On behalf of the Director General of the IAEA, it is my pleasure and privilege to welcome you to this International Conference on Research Reactor Utilization, Safety, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste Management. I would like to offer my sincere thanks to the Government of Chile, and the Nuclear Energy Commission of Chile, for hosting this Conference in the beautiful and historic city of Santiago de Chile. I would also like to thank you, the 150 or so pre-registered delegates from around the world, for participating in this conference. I trust that you will have an interesting and enjoyable week.
For more than 50 years, research reactors have been one of the locomotives of nuclear science and technology. To date, approximately 670 research reactors have been built, and some 270 of these reactors, in 59 countries, continue to operate today. Altogether, over 13,000 reactor years of operational experience has been accumulated during this period. Just as important, however, is the fact that they have operated in a remarkably safe manner.
The IAEA's statutes charter it to promote the contributions that atomic energy can bring to health and prosperity of people throughout the world. Thus, the Agency is authorized to encourage and assist in the development and practical application of research related to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
From its inception in 1957 there has been a broad interest at the IAEA in the benefits to be derived by Member States from the safe operation of research reactors. The multi-disciplinary research that a research reactor can support has led to the development of numerous capacities within Member States, many of which have been realized under the umbrella of the Agency's Technical Cooperation program. These benefits have been realized in a wide variety of areas within science and technology - nuclear power, radioisotope production, neutron beam research and analysis, nuclear medicine and personnel training, and more recently, materials development, component testing, computer code validation and environmental pollution control. One can cite numerous Member States, for example Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the Latin American region, who have developed high quality nuclear programs indigenously, thanks in no small part to the growth and effective utilization of their research reactor programs. Thanks to the recognition of these great benefits for human health, welfare and social development, new research reactors are being planned and built. But, pre-eminent to the pursuit of these universal gains is the pre-condition that any and all reactor operations be conducted with a commitment to and an assurance of safety - safety for the operators, safety for the public, and safety for the environment.
The research reactor community has had a long and successful history of both productive and safe operations; however, 63%, nearly two-thirds of the world's operating research reactors, are now over 30 years old. Many of them have been refurbished to meet today's technological standards and safety requirements; however, the challenges associated with the ageing of components, materials and, even the staffs at these facilities continue to be serious issues - issues that are receiving increased attention, worldwide. Likewise, worldwide attention is focused on the serious erosion in the level of governmental support, management commitment and available resources to the infrastructure necessary for effective research reactor operations. Robust utilization plans are not always an inherent part of the decision-making process for determining whether a research reactor should be built, in the first place, or should continue to operate, in the long run. This is compounded by the fact that the use of these reactors is no longer an attractive research vehicle for the university students and academic researchers. From these facts, it can be seen that there is a need to infuse vitality into this critical part of the nuclear industry and its infrastructure, thereby allowing for broader beneficial applications.
And that bring us to the challenges that stand before this conference. I am confident that each of you has come here looking to be provocative in your contributions and hoping to help promote a renewed vision within the research reactor community. I know your discussions will be both insightful and probing; hopefully, the findings and recommendations will carry on this vision of far- and broad-sightedness. We all know that if the safe operations, as a hallmark, are to be continued; if the scientific research and discoveries are to be continued; if the benefits for mankind are to be maintained - then the premises upon which research reactor are built must be reconsidered and brought into the technical, economic, social, realities of today. The question is, "How is this to be done?" Here are some of my thoughts relating to our Agency's activities.
First, in response to a Resolution from the 2000 General Conference, the IAEA is developing a Code of Conduct concerning the utilization and operation of research reactors, relying on the technical, legal and political expertise of many of the Member States. This Code of Conduct, as a non-binding international legal instrument, offers guidance to States for the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations, and includes recommendations for "best practices" for safety management of research reactors. The final draft version of the Code is being distributed to all Member States for comments this week and is expected to be resubmitted for consideration by the Board of Governors in March 2004 and should have the unequivocal support of all countries with research reactors.
The acceptance of such a Code will carry forward the initiatives that have been pursued under the IAEA's programs for Safety Standards and Safety Review Missions. The concept of providing internationally accepted standards for the safe construction, operation, shutdown and decommissioning of a research reactor has been in place for over a decade. Likewise, the Agency has commissioned numerous safety and security missions, such as INSARR's, IRRT's and, more recently, IPPAS's to assure that the totality of the research reactor infrastructure is effective and properly focused. These activities must continue in the future and must be supported by all concerned stakeholders, as mutually enhancing learning processes.
My second point addresses the need to effectively deal with the unique issues associated with fuel management in research reactors. In today's world, converting existing reactors from High Enriched (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), and designing new reactors to burn LEU, are urgently needed. The Agency supports the RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) programme that aims at reducing and eventual eliminating all commerce in HEU for research reactors. High-density fuels that will support the operation of high flux reactors must be developed and qualified. Fuel conversion leads directly to the next element within fuel management, that being the need for assuring the repatriation of research reactor spent fuel to the country of origin. The US has an Acceptance Programme in place for US origin fuel discharged up to May 2006, which is supported by the Agency. A Tripartite Initiative (IAEA, RF, US) is working on developing a similar programme for research reactors with Russian origin fuel. The research reactor community, at large, must also address this issue. If only from economical and human resource viewpoints, safe and secure operations cannot be assured in the future if each individual end-user must deal, by themselves, with the issue of long-term storage. Creative solutions, such as regional initiatives, to problems with the back end of the fuel cycle, must be considered and undertaken if the balance between technological advance, safety and security is to be maintained. This particular issue has been a point of emphasis by the Director General, as noted by his statement at the Agency's 2003 General Conference and by his recent article in "The Economist."
My third point addresses the threat to public safety and security posed by some form of nuclear terrorism. In the wake of recent highly organized terrorist attacks, the international community has to come to recognize that new and stronger measures must be taken to protect against and prepare for diverse range of terrorist scenarios. One of the key priorities must be the provision of adequate physical protection for all nuclear materials, radioactive materials, and facilities. This includes the transportation challenges inherent with their use. The concern is no longer limited to a specific country or geographic region. All of the activities associated with research reactor design, operations and utilization must consider security implications. All strategies must consider the implications of theft, sabotage or other malevolent activities.
My final, but, nonetheless, most important point, addresses the need for us to look at all aspects of life cycle management as part of our consideration of how to better utilize these technological tools. Many research reactors that are in operation, or are being proposed for operation, today, seem to have neither realistic utilization plans nor solid decommissioning plans. The Agency can assist operating organizations and national authorities in developing realistic strategic plans, focusing on implementing and utilizing these reactors in a manner that is consistent with the facility's and host country's capabilities and objectives, and that will make them more viable in the next decade and more attractive to future generations. However, the research reactor community must take the initiative and generate creative solutions to this problem.
Special consideration should be also given to research reactor facilities that have become or are developing into regional "centres of excellence" in order to maintain critical mass to create adequate benefits. Likewise, we must also consider regionally focused solutions to issues such as the development and maintenance of the necessary regulatory infrastructures, the production of radioactive sources and the long-term disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The IAEA can assist Member States in the decommissioning of reactors by providing guidance documents, training and expert advice. Whether it is a point of national status or institutional pride, some countries and reactor operators are reluctant to take on the challenges of decommissioning. As a minimum, preliminary decommissioning plans should be prepared for all research reactor facilities. Only then can options be assessed, informed decisions made, and appropriate actions undertaken. This challenge must be dealt with.
Now is the time to pursue provocative and innovative solutions to problems. Creative solutions, such as the recent initiation of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and the Iberian-Latin American Nuclear Safety Network as vehicles to address the problem of knowledge management for sharing expertise and experience, must be pursued. The vision of the research reactor community must be extended. Perhaps, the chartering of a new international group, similar to INPRO in the power reactor community, that would set its horizon on the 2020 or 2030 time frame, and would look to see where and how research reactors could and should evolve, is appropriate.
This conference was designed to provide us with a forum for considering far-ranging issues. In that regard, you have a very full programme ahead of you. I encourage you to be provocative and innovative and to think outside the box. I encourage you not to be satisfied with "good enough" when "excellence" is within your grasp. Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your findings.