Safeguards and Verification

Safeguards Statement for 2002, Background to Safeguards Statement and Executive Summary of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2002


Safeguards Statement for 2002

  1. The Safeguards Conclusions

    2. The International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to hereafter as the ‘Agency’) concluded that, during 2002, with the exception of the nuclear material in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in the 145 States (and in Taiwan, China) which have safeguards agreements in force, the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. This conclusion was derived from the evaluation of all information acquired in implementing safeguards agreements and of other information available to the Agency. In the course of that evaluation, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards nor of the misuse of facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards.

    During 2002, the Agency remained unable to verify the initial report on nuclear material made by the DPRK and the DPRK remained in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement pursuant to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For most of 2002, as requested by the United Nations Security Council, the Agency continued to monitor the "freeze"1/ at the five facilities under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In summer 2002, the Agency monitored the DPRK’s maintenance activities at the 5 MW(e) reactor and the reprocessing plant. The DPRK did not respond to the Secretariat’s enquiries in October 2002, nor to the Board of Governor’s resolution of 29 November 2002 requesting clarification about a reported enrichment programme. On 12 December 2002, the Agency was notified by the DPRK of its lifting the freeze and resuming nuclear power generation operations. The DPRK demanded that the Agency immediately remove all seals and cameras from all facilities subject to the freeze. In December 2002, ignoring Agency requests, the DPRK unilaterally removed all seals and obstructed all cameras installed for verification purposes. Later that month, the DPRK demanded that the Agency withdraw its inspectors immediately. On 31 December 2002, Agency inspectors left the DPRK and the Agency’s verification activities were suspended. Consequently, at the end of 2002, the Agency was not in a position to conclude that nuclear material in the DPRK had not been diverted2/.

    Since December 1998, when Agency inspectors were relocated because of security concerns, the Agency had been unable to provide assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions because the Agency had not been in a position to implement its Security Council mandated inspection activities. Safeguards implementation was limited to a yearly physical inventory verification of the nuclear material under safeguards located at Tuwaitha, Location C (depleted, natural and low enriched uranium). One such inspection was carried out in January 2002, pursuant to the Agency’s NPT safeguards agreement with Iraq. On 27 November 2002, the Agency resumed inspections in Iraq pursuant to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, now including resolution 1441 (8 November 2002). From then on, the Agency’s safeguards activities in Iraq under the NPT safeguards agreement were again subsumed under these resolutions. Between the resumption of inspections and the end of the year, no evidence was detected of prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities although inspection activities were still ongoing3/.

    In 2002, for 13 States having both a comprehensive safeguards agreement4/ and an additional protocol5/ in force or being provisionally applied, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material in those States or under their jurisdiction or control had been placed under safeguards and remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. This conclusion was derived from the evaluation of all information acquired in implementing safeguards agreements and additional protocols and of all other information available to the Agency. In the course of that evaluation, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards or of undeclared nuclear material or activities in these States. For the 15 other States that each have a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the Agency’s evaluations for drawing such a conclusion are in progress.

  2. Safeguards Implementation in 2002

    3. As of 31 December 2002, safeguards agreements with 145 States (and with Taiwan, China) were in force. However, 48 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet brought into force a safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the treaty. During the year, the Agency carried out safeguards activities, including inspections, in 69 States with significant nuclear activities6/ (and in Taiwan, China): in 61 States pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements; in four States pursuant to INFCIRC/66-type safeguards7/ covering specified nuclear or non-nuclear material, facilities and equipment; and in certain facilities in four8/ of the five nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the Agency9/.

    By the end of 2002, additional protocols with 74 States10/ had been approved by the Board. They cover four States with no safeguards agreements 3/4 one of which has significant nuclear activities, 64 non-nuclear-weapon States that have comprehensive safeguards agreements, one State with an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, and the five nuclear-weapon States, each of which has a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the Agency. Of the protocols signed, 28 were in force and one was being applied provisionally, pending its entry into force.

    Overall progress on the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains below expectations. By the end of 2002, 23 States with significant nuclear activities had not signed a protocol additional to their safeguards agreement. In addition, 17 such States had signed but not ratified their additional protocols11/. Only for States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force are Agency safeguards able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole.

    In the course of the year, safeguards agreements were concluded for three additional States and entered into force for four. In addition, the validity of Albania’s comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded prior to its adherence to the NPT was confirmed through an exchange of letters to satisfy the requirements of that Treaty. While additional protocols were approved by the Board for thirteen States, such protocols entered into force for only four States, including one nuclear-weapon State.

    In 2002, safeguards expenditure from the Regular Budget was $78.5 million including a special provision for equipment procurement. In addition, Member States contributed extrabudgetary funds of $19.7 million. These extrabudgetary funds were used largely for equipment development and procurement. Despite measures instituted to increase management efficiency, the continuing shortage in Regular Budget funds and reliance on voluntary contributions have been, and continue to be, of great concern because of the unpredictability and constraints attached to extrabudgetary funds. Any benefits that may be derived from further efficiency gains are small compared to the resources required to maintain effective safeguards. A shortfall in Regular Budget funds and the associated shortfall in human resources will also delay progress in implementing the Agency’s strengthened safeguards system. In order to cope with this shortfall, an increase in the Regular Budget for safeguards activities of $19.2 million in 2004 and an additional $2.5 million in 2005 would be required. Without this increase, the Agency would not be in a position to ensure that the safeguards system will remain effective and, therefore, credible.

  3. Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System

    4. In 2002, further progress was made in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system through developments in the six major areas of: (i) the State evaluation process; (ii) entry into force and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols; (iii) integrated safeguards; (iv) safeguards approaches, procedures and technology; (v) increased co-operation with State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material; and (vi) training and supporting activities.

    The State evaluation process, the foundation for the Agency’s safeguards conclusions, was restructured and streamlined. Improvements were made to the analytical framework within which State evaluations are conducted. New, supplementary sources of information about States’ nuclear activities were factored into the evaluation process and new software tools were introduced to facilitate the management and analysis of the additional information being obtained.

    The Agency’s outreach activities continued to encourage all NPT States to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force and all States with safeguards agreements bring additional protocols into force. On a practical level, implementation trials of additional protocol measures continued to provide helpful experience to States and to the Secretariat.

    A milestone in 2002 was the presentation of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards to the Agency’s Board of Governors at its meeting in March 2002. For States which have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, and for which the Agency has been able to draw the requisite safeguards conclusions, the conceptual framework paves the way for the implementation of ‘integrated safeguards’, which represents the most effective and cost-efficient combination of safeguards measures available to the Agency. Individual elements of the framework continued to be developed throughout the year. Integrated safeguards were being implemented in Australia and in Norway at the end of 2002.

    In 2002, new, generic types of safeguards approaches such as those for conversion facilities and enrichment plants, and further approaches for specific facilities were developed. A detailed plan was prepared for a major project to redesign and re-engineer the 20-year-old IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS). Progress was also made in certain safeguards techniques and complementary measures: for example, improvement in and increased reliability of containment and surveillance equipment were achieved. Closer co-operation between the Agency and State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs) is expected to stem from activities undertaken in 2002 to help States to evaluate and, if necessary, update their SSACs, and to identify ways in which SSACs can further contribute to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In that regard, the safeguards training curriculum was further fine-tuned and developed to enable it to better impart to Agency staff and to Member State personnel the knowledge and skills required by the strengthened and more efficient safeguards system.

1/ Facilities covered by the "freeze" were a 5 MW(e) experimental nuclear power plant, a nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant, the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing plant) at the Institute of Radiochemistry, and a 50 MW(e) nuclear power plant, all at Nyongbyon, and the Taechon 200 MW(e) nuclear power plant.

2/ On 6 January 2003, the Board adopted a resolution outlining a number of steps to be taken by the DPRK to allow the Agency to implement safeguards measures. On 10 January 2003, the DPRK Government informed the Agency of its withdrawal from the NPT. The Board, in a resolution of 12 February 2003, confirmed that the Agency’s NPT safeguards agreement remained binding and in force, declared that the DPRK was in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, called upon the DPRK to urgently remedy its non-compliance by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency, and decided to report the DPRK’s non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

3/ In response to advice from the United States Government received on the night of 16-17 March 2003, and in consultation with the President of the Security Council and in co-ordination with the UN Secretary-General and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the Director General decided on the withdrawal of Agency inspectors from Iraq for security reasons. The inspectors left Iraq on 18 March and since that time the Agency’s verification activities in Iraq were suspended because of ongoing hostilities.

4/ Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on the document The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), 1972. Such agreements require each State party to accept (Agency) safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. Comparable provisions are contained, or are to be contained, in comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to other bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

5/ These additional protocols are based on the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), 1997.

6/ In the context of this report, a State with ‘significant nuclear activities’ means a State having any amount of nuclear material in a facility or location outside facilities (LOF) or nuclear material in excess of the limits in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

7/ These safeguards agreements are based on the guidelines contained in the document The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968), INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, 1968. Such agreements specify the nuclear material, non-nuclear material (e.g. heavy water, zirconium tubes), facilities and equipment to be safeguarded, and prohibit the use of the specified items in such a way as to further any military purpose.

8/ In the Russian Federation, no inspections were performed in 2002 as no facilities were designated for inspection.

9/ Voluntary offer safeguards agreements have been concluded with the five nuclear-weapon States. Each State offers some or all of its civilian nuclear material and/or facilities from which the Agency may select some for the application of safeguards. Article IX.3 of the NPT defines a nuclear-weapon State as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. There are five such States: China, France, the Russian Federation (the Soviet Union when the NPT entered into force), the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

10/ Measures foreseen in the Model Additional Protocol are also being implemented in Taiwan, China.

11/ It should be noted that ten European Union Member States had informed the Agency by the end of 2002 that they had finalized their national ratification procedures but that entry into force of the additional protocols would wait until all European Union States had done so.