

**Assessment of the Global
Partnership work and the role of the
CEG**

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Structure of the Presentation

- Summary of the key objectives of the Global Partnership
- Achievements to date
- Contribution of the CEG to the GP
- Lessons Learnt and the value of the “CEG model” to wider non proliferation activities
- Current evaluation of the GP by King’s College, London and preliminary findings
- Future of the GP

Key Principle agreed at Kananaskis

“The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded co-operation projects to address:

- Non-proliferation
- Disarmament
- Counter – terrorism
- Nuclear safety, including environmental

-issues with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes....”

Leaders agreed that initial work and priorities would be focused on Russia related to nuclear submarine dismantling and Chemical Weapons Destruction

G8 GP Political achievements

- One of the few G8 initiatives that is on course to meet most of its original agreed objectives in terms of total financial pledge, and sustainable non proliferation benefits
- Brought together 22 countries and the EU to address a common objective : enhanced collaboration
- Enabled good working relations with FSU governments and institutes to be established in areas that before 2002 would have been very difficult if not impossible
- Enhanced defence diplomacy

G8 GP specific achievements

- Over \$20 billion now pledged to address global threats
- 22 countries and the European Union have committed funds
- Nearly all decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines expected to be dismantled by around 2010, and good progress in clean up of former Russian Navy sites
- Chemical Weapons Destruction facilities will enable Russia to destroy around 85% of stockpile by around 2012
- Significant number of civilian nuclear facilities across the FSU have had their security enhanced
- Many thousands of Former Weapons Scientists and Engineers secured alternative non weapons employment in sustainable jobs
- Closure of the last weapon-grade Pu producing reactor in Russia this year(?)
- Significant enhancement of the nuclear safety culture and regulatory regimes

Benefits of the GP to all

- Reduction in a range of proliferation, security, safety and environmental concerns from WMD legacy materials and know-how
- Enhancements to the global security and safety culture
- Enhancement of defence diplomacy and strengthened safety response plans in the event of submarine accidents
- Enhancement of political relations with both beneficiary countries and other GP donors
- Showcasing for project management and nuclear decommissioning expertise in Governments and the private sector for similar challenges globally
- Opportunities for S&T collaboration with FSU and wider afield, including potential to enhance greater awareness of proliferation concerns for all who work with CBRN material and associated technologies

Contribution of the CEG to the GP

- Here before the GP - at the sharp end of implementing collaboration to deal with complex nuclear legacy issues
- A benchmark on how collaboration and coordination of nuclear challenges should be implemented
- Greatly enhanced good working relations between Russia and its GP partners in dealing with the legacy challenges in NW Russia
- Ensured the IAEA played an appropriate role in a key GP objective

Lessons Learnt

- CEG an excellent forum for the open sharing information and lessons learnt on the most crucial issues in Russia
- Forum for sharing views on the most appropriate technical solutions and partnerships, helping reduce duplication of effort and contribute to the identification of priorities
- Invaluable framework for promoting international experience and technologies
- Has a key role in contributing to the international technical audit process and providing confidence to donors and beneficiaries that the chosen technical solutions are robust

Lessons Learnt

- The CEG model seen by many as applicable to the coordination of other non proliferation activities (e.g. on human dimension)
- Potential scope to widen the CEG to encompass other areas other than legacy work in NW/Far East Russia and RTGs
- Regular face to face contact essential to enhance good working relationships (trust building), exchange of relevant information and understanding of all partners' requirements

Current Evaluation of the GP

- Focused on European approaches to threat reduction encompassing a wide range of safety, security and non proliferation challenges
- Seeking to generate new insights into European policies and practices
- In the final stages of the field work interviewing a range of practitioners from across Europe with experience of Global Partnership projects and programmes

Current Evaluation of the GP

Research guided by the question:

“What does a comparative analysis of the experiences of European G8 countries and the EU in implementing the GP reveal about the optimal approach to multilateral threat reduction”

Current Evaluation of the GP

Aim:

- To help inform and shape future threat reduction policies and activities, primarily funded by European states and the EU under the umbrella of the GP post 2012
- Identify key lessons learnt
- Identify successes and missed opportunities
- **Identify the wider benefits of the GP project**

Current Evaluation of the GP

Countries and organisations :

Belgium	Japan
Canada	The Netherlands*
Czech Republic	Norway*
Denmark	Russian Federation
EBRD*	Sweden
European Union*	United States
Finland	United Kingdom*
France*	
Germany*	(plus a number of contractors)
International Energy Agency*	
Italy*	*interviews completed/responses received

Key findings so far in the Evaluation

- The GP has been very successful in enhancing collaboration and effective working amongst donors and beneficiaries
- The GP has contributed to wider policies on nuclear safety and the environment as well as other policy objectives of both donors and beneficiaries
- The CEG framework seen as a model for future GP collaboration outside Russia
- Many non proliferation objectives would not have been so well advanced without the GP initiative
- Lessons learnt over the past seven years should enable fast track implementation of new projects outside Russia and the FSU

Which future for the GP after 2009 G8 summit?

- A “paradigm shift” is proposed: moving from non proliferation associated with Cold War legacy approaches to proactive prevention programmes aiming at sustainability (long term funding by different sources including beneficiaries and private sector) for stability
- A real partnership approach with enhanced coordination (as in CEG) and mutual trust
- Development of global networks based on CBRN centres of excellence (CEG is a virtual CoE on nuclear problems)
- Improvement of non-proliferation awareness, as well as an enhanced “professional responsibility” by use of best practices

Welcome your views on the GP

Covering:

- Policy approach and priorities
- Organisation
- Reporting and monitoring
- Successes
- Failures
- Missed opportunities
- Recommendations on what should happen post 2012