Statements of the Deputy Directors General
17 November 2008 | Mumbai, India
International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety - Ensuring Safety for Sustainable Nuclear Development
Opening Statement at International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety - Ensuring Safety for Sustainable Nuclear Development
by Mr. Tomihoro Taniguchi
IAEA Deputy Director General, Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
On behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to this International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Government of India and in particular, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, for hosting this important conference in the historically fascinating city of Mumbai that is also experiencing tremendous development and change.
Let me contribute to setting the stage for this week by describing how I see the character and value of this important conference in which we have all invested a commitment of our precious time, knowledge and experience. This periodic conference provides a forum for discussion and broad interaction on the future direction for the international cooperation and the IAEA´s activities regarding nuclear installation safety. This week, we have the opportunity to add deeper insight and clearer foresight to nuclear safety worldwide through our active participation, sharing and tough questioning. Our return on investment in this conference is measured by the outcomes we achieve this week that can indeed be implemented to improve the existing Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime and position the nuclear community to better meet the challenges we are facing now.
Nuclear Vitae Nova
I would like to provide some context for the global environment in which we find ourselves. Today, there are 439 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries and the number of new plants under construction stands at around 36. The Agency´s updated projections continue to show a significant increase in the use of nuclear energy by 2030, with the possibility of even doubling today´s nuclear power capacity.
In light of the many ambitious plans for nuclear power plant development programmes both in new and mature countries, the international nuclear community is now facing a historical turning point with numerous challenges in not only safety, but also security. As new nuclear power programmes emerge and mature programmes expand, managing safety and security becomes a cornerstone of sustainable development.
Undoubtedly, we are all aware of the tragic Chernobyl accident in 1986 and its effects on people and the environment. After the Chernobyl accident, the international nuclear community recognized that when it comes to safety performance and its public perception, we are all in the same boat. The Chernobyl accident proved that an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. In order to prevent another serious nuclear accident or terrorist incident, which, should it occur, will erase the high expectation of nuclear power development worldwide, we need new thinking and a new approach adapted to the dynamically changing global situations. This is why I prefer to use the phrase "vitae nova" rather than "renaissance" which requires fresh insights and overcoming old mindsets, rather than a simple revival of good old days, in order to achieve effective and creative transitions in new and expanding programmes.
One particular aspect of the dynamically changing global situation that underscores the need for new thinking is the multinational context of today´s nuclear business and activities which requires closer international cooperation. The safety impact of the globalization of nuclear technologies and industry will be discussed during session 2 of this programme. I will also elaborate my views on this topic later.
Continuous Improvement of the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime
Our international efforts to continuously improve the existing Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime help us to ensure high levels of safety in both mature nuclear programmes and those programmes under consideration. The application of IAEA safety standards, peer reviews (like IRRS and OSART) and advisory services at national and international levels are essential to support the development of effective national safety infrastructures and the harmonised implementation of other international instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention and codes of conduct.
An effective Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime also relies upon a strong Global Knowledge Network and Global Experts´ Community. As I look at the audience here today, I see an impressive gathering of global nuclear safety experts. Your combined knowledge and experience is a powerful force for advancing nuclear safety and security worldwide, and especially for meeting the challenges associated with the launching of new nuclear programmes and the expansion of existing programmes. At this conference, we all have a valuable networking opportunity to share a common view for safety and to promote international cooperation to meet the increasingly complex policy and technical challenges we all face with nuclear development and expansion worldwide.
Establishing and Maintaining Nuclear Safety Infrastructure
For both mature and new programmes alike, the challenges now faced by many Member States are enormous for building and strengthening human and organizational capacity, and establishing and maintaining strong nuclear safety infrastructures. In September, the IAEA Director General stated in his remarks to the Board of Governors, (and I quote) "Embarking on nuclear power is a complex process that requires an appropriate regulatory and legal framework, an effective and independent regulatory body and the building of the necessary human capacity." The Director General also quoted from the International Nuclear Safety Group´s (INSAG) annual letter to the IAEA, which stated, (and I quote) "Moreover, safe operation can only be ensured if there is a comprehensive infrastructure in place that is properly maintained and improved throughout the life of the nuclear power programme." I reference these statements to emphasize that our work toward ensuring safe and secure nuclear operations is not finished after the governmental infrastructure is established; on the contrary, the further demanding work of sustaining and continuously improving the substantive safety infrastructure, with a strong safety culture, has only just begun.
The political and industrial leaders promoting nuclear power development worldwide may tend to underestimate the vital importance of safety. New entrant countries may tend to regard safety as an additional burden rather than an enabler for successful introduction of new nuclear power plants. Our nuclear safety community should clearly communicate to all those considering nuclear programmes that the use of such technology requires a strong commitment to safety that must endure the lifetime of the programme.
I would like to emphasize the importance of another critical aspect of the safety infrastructure for both existing and new nuclear programmes. It is not possible to eliminate completely the risk of an accident or malicious use of nuclear material. Therefore, it is imperative that national infrastructures must have effective emergency preparedness and response capabilities, including trans-border cooperative measures. In order to control and mitigate the impact of such events, the two conventions for emergency notifications and assistance require a strong commitment of the contracting parties and sufficient resources for their adequate implementation.
It is also important that I discuss regulatory independence. Assurance of independence will remain as an international challenge as existing nuclear programmes expand and new programmes begin. The importance of regulatory independence is prominently recognized in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention and in the IAEA safety standards. In addition, regulatory independence is highlighted in the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles document, which states that the regulatory body must, (and I quote) "be effectively independent of the licensee and of any other body, so that it is free from any undue pressure from interested parties."
Compared with past discussions on this issue that were mainly focused on legal "de jure" aspects of regulatory independence, recent discussions have been focused on "de facto" aspects related to technical and managerial competence, and human and financial resources, particularly for new countries launching new nuclear power plants. In other words, legal independence and authority are necessary conditions for overall regulatory effectiveness; however, they are not necessarily the only conditions to assure independent regulatory judgement and implementation.
As those who have successfully established independent regulatory programmes may attest, independence is an evolutionary process and a constant struggle that requires an unyielding commitment to safety.
Future Challenges
So far, I have discussed the context of the nuclear vitae nova, and the need to continuously improve upon the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime, and the importance of establishing and maintaining strong nuclear safety infrastructures. Now, I would like to draw your attention to three specific future challenges for us to consider. The first is regarding new entrant nuclear programmes. The second pertains to responsibilities related to the globalization of nuclear activities, and the third is synergy between safety and security.
New Entrant Nuclear Programmes
As I previously mentioned, the ambitious plans to introduce nuclear technologies in many countries heretofore without nuclear programmes are an enormous challenge for the global nuclear community. We are all in the same boat and a serious accident anywhere is a serious problem everywhere. Therefore, it is essential that new entrant nuclear programmes are launched in a safe and secure manner.
The global nuclear community needs to do its part to ensure that these new entrant programmes benefit from the lessons learned from the many decades of experience in the application and regulation of nuclear technologies. To reiterate once more, the development of a national nuclear safety infrastructure and relevant capacity building are complex undertakings that require inter alia a lifetime commitment to the programme, an effective and independent regulator, strong safety management and culture, effective emergency response capabilities and sustainable human capacity.
Responsibilities Related to the Globalization of Nuclear Technologies and Industries
The responsibility to ensure safety and security rests primarily with the country concerned, but it also extends to the countries supplying components and technical expertise. This challenge is presented by the multinational context of today´s nuclear business and activities. Supplier countries have moral, as well as technical and business responsibilities when transferring such technology. Supplier organizations should work with their own governments, as well as recipient country governments, to set up agreements on long term cooperation for safety and security in recipient countries. In recognition of the significance of this matter, an international workshop was organized in Vienna this past July to discuss the roles of supplier countries and their responsibilities to assure long term safety.
Safety and Security Synergy
The interface and synergy between safety and security is an important matter of policy and practicality. This issue was well discussed in depth at the Scientific Forum during the IAEA General Conference in October and during the latest meetings of INSAG and the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec). As you are aware, the IAEA Safety Fundamentals states that "safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner." This was further highlighted by the Chairman of the Commission on Safety Standards in his letter to the IAEA Director General. In that letter, he recommends that, (and I quote) "the review of the nuclear security series publications must be considered so as to verify that the application of the safety related recommendations given to Members States does not compromise security and that the recommendations from the security series publications do not compromise safety." The integration and synergy between safety and security is but one area, among others, where continued international cooperation will lead to further improvements in the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime through enhanced IAEA safety standards and security guidance documents and their effective application worldwide. Our challenge is how to achieve this as early and as effectively as possible.
Concluding Remarks
For my conclusion, I would like to emphasize three key points from my remarks. The first is the need for continued focus on international cooperation, especially support for new entrants in building actual capacity and expertise to prevent serious accidents. The second is the vital importance of emergency preparedness and response in national and international safety infrastructures in order to mitigate the impacts of accidents should they occur. And the third is the strong commitment to and leadership for safety in ensuring that robust national safety infrastructures are in place worldwide, with effective and independent regulatory bodies, and strong safety management, leadership and culture.