

Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Regime

Public Hearing "Assessing Euratom – 50 years of European Nuclear Policy"

Brussels, Belgium
European Parliament
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
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Atoms for Peace: The First Half Century
1957–2007


International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA

- **Independent** intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization within the UN system (1957)
- Mandate:
 - to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world
 - ensure that assistance provided is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.(Article II, IAEA Statute)




IAEA Vienna, Austria


The Three Pillars of the IAEA



The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime



NPT - Cornerstone of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime



IAEA

Atoms for Peace: The First Half Century

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Developments in Nuclear Proliferation

Disarmament:

- Slow progress

Technology Transfer:

- Increased dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear 'know-how'

Verification:

- Renewed concern about acquisition of nuclear weapons by States and extremist groups
- Emergence of clandestine nuclear procurement network (Iran and Libya)
- Nuclear test by the DPRK

What is Needed?

- **Disarmament:** a real renewed commitment
- **Technology:** better control of access to nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) technology
- **Verification:** support for effective nuclear verification
- Revisit how to deal with the three countries that remain outside of the NPT

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technology

Better Control of Access

- Establish mechanisms to assure supply of fuel for nuclear power plants
- Develop similar assurances for acquisition of nuclear power reactors
- Encourage countries to develop multilateral approaches to the back end of the fuel cycle (reprocessing and spent fuel disposal)
- Encourage countries to undertake enrichment in multilateral operations
- Enhance export control systems

Support for Effective Nuclear Verification

- Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols must become the universal non-proliferation standard
- State-of-the-art verification technology must be made available

Cooperation between the IAEA and EURATOM

Partnership Approach

- Enabling – activities carried out by both organisations to fulfill their mandates in an effective and efficient manner
- Joint activities – cooperation towards cost-effective sharing of activities but maintaining independent conclusions
- Euratom Inspection – under appropriate circumstances, the Agency uses results of Euratom inspection activities in drawing its independent safeguards conclusions

Cooperation between the IAEA and EU

- Additional protocols are in force in all EU States
- Progress is being made towards Integrated Safeguards in EU States
- EU bilateral efforts to promote adherence of other States to additional protocol are vital
- 2006 marked 25 years of European Commission support programme to IAEA

Summary

- The NPT is a success – none of the 1960s threshold States went on to develop nuclear weapons
- The nuclear non-proliferation regime faces a number of challenges
- The system is not ‘in crisis’ but is certainly being tested
- We cannot build tomorrow’s regime with yesterday’s tools
- Innovative solutions needed in disarmament, technology transfer and verification
- Otherwise the international nuclear non-proliferation regime may become obsolete
- Continued EU support and cooperation is essential