action (September 2009), and [encouraged] them to continue these efforts, as appropriate and subject to the availability of resources, and review the progress in this regard, and [recommended] that the other Member States consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and the amendment of operative SQPs”

2. Secretariat Activities

In its implementation of the Plan of Action for the period between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010, the Secretariat convened three outreach events in order to facilitate the conclusion and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) and additional protocols (APs), and the amendment/rescission of small quantities protocols (SQPs). These were: (1) an interregional seminar on IAEA safeguards for States with limited nuclear material and activities, held in Arusha in November 2009; (2) a briefing on IAEA verification pursuant to the NPT, conducted in New York in May 2010 (in the margins of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons); and (3) a seminar for Portuguese-speaking States with limited nuclear material and activities, held in Lisbon in June 2010.




The Secretariat also made presentations in a number of other events – such as the Second Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in New York in April 2010 – in which it was able to reach out to States in the context of this Plan of Action.

Bilateral consultations on the conclusion of CSAs and APs and the amendment/rescission of SQPs were also held throughout the year with representatives from more than 75 Member and non-Member States in Berlin, New York and Vienna.

3. Achievements

Between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010, CSAs entered into force for eight States and APs for ten States. During the same period, eight States signed CSAs and ten States signed APs. Four States agreed to amend their SQPs. The milestone of 100 States with additional protocols in force was achieved in May 2010 as the NPT Review Conference was being held in New York.



Thus, at the end of June 2010, there were 175 States with safeguards agreements in force, of which 101 States also had APs in force. Eighteen non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the NPT had yet to bring into force CSAs. One State was applying its AP provisionally pending entry into force. Of the 89 States with operative SQPs, 35 had brought the revised SQP text into force.¹

Progress has therefore been encouraging over the last few years *vis-à-vis* the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional

protocols. In May 2005, as many as 38 NNWS had not yet brought into force their NPT safeguards agreements; this number had decreased to 26 by the end of June 2009 and to 18 as of June 2010. A similar trend can be observed in the case of APs: while in May 2005 only 66 States had APs in force, by the end of June 2009 this number had risen to 91; one year later, in June 2010, more than 100 States had such APs in force.

4. Planned Activities

For the 2010/2011 period, proposed activities include:

- The organization of a regional outreach seminar for States in the Asia/Pacific region focusing on the conclusion/entry into force of CSAs and APs and on the amendment of SQPs.
- Participation in other events, including national seminars on safeguards-related matters and meetings of States party to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.

In addition, the Secretariat will continue its outreach activities with relevant States through continued reminders and bilateral consultations.

5. Conclusion

Significant progress has been achieved in the period between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010 in terms of entry into force of NPT safeguards agreements and additional protocols. It is particularly noteworthy that: (1) the milestone of 100 States with APs in force was achieved in May 2010; and (2) the number of NPT NNWS without CSAs has decreased from 26 to 18 since last year's update of this Plan of Action. Encouraged by such progress, the Secretariat will continue its work in safeguards outreach to ensure that this positive momentum is maintained.

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From August 2010:



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¹ More information on the status of safeguards agreements, small quantities protocols and additional protocols can be found at <http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html>


Annex I: interregional, regional and sub-regional outreach events

Seminar	Partners	Participants/Observers
Minsk, Nov. 2000		Approx. 15 participants from 5 of the Newly Independent States
Tokyo, June 2001	Co-sponsored by the IAEA	Approx. 20 participants from 16 Asian States
Lima, Dec. 2001	OPANAL, UN-LiREC	49 participants from 22 out of the 33 States of Latin America and the Caribbean, observers from Japan and the US
Tallinn, Jan. 2002	Sweden (co-sponsored)	21 participants from 3 countries of the Baltic Region and observers from Kazakhstan (focus on legislation)
Almaty, Jan. 2002		23 participants from 4 Central Asian and 3 South Caucasus Republics, observers from China, Japan and the US
Johannesburg, June 2002	UNREC Africa	75 participants from 35 of the 53 African countries, including 10 non-Member States; observers from the European Union and Japan
Poiana Braşov, February 2003		42 participants from 13 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, observers from Cyprus, Finland, Malta and the US
Kuala Lumpur, March/April 2003	ASEAN Sec., UNREC Asia/Pacific	41 participants from 9 ASEAN States and observers from Australia, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and the US
Tashkent, June 2003		21 participants from 7 States of Central Asia and South Caucasus, Observers from China, Japan and US
Vienna, Nov. 2003		32 participants from 16 States in five regions, mostly with no CSA in force
Ouagadougou, February 2004	ECOWAS Sec., UNREC Africa	37 participants from 13 countries in Africa and 3 international organizations. Observer from France.
Windhoek, March 2004	UNREC Africa	63 participants from 17 countries in Africa, 2 international organizations and one NGO (VERTIC)
New York, May 2004		47 participants
Sydney, Nov. 2004	Australia (co-sp.)	31 participants from 14 countries of the South Pacific Region
Vienna, Nov/Dec 2004		35 participants from 17 States in five regions
Rabat, Oct. 2005		39 participants from 21 African States
Vienna, Feb. 2006		59 participants from 33 SQP countries and 10 observer States
Quito, Apr. 2006		44 participants from 20 countries in LAC (inc. 17 SQP States)
Sydney, July 2006	Australia (co-sponsored)	56 participants from 33 countries in Asia/Pacific with limited nuclear material and activities, and from 2 observer States
Vienna, May 2007	Held back-to-back with the NPT PrepCom	30 participants representing 13 NPT States parties with no safeguards agreements and two high-level invited speakers
Vienna, February 2008	Co-organised with SG/CTR	17 participants representing 9 SQP States in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America (and one high-level speaker).
Geneva, May 2008	In the margins of the NPT PrepCom	17 participants from 15 States in the briefing on the conclusion of NPT safeguards agreements; 32 participants from 23 States and one international organization in the briefing on the strengthened safeguards system (and one high-level speaker).
Santo Domingo, July 2008		27 participants representing 14 SQP States in the Greater Caribbean and 2 high-level speakers from international organizations (OPANAL and UN-LiREC)
New York, May 2009	In the margins of the NPT PrepCom	24 participants from 14 States and several NGOs
Arusha, Nov. 2009		26 participants from 15 States; observer from Italy
New York, May 2010	In the margins of the NPT RevCon	37 participants from 22 States; two high-level speakers
Lisbon, June 2010		20 participants from 6 States; observer from the USA


Annex II: status of conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols



Conclusion of Additional Protocols 1998- 30 June 2010 (yearly)



Conclusion of Additional Protocols 1998- 30 June 2010 (cumulative)





PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

PART 2: Background and Generic Description of Activities

1. Purpose

A key challenge for the Agency according to the 2006-2011 Medium Term Strategy (GOV/2005/8) is “to be equipped to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the international community.” To this end, the Agency will *inter alia* be “promoting the entry into force of outstanding comprehensive safeguards agreements, and of additional protocols for all States”.

The aim of this Plan of Action is to focus the Secretariat’s efforts in this regard and to provide a strategy for the Agency’s outreach activities. It is a document of the Secretariat that serves as a blueprint for cooperation within the Secretariat and among Member States to achieve wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, as mandated by the General Conference and the Board of Governors, and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT States Parties.

2. Background

When the Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)) in May 1997, it tasked the Director General with negotiating additional protocols (APs) with all States. Further impetus to this mandate was given by the States Party to the NPT in the consensus Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in May 2000 (NPT/CONF.2000/28), which recommended:

“that the Director General of the IAEA and the IAEA Member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.” (Para. 47)

In the same year, the General Conference adopted resolution GC(44)/RES/19 on “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Additional Protocol”, which recommended:

“that the Director General, the Board of Governors and Member States consider implementing the following elements of a plan of action, as appropriate and subject to available resources, so that safeguards agreements and additional protocols can be brought into force, and review progress in this regard:

- (i) Intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols, especially with those States having substantial nuclear activities under their jurisdiction,
- (ii) Increased bilateral and regional consultations among Member States at both technical and political levels, with a view to promoting the domestic process to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols,

- (iii) Assistance by the IAEA and Member States to other States by providing their knowledge and technical expertise necessary to conclude and implement safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
- (iv) Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
- (v) Consideration by Member States, subject to progress made under (i) to (iv) above, of further steps to promote the safeguards agreements and Protocols, including, *inter alia*, an appropriate international meeting”.

The United Nations General Assembly, in resolution A/RES/55/33R (2000):

“[welcomed] the adoption by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 22 September 2000 of resolution GC(44)/RES/19, which contains elements of a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and [called for] the early and full implementation of that resolution.”

Subsequently, the General Conference has adopted each year a resolution in which it has noted the efforts by the Secretariat and some Member States in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency’s updated plan of action, and *inter alia* encouraged them to continue such efforts (see Part 1 of this Plan of Action for reference to the latest such resolution).

More recently, in its Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50), the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons encouraged the IAEA to “further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols”.

3. Secretariat Activities

Since the development of the 2001 Plan of Action, the Secretariat has intensified its outreach efforts. In addition to its traditional activities centred on correspondence and consultations, the Secretariat has *inter alia* organized a series of interregional, regional and subregional seminars, and contributed to national seminars to help States in their preparations for the implementation of safeguards agreements and APs.

While the purpose of such seminars has been to promote wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, their focus has been adapted to the specific situation. Thus, the May 2007 Vienna seminar – attended by States without safeguards agreements – focused on the basic features of NPT safeguards agreements and APs, whereas the October 2005 seminar in Rabat – for States that had already signed APs – looked more closely at reporting requirements and the States’ experience in implementing strengthened safeguards. The seminars have been carried out with the active support of the host countries and often in collaboration with the United Nations and other partners.

Other efforts of the Secretariat have included the following:

- **High-level dialogue:** adherence to strengthened safeguards is a priority for the Director General in his dialogue with State representatives; several safeguards agreements and APs have been signed in connection with official visits by the Director General.
- **Consultations with State delegations,** mostly in Vienna, Geneva and New York, to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs, and the amendment or rescission of SQPs.
- **National seminars on the AP:** such as the ones held in Algiers, Astana, Bangkok, Bern, Bogotá, Hanoi, Kiev, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Mexico City and Port-au-Prince.

- **Training of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs):** national, regional and interregional training courses are conducted periodically to assist States in fulfilling safeguards obligations.
- **IAEA SSAC Advisory Services (ISSAS):** upon request by States, ISSAS missions allow the Agency to evaluate the performance of SSACs and make recommendations in this regard, thereby assisting States in fulfilling obligations under safeguards agreements and APs.
- **Outreach publications:** in 2002, the Agency published the booklet *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols*, which has been used extensively for government outreach purposes. Updated versions in English, French and Spanish were issued in 2005 and 2008; in June 2006, a complementary publication entitled *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: Overview of Safeguards Requirements for States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities* was published. Both booklets are available on the Agency's public website.
- **Outreach to civil society and the general public:** in February 2003 and again in February 2004, the Secretariat organised an awareness seminar on verification and nuclear security for NGOs, academic institutions and media. Information on the Agency's strengthened safeguards system was issued on the web for public information purposes, and related articles have been published in relevant publications. The importance of wider adherence to APs was also a recurring theme in presentations made at the October 2006 Safeguards Symposium at IAEA headquarters.
- **Advisory missions by international teams of experts (ITE):** as part of the Nuclear Security Plan of Activities, the Agency has undertaken efforts to inform and advise States about international legal instruments that are relevant to the protection against nuclear terrorism – including NPT safeguards agreements and APs – and to encourage adherence to and/or implementation of such instruments. ITE missions are planned and implemented by OLA in coordination with EXPO and NSNS, and funded through the Nuclear Security Fund.

4. Categories of States

The Plan of Action makes a distinction between three categories of States: IAEA Member States with safeguards significant nuclear activities (*i.e.* nuclear material subject to routine inspections) (Group 1); IAEA Member States with limited nuclear material and activities (Group 2); and non-members of the Agency (Group 3).

The highest priority is given to the conclusion of APs with all States in Group 1 – in particular with States that have declared conversion, enrichment, fabrication or reprocessing facilities. Outreach activities for States in Group 2 also focus on the amendment of SQPs, which gives the Agency additional tools to fulfil its verification mandate in such States. This sometimes requires coordination with other IAEA Departments (in particular the Department of Technical Cooperation) that may have regular contacts with decision-makers and regulatory authorities in this group of countries. A special situation – thus special working methods – also apply to most non-member States of the Agency (Group 3), where there are no working level relations with Agency staff. Most of these States can be expected to have little or no experience of the Agency's mandated activities.

5. Lessons learned

Through its outreach work, the Secretariat has gained a better understanding of the key factors that may affect States' consideration of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs. These can roughly be divided into four categories:

1. **Policy Factors** include a lower priority given to nuclear non-proliferation compared to other national priorities, insufficient awareness of the role of strengthened safeguards for nuclear

non-proliferation and international security, expectations of reciprocal economic and/or security-related benefits and reluctance to submit to an “intrusive” verification regime.

2. **Legislative factors** include insufficient knowledge about legal requirements and the need for legislative assistance, existing national legislation that may contradict provisions of the AP (e.g. confidentiality provisions) or a lack of legal authority to collect and share information for declarations, for instance, export/import monitoring.
3. **Administrative factors** include gaps in the working relationship between regulatory authorities and Government ministries involved in the conclusion of international agreements (Foreign/Legal Affairs), a lack of communication channels between nuclear authorities and mining companies and research facilities for declaration purposes, and reluctance among policy-makers and law-makers to attend to matters perceived as overly complex and technical.
4. **Technical factors** frequently involves the absence of an established or effective SSAC, sometimes due to the lack of an assigned safeguards focal point, insufficient understanding of requirements to make declarations and the need for technical assistance.

In terms of the categories of States identified above, the typical obstacles facing States would be as follows:

Table 1: Factors affecting States’ consideration of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs

	Member States	Non-Member States
Safeguards significant nuclear activities	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 1</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of legislative and technical infrastructure for making declarations (notably for export monitoring) • Inconsistencies with existing legal provisions; expectations of something “in return” for concluding legal instruments 	<p style="text-align: center;">DPRK</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Declaration of withdrawal from the NPT
Limited nuclear material and activities	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 2</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical counterparts’ lack of access to ministries • Limited knowledge of the role of strengthened safeguards • Low priority given to nuclear non-proliferation • Insufficient knowledge of legal requirements 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 3</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited awareness of the policy function of the Agency in general and strengthened safeguards in particular • Reluctance to deal with overly technical matters

7. Future Efforts

More than 80% of the 72 States with safeguards-significant nuclear activities have signed APs. While concluding APs with such States – especially those with activities in “sensitive technological areas” (as defined in INFCIRC/267) – remains a matter of highest priority, outreach efforts also need to

focus on SQP States. Table 2 below summarizes the focus that such efforts should now take, for each of the three groups identified above for outreach purposes.

Table 2: Focus of future outreach efforts

	Member States	Non-Member States
Safeguards significant nuclear activities	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 1</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individualized consultations • National seminars • Use of inspectors on mission to help prepare for AP implementation • SSAC training • Focus on facilitating entry into force of signed agreements. 	DPRK
Limited nuclear material and activities	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 2</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outreach visits to provide advice on policy, legislative and technical aspects of safeguards; this includes making use of relevant high-level visits by Secretariat delegations. • Use of good offices to help technical counterparts gain access to relevant ministries • Consultations with officials in Vienna • Regional seminars; briefings at international meetings; legislative and technical assistance; this could include back-to-back events with TC and other meetings and, on demand, presentations to parliamentarians to facilitate ratification 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Group 3</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concerted efforts with Member States with links to the State concerned • Non-member States to be invited to Agency seminars subject to extrabudgetary resources • Briefings involving non-member States to be held in the margins of other regional / international meetings to minimize resource demands.

Outreach and SSAC training

The Secretariat is currently working to implement two separate mandates of the Board: on the one hand, negotiating safeguards agreements and APs, and the amendment of SQPs; and on the other, assisting States with SQPs, including non-members of the Agency, in establishing and maintaining SSACs and putting into place the necessary legislative and technical framework to implement safeguards.

In the Secretariat’s experience, confusing these two messages, for instance by providing policy outreach to the technical level or providing training on the detailed reporting requirements to the policy level, risks being counterproductive – in particular when dealing with States that have limited experience of IAEA matters.

Consequently, it is important to first address the policy level, and to concentrate the training efforts on States having already taken the decision to conclude safeguards agreement and/or APs, or to amend SQPs.

8. Coordination

Coordination with States

In accordance with the fourth element of the Action Plan proposed in GC/(44)/RES/19, which calls for “*Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols*”, the Secretariat takes steps, as appropriate, to ensure that its efforts are coordinated with those of Member States that are actively involved in efforts to promote wider adherence to the AP.

- An international conference held in Tokyo in 2002 aimed at facilitating and coordinating international efforts towards wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system. It underlined the Agency’s role in facilitating the coordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and cooperation and sharing of related information.
- Australia, France, Japan, the United States and the G-8 group of countries have coordinated their bilateral efforts with the Secretariat’s outreach activities.
- At the request of the Presidents of the Conference and relevant Committee Chairs, the Secretariat held briefings and made presentations at the 2005 and 2010 Review Conferences, as well as at sessions of the Preparatory Committees for the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Briefings were also held in connection with a regional conference in Wellington (March 2001) organised by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and at the Asia-Pacific Regional Safeguards and Security Conference, organized by the Government of Australia in November 2004.

Coordination within the Secretariat

The Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO) coordinates the implementation of this Plan of Action, and all relevant Secretariat units have designated focal points in this regard.

- Each outreach seminar is generally a cooperative undertaking by EXPO, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Department of Safeguards (SG).
- TC officers may receive guidance by EXPO to support, as appropriate, regional outreach efforts. For example, TC regularly arranges for Member State representatives undergoing fellowship training or scientific visits in Vienna to meet with EXPO to discuss, *inter alia*, adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system.

9. Resource Implications

The Secretariat has so far been pursuing its outreach efforts mainly through extrabudgetary contributions – most recently from Italy and the United States. In recent years, Australia, France, Japan, Spain and Sweden have also contributed in cash to the Agency’s efforts and a number of States have provided in-kind support, e.g. by hosting outreach events (such as the ones recently held in Portugal and in United Republic of Tanzania). The implementation of this Plan of Action has required a significant workload for staff in EXPO, as well as in OLA and SG. Staff costs have been borne by the Agency through the regular budget.

10. Conclusions

The Agency’s work to strengthen safeguards by promoting the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs and the amendment of SQPs continues to bear fruit. The continued success of the Secretariat’s Plan of Action will require that sufficient extrabudgetary resources continue to be made available with minimum conditions, that appropriate coordination within the Secretariat and between States and the Secretariat be maintained, and that strengthened safeguards remain a priority for States in peaceful nuclear cooperation and in the wider context of international security and development.

Annex I. Proposed Agency/State activities

1. Agency Activities	2. States Activities	3. Agency/States Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular correspondence • Preparation of draft agreements/protocols • Presentations/speeches at international meetings • Informal contact in margins of Agency meetings • Back-to-back activities at other Agency events • Consultations during visits of high-level Secretariat staff. • Regional and national seminars • SSAC training • Country visits by EXPO and other staff • Formal consultations upon request • Development of guidelines and tools • Encouragement to other States and regional organizations (e.g. NWFZ) to use good offices • Tailor-made outreach to remaining states with significant nuclear activities that are considering concluding additional protocols • Cooperation within the Secretariat, in particular to reach out to States with limited nuclear activities. • Continued technical and legislative assistance for AP implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs as priorities in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation • Other individual State-to-State bilateral approaches • High-level bilateral visits • Coordinated efforts to reach out to individual States • Sharing of experience of AP preparation and implementation • Push for general adherence to strengthened safeguards in groups, e.g. EU, NWFZ etc. • Bilateral and multi-country efforts to reach out to States • State-to-state assistance in legislative drafting • State-to-state assistance related to the monitoring of Annex 2 items 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for the secure financing of the strengthened safeguards system • Extrabudgetary support for the Agency's outreach efforts • Hosting of IAEA regional seminars • IAEA co-sponsoring of States' international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system • Agency participation in international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system • Cooperative training programmes • Coordination of regional efforts with Agency seminars • Cooperation with or use of regional organizations • Requests for IAEA assistance to facilitate adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system • Invitation to the Agency to make presentations at regional meetings. • Coordination of outreach activities with other States and with the Agency