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Statement to the Forty-Sixth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference

Vienna, Austria

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed important changes and events relevant to every aspect of our work. The urgent need for a strengthened safeguards regime was graphically illustrated by our findings in Iraq. Similarly, the necessity of upgrading nuclear safety worldwide has been made abundantly clear in the post-Chernobyl era. More gradually, in the technology area, the role of nuclear power as a major source of energy supply and as a mechanism to mitigate climate change has been undergoing a steady re-evaluation - though it continues to be subject to mixed views - while other nuclear applications have gained broad recognition by many of our Member States as tools of choice for sustainable development. And just in the past twelve months, shortcomings in nuclear security and the necessity for rapid improvement were made visible by the events of September 11th of last year. All these changes and events have had a profound impact on our activities and our priorities. And, I have to add, during this entire period of evolution, the Agency has been subject to a zero real growth budget.

Today I would like to review with you some of the Agency's recent activities in response to the various developments - and some of the challenges that we continue to face.

Nuclear Technology

Nuclear Power Operation and Construction
Let me first turn to nuclear technology, beginning with nuclear power. The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy and electricity in the coming decades. Nuclear power is currently a significant contributor to world electricity, and continues to be the only source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment.

Nuclear power remains, however, mainly in a holding position. And while its environmental merits are increasingly recognized, public concerns remain, principally about operational safety and waste disposal. For a number of years, I have been stressing that the future of nuclear power will depend on sustaining a strong safety record, improving economic competitiveness, demonstrating waste management solutions and technological developments - in short, regaining public support. I am pleased to note that, in the past year, we have seen positive developments in many of these areas.

In 2001, nuclear power supplied 16.2% of the world's electricity, up from 15.9% in 2000. In addition to two new nuclear units in the Russian Federation and Japan, this increase was mainly due to the continuing improvements in plant availability as a result of effective management. Average energy availability in 2001 was 83.4%, an improvement equivalent to having 33 more 1000 MW(e) power plants than in 1990.

With regard to the construction of new plants, Asia and Eastern Europe remain the centres of expansion. At the beginning of 2002, 17 of the 32 nuclear power plants under construction globally were in four Member States: China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Russia and Eastern Europe accounted for an additional 10 units.

Some important developments have also taken place recently in Western Europe and North America. The US Government, in keeping with its new energy policy that envisions an increasing role for nuclear energy, has committed to work with the nuclear industry to have a new nuclear plant operating in the USA before the end of the decade. This would be the first start of construction of a new nuclear plant in the USA since the late 1970s. And in May the Finnish Parliament ratified the Government's favourable "decision-in-principle" to build a fifth nuclear power plant, as "the most cost-effective alternative, both in terms of central government finances and national economy, for generation of baseload power within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol." This is also the first decision to build a new reactor in Western Europe in 15 years, and contrasts with past decisions in Belgium, Germany and Sweden to phase out nuclear energy. Finally, the European Commission in July indicated that where developing countries have opted or are opting for nuclear energy, and where this is consistent with a national strategy promoting sustainable development, and sufficient safeguards exist, the European Union may provide technical assistance for establishing and implementing the necessary regulatory framework and institutional capacity to manage nuclear energy safely.

Status of New Reactors Under Development
In the light of these developments, a key challenge for the industry will be to prove that available new designs address the often expressed concerns about nuclear power. Work is being carried out in Argentina, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden and the USA on advanced water cooled reactors (both light and heavy water). China, France, Japan, Russia, South Africa and the USA are among those exploring advanced modular high temperature gas cooled reactors. And China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Russia are working on advanced designs for liquid metal cooled fast reactors. Research is also under way in the Republic of Korea, Russia, the USA and eight countries of the European Union on accelerator driven systems. All of these new designs aim to produce electricity at an enhanced level of safety, and some seek to serve additional aims, such as producing hydrogen as a clean fuel source, producing potable water at minimal cost, incinerating long lived radioactive waste and reducing plutonium stockpiles.

International Initiatives for Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles
Despite the positive results achieved to date on new designs, nuclear energy, like all other technologies, must continue to innovate if it is to play a significant long term role commensurate with its potential. The Agency encourages collaborative innovation - both through its International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and through close co-operation with similar efforts. Currently, 12 countries and the European Commission support INPRO by their active engagement, financial assistance and expertise. The INPRO International Co-ordinating Group is now working to define user requirements related to economics, waste, safety, non-proliferation and other issues. These user requirements will be reported in June of next year at an International Conference on "Innovative Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Nuclear Power" together with the results of the Generation IV International Forum - a US-led co-operative initiative working on innovative reactor technologies - and other projects.

Nuclear Desalination
For many countries - particularly developing countries - an important potential use of nuclear power is for seawater desalination. More than one billion people have no access to clean water, and experts predict that, without intervention, about two-thirds of the world's population will face shortages of clean water by 2025. The focus of the Agency's nuclear desalination activities is being shifted to country specific projects - an approach supported by the Agency's International Nuclear Desalination Advisory Group (INDAG). Early this year, with the Agency's technical assistance, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea initiated a joint study of a nuclear desalination plant for Indonesia. Another joint study is under way between Tunisia and France. And Pakistan is continuing efforts to set up a nuclear desalination demonstration project at Karachi. Together with the Indian nuclear desalination project at Kalpakkam, which is now in the commissioning test stage, these projects should help enhance understanding of the technical and economic feasibility of using nuclear power to produce clean potable water. These projects and related developments will be discussed during the International Conference on Nuclear Desalination in Marrakesh next month.

Fusion Research
In the area of fusion research, I would note that the engineering design of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), with collaborative efforts by the European Union, Japan, Russia and the USA, was completed last year. For the next ITER phase - the construction of the first large scale fusion machine - four offers have been made for the site location: in Canada, France, Japan and Spain. I would also point out that the Agency has accepted the request by the ITER parties to continue in its role as facilitator during the next phase of activities, and that the USA has recently indicated renewed interest in the ITER programme.

Licence Extension and Decommissioning
Two other important issues of current focus involve nuclear power plant licence extension and decommissioning. About one third of the worldwide installed nuclear capacity is over 20 years old. Ten US nuclear power plants have now been granted licence renewals that would increase their licensed lifetimes to 60 years, and 37 additional plants have applied for licence renewal. Last year Russia also began the process of formal licence extension, with the first extension of 5 years already granted. Extending the operating life of existing nuclear plants is economically attractive because it requires relatively little capital expenditure, and reduces the short term need for new generating capacity; however, it also requires particular attention to the safety of ageing equipment and systems.

Regarding decommissioning, the number of successfully completed projects is steadily increasing, together with confidence in the feasibility of safe decommissioning. Some parts of the decommissioning process, however, still require additional effort: improved understanding of costs; better defined organizational structures for decommissioning projects - which in some cases must last for decades; and planning for use of the site at the completion of decommissioning. In addition, facilities with an accident history (such as Chernobyl-4) or with particular features (e.g. graphite reactors) still pose major technological challenges. The Agency continues to provide technical assistance to ongoing decommissioning projects in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine, as well as making available relevant safety standards and technical guidance. We are also establishing a new decommissioning technical group, made up of experts from Member States, to provide technical and resource insights on decommissioning issues.

Last month the Agency co-ordinated the arrangements for and verified the transport of fresh fuel from a research reactor at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to Russia, the country of origin. This important security measure will be followed by decommissioning of the reactor.

Next month the Agency will host an international conference on decommissioning in Berlin, and we will convene an international symposium on nuclear power plant life cycle management in Budapest in November.

Waste Management
The management and disposal of spent fuel and high level radioactive waste continues to be a major point of public concern with respect to nuclear power. Some important progress has taken place in the past twelve months. In the USA the selection of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository for high level waste and spent fuel has already been approved by the President and the Congress. And Sweden has begun geological investigation of candidate sites for a spent fuel repository.

Thus, together with the decision in Finland to go forward with a deep disposal facility near the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant - which I reported to you last year - it is likely that by the end of the next decade one or more repositories for the disposal of high level waste and spent fuel will be in operation. Implementation is expected to take place in stages, with only a portion of the repository excavated initially, giving opportunities for regulatory review, public consultation and design and technological optimization as construction proceeds and the repository is expanded. This stepwise approach is perceived to have advantages in terms of safety, public acceptance and reduced initial costs. As I have often stated, the most important step in gaining public confidence in this area will be to demonstrate that technologically and environmentally sound waste disposal solutions exist and are actually working.

Late last year the Agency launched a new initiative to assist in their efforts to move forward with the disposal of high level and long lived Member States radioactive wastes through a "Network of Centres of Excellence" for training and demonstration of disposal technologies in underground research facilities. This network, built initially around facilities made available by the Governments of Canada and Belgium, has now expanded to include underground facilities in Switzerland and the USA. To date, 19 developing Member States have indicated an interest in training scientists through the network.

Progress is also being made on the safety aspects of radioactive waste management. As requested by last year's General Conference, we are: developing a common framework for different types of radioactive waste; assessing the safety implications of extended waste storage; defining safety standards for geological disposal (including the issues of human intrusion, institutional control and retrievability); and developing a well co-ordinated programme to ensure adequate application of the Agency standards. Much of this work is being performed under the auspices of the Agency's Waste Safety Standards Committee. While the exact circumstances differ from country to country, each of these issues must be addressed as a precondition for a coherent system for radioactive waste management and disposal.

Nuclear Applications
A major part of the Agency's technology activity is focused on transferring nuclear technology in applications other than nuclear power. Under both the regular budget and technical co-operation (TC) programmes, the Agency functions as a catalyst for social and economic development by supporting the needs and priorities of Member States.

I should mention that one of the conclusions of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which took place very recently in Johannesburg, was the need to ensure capacity building and the transfer and use of modern technology as a prerequisite for development. The Agency used this forum to enhance awareness - through participation in panels, side events and other interactions - of nuclear technologies that contribute to many aspects of Agenda 21 and the United Nations Millennium Declaration, ranging from human health and agricultural productivity to water management, environmental cleanup and energy production. A few examples will illustrate the range and variety of Agency activities in these areas.

Radiotherapy Servicess
Many of the Agency's developing Member States have given high priority to the introduction or upgrading of radiotherapy services. Radiotherapy is used with curative or palliative benefit for over 50% of cancer patients in industrialized countries. However, fully two-thirds of global teletherapy equipment serves the populations of industrialized countries - and the remaining one-third is stretched among the remaining 5.5 billion people. The Agency Directory of Radiotherapy Centres still identifies many countries that have poor or no radiotherapy services. We expect therefore that requests for assistance will increase, especially given our recent successes in initiating radiotherapy programmes in some developing Member States including Ethiopia, Ghana, Mongolia, Namibia and Uganda.

The Agency does not have the financial resources to respond fully to the growing requests for radiotherapy machines. However, the effectiveness of Agency expertise, training and other resources can be extended through partnerships with recipient States and donor organizations. A good example is in Zambia, which has secured a multi-million dollar OPEC Fund loan to establish a radiotherapy oncology centre; the Agency has been called on to assist Zambia's effort related to design input, equipment selection, training, dosimetry and safe, effective procedures. A realistic broad objective in this area is to assist Member States in establishing national 'centres of competence', which can serve as both a model and a training resource for further expansion of radiotherapy services. We are also working with the World Health Organization (WHO) on procedures for quality assurance and good manufacturing practices that can be incorporated into relevant WHO guidance.

Sterile Insect Technique - Tsetse and Trypanosomosis
Tsetse flies, and the sleeping sickness they transmit to humans and ngana disease to livestock, create a significant burden on rural populations across Sub-Saharan Africa - not only in terms of direct health effects, but also by restricting the use of draft animals in crop production. The Agency supports the efforts of African Member States to implement the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign, including the use of the sterile insect technique (SIT). This joint international project closely co-ordinates the technical and economic contributions of the African Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the IAEA, WHO and the recipient Member States. Mali has begun preparation for releasing sterile tsetse flies over an area of 2500 square kilometers, and Ethiopia is constructing a factory for sterile tsetse production that will supply a similar project over a 5000 square kilometer area. The results of a recently completed co-ordinated research project (CRP) are being used to upgrade the mass production process of sterile male tsetse flies at rearing centres in Africa. The Agency also recently organized field visits by international journalists to experience first-hand the impact of tsetse and trypanosomosis on African agriculture and human health - an effort that has helped to enhance public awareness of the poverty and health dimensions of this problem and the role of SIT in a sustainable solution.

SIT - Malaria-Transmitting Mosquito
Research on the use of SIT to combat the malaria-transmitting mosquito has begun with the development of a project document, following input from Member States, outside experts and WHO. Expert missions have identified two potential field sites, one in Northern Sudan and the other on Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean, for evaluating the anti-malarial application of SIT.

Sustainable Agriculture and Food Safety
Nuclear technology in plant breeding programmes is being applied to produce crop varieties with improved yield, quality and ability to tolerate unique environments. Nuclear based techniques are also being used to evaluate soil processes, to monitor the migration of nitrates from fertilizer, and to identify carbon dynamics in various agroecological zones - insights that, in turn, can lead to more efficient land use. And food irradiation is being used in over 30 countries to ensure safety and quality and to satisfy trade and export regulations.

Water Resources Management
The use of isotope hydrology in water resources management is continuing to gain recognition through TC projects in 40 countries around the world. Isotope hydrology is used to map underground aquifers for improved groundwater management, and for investigation and recovery from contamination events. In addition, we are exploring uses of isotope hydrology to assist in river basin management and - based on our successful experience in Venezuela in isolating and correcting dam leakage - we are working with multiple teams under the African Regional Co-operative Agreement (AFRA) to assess the leakage and structural integrity of dozens of dams across Africa. The Agency's increased technical and research co-operation with the water sector programmes of other United Nations organizations has been accompanied by greater recognition - including our selection as the lead UN agency for co-ordinating the celebration of World Water Day in March.

Industrial Processes
Radioisotopes and radiation are used regularly in an extensive range of industrial applications, ranging from the sterilization of medical products to the surface treatment of sheet metal and piping to enhance corrosion resistance. Radioisotopes are used to map and enhance the productivity of oil fields and for trouble shooting in various operational aspects of petrochemical complexes. Member States continue to seek the Agency's assistance in setting up their own non-destructive testing infrastructure to help their industries to improve output. Agency technical co-operation proved instrumental in the successful assembly and operation of the first industrial unit for flue gas treatment in Poland, thus helping to substantially reduce sulphur dioxide emissions in the use of coal for electricity production. Similar efforts in the Republic of Korea have resulted in the use of an electron beam facility to enhance the treatment of waste water from a dye complex.

De-mining
Four institutions participated in a CRP to develop nuclear instruments for the detection of land mines. A number of these instruments performed well in detecting simulated explosives buried below the surface. One such instrument was selected for performance checks in Vienna and is being prepared for field trials in Croatia as part of a regional TC project. These Agency efforts and related research and development are expected to produce instruments that can be combined on a multisensor land mine detection system. If successful, this approach would be much less labour intensive and more efficient than conventional methods because of the capability of nuclear instruments to detect explosives remotely.

Laboratory Activities
The Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco has developed a number of new techniques for the detection and study of nuclear and non-nuclear marine pollutants in the laboratory and the field. A new in situ radioactivity monitoring system has been developed that permits real time monitoring of marine borne contaminants, and much better mapping of the sea bottom than time intensive sampling from ships. An initial trial in the Irish Sea was very successful, and use of the system is now being discussed with other States. In addition, a new underground laboratory is now in place for ultra-sensitive measurements of relatively short lived radionuclides, and new mass spectrometry techniques are providing highly sensitive analysis for long lived radionuclides. These techniques are being used to support environmental studies and coastal zone cleanup and protection efforts related to both nuclear and non-nuclear contaminants. They will also be extremely helpful in providing faster and more accurate analyses during emergencies.

Work at the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf continues to focus on: training scientists from developing Member States in nuclear technologies; assisting developing country laboratories in becoming accredited in nuclear analytical techniques; and supporting Agency projects in nuclear applications ranging from mutation plant breeding to insect sterilization. A recent development incorporates radioecological expertise into the analysis of pollutants in terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems and food chains.

Co-ordinated Research Projects
Co-ordinated research projects continue to represent a significant area of Agency activity, bringing together research institutes in developing and developed Member States to collaborate on topics of interest. In 2001, contracts and agreements totaling nearly $6.5 million were concluded with over 900 scientists in 104 countries. Thematic, or doctoral, CRPs have been introduced to combine capacity building with scientific research. Each of these CRP pairs senior researchers in developing and developed countries, who jointly supervise a research fellow from the same developing country in studies leading toward an advanced degree.

To conclude my review of developments in nuclear technology, let me say that we must continue to encourage co-operative development in reactor and fuel cycle technology. While the Secretariat is aware of the merits of nuclear power and its potential, we are equally aware of the concerns associated with it, and the divergent views that exist today on its role. The choice of whether to use nuclear power is a national prerogative. The Agency's statutory role, however, is to ensure - by fostering safety, security and technological development - that this important energy source remains available for those who want to make use of it. We must place a strong focus on the back end of the fuel cycle, developing solutions that create confidence about the safety of the entire cycle. And we must increase our efforts to provide Member States and the public at large with objective information about the range of nuclear technologies available.

In the coming year, the Agency will focus on a number of specific technology issues that are of high priority: supporting Member State efforts related to decommissioning and licence extension; assisting with energy planning assessments; promoting co-operative research and training on waste management; establishing user requirements for innovative reactor and fuel cycle technology; supporting insect rearing facilities for expanded use of SIT against tsetse in Africa; exploring additional applications for isotope hydrology; and expanding the application of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy techniques.

Nuclear, Radiation, Transport, and Waste Safety

Safety in nuclear activities around the globe remains a key factor for the future of nuclear technology. It is satisfying to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide. Still, more work needs to be done, and public demands are widely voiced in many countries for greater transparency and accountability on safety issues. The need for a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety regime, therefore, continues to be a high priority.

International Conventions
The development and adoption of legally binding norms has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. The Early Notification and Assistance Conventions are long established. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management has been in force for over a year. And in April, the Agency hosted the second review meeting of contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety here in Vienna. However, many States are not yet party to these conventions, and certain key areas of the nuclear fuel cycle are still not subject to conventions.

I am pleased to note that this year's review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety demonstrated the strong commitment of all involved to the objectives of the Convention. Participation was nearly triple that of the previous review meeting; national reports were of high quality; and the peer review, which covers the national reports of all contracting parties, was substantive and candid. The contracting parties concluded that the global community had made significant progress in the areas of regulatory independence, supporting legal infrastructures, implementation of safety upgrades in installations built to earlier standards and emergency preparedness. The Agency's safety review services were considered a significant factor in these areas of progress.

The contracting parties also observed that a number of nuclear installations are in operation or under construction in States that are not contracting parties to the Convention. I would encourage these States to join the Convention.

The contracting parties asked the Secretariat to prepare, for their next review meeting in 2005, a report on nuclear safety issues and generic trends, drawing upon the results of our safety review services. This is a welcome development which, as a supplement to national reports, could provide further insight into the status of nuclear safety.

Establishment of Global Safety Standards
The development and continuing evolution of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with assistance in their implementation, is another key component of the global safety regime. In the mid-1990s, a major overhaul of the Agency's safety standards programme was initiated, with a revised oversight committee architecture and a systematic, rigorous approach to upgrading the entire corpus of standards. The new standards that have resulted are of the highest calibre, represent current international best practices and should be viewed as being universally applicable. With the assistance of the Commission on Safety Standards, the Agency is currently reviewing its strategy for the global acceptance and use of its safety standards.

A regional effort is under way in Europe to ensure a common approach to nuclear safety, including common standards, criteria and practices. In my view, any efforts to strengthen safety through regional standardization and co-operation should be commended. Based on our recent dialogue with the European Commission, I understand that such efforts aim to be consistent with and draw upon the internationally agreed standards and to use them as the basic point of reference. This is welcome. In my view, nuclear safety - which by its very nature knows no borders - will be better served through the development of a single set of standards that reflect international best practices and are universally applied.

Application of Safety Standards
Safety standards are not effective simply by promulgation, but only if applied in practice. The Agency's safety services use IAEA standards as a baseline, assist Member States in their application, and provide important feedback on their effectiveness.

High demand for operational safety services has continued in Asia and in most Central and Eastern European countries. Good examples of the use of the Safety Culture Enhancement Programme Service are to be found in Brazil, Mexico and the Netherlands. Current areas of focus, based on the trends observed, involve the ability of nuclear installations to manage the interactions between technology, economic pressures, human and organizational factors and nuclear safety in times of change.

Design reviews have been carried out in the last year at Temelin and Kozloduy after upgrades to the initial design, and seismic upgrading and environmental impact remain areas of significant interest. There is continuing demand for support for periodic safety reviews, with increasing focus on the ageing of facility equipment and systems.

In 2001 the findings from seven full scope International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) reviews were evaluated. Nearly 70% of the findings related to institutional and organizational issues such as the availability of human resources, regulatory independence, completeness of the legislative framework and the effectiveness of regulatory inspection and enforcement.

The Agency also provides peer reviews on the effectiveness of radiation safety infrastructures. This is intended to complement the IRRT service, but has been of particular interest to States without nuclear power programmes. It is still used extensively to evaluate progress in the Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Safety Infrastructure. One such mission was recently completed in El Salvador, and another eight missions are planned for the last quarter of 2002.

These and other safety services provide support and share valuable insights, and I urge all Member States to use them. Recipient Member States invariably express appreciation for the insights gained, but for the global nuclear safety regime to become more effective, the results of these services must be widely known to governments and to the public. The development and implementation of an 'Integrated Safety Evaluation' service - which would provide a consolidated diagnosis of a country's nuclear safety status, in terms of both the regulatory infrastructure and the operating facilities - may serve as the future vehicle for raising the profile and better communicating the results of Agency safety services.

Radiological Protection of Patients
There is clearly a growing emphasis by Member States on issues related to radiation, transport and waste safety. One such issue involves the radiological protection of patients. Accidents involving severe overexposures and in some cases fatalities, together with the concerns expressed in various forums, have prompted greater recognition of the need to address this issue. An Agency conference organized in Málaga last year called for the formulation of an action plan, which was approved last week by the Board. This plan, developed in consultation with other relevant UN organizations and professional associations, puts forward a range of activities that, if implemented, will be of great benefit in helping Member States to provide adequate patient protection.

Transport Safety
Many Member States continue to express concern over the risks involved in the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material. Last year the General Conference adopted a resolutionurging Member States that shipped radioactive materials and spent fuel to provide assurances, as appropriate, to potentially affected States that their national regulations were in accordance with the Agency's transport regulations. Work is continuing on refining these regulations. We have also been working closely with, and providing detailed input to, the International Maritime Organization on the preparation of its emergency management schedules.

Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) missions, which help transporting countries to assess their effectiveness in applying the Agency's transport standards, were carried out in Brazil and the United Kingdom in April and June 2002, respectively. A TranSAS mission will be carried out in Turkey early next year, and preliminary discussions are under way with Panamanian authorities for a possible mission that would include appraising operations in the Panama Canal. It is important that Member States - particularly transporting countries - make use of this valuable service. The Agency will host an international conference here in Vienna next July on the safety of transport of radioactive material. Naturally the Agency will continue its efforts, in co-operation with all concerned, to enhance all aspects of transport safety.

Radionuclides in Commodities
Two years ago the General Conference asked the Secretariat to develop radiological criteria for long lived radionuclides in commodities, particularly foodstuffs and wood, to facilitate international trade. Since that time, there has been extensive study and debate on this issue among relevant experts, and substantial progress has been made. However, consensus has not yet been reached on appropriate radiological criteria among all interested Member States. One problem is that the levels already established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, regarding the safe consumption of potentially contaminated foodstuffs after a nuclear accident, are much higher than the regulatory clearance levels proposed for non-edible commodities. Consultations are under way to resolve these differences. Another problem involves naturally occurring radionuclides - for example, in commonly used minerals and sands - which are often present at levels well above the standards set for artificial radionuclides. We will continue our efforts, in co-operation with Member States and expert bodies - particularly with the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its sponsoring organizations, FAO and WHO - to resolve remaining outstanding issues.

Occupational Radiation Protection
Last month the Agency, jointly with the International Labour Organization (ILO), convened an international conference in Geneva on occupational radiation protection - an event co-sponsored by many concerned international organizations. Since 1961 the Agency and the ILO have been working to establish international occupational radiation safety standards for the protection of workers. I am pleased to note that the conference found that radiation doses of workers have been dramatically reduced over the years, although continuing vigilance has been recommended.

Radiation Protection of the Environment
International radiation standards historically have been based on protection of humans, with the assumption that other species would also be adequately protected. That assumption, while generally valid, may no longer cover emerging expectations for non-human species in remote areas. For example, some Agency studies have shown that even large marine discharges of radioactive materials are unlikely to affect humans adversely, but other species in the disposal area could be affected. Some Member States are seeking to extend protection provisions to focus on individual organisms, rather than on collective protection. This would require revision of some assumptions in the radiation safety community, and could require reviewing the Agency's standards for limiting discharges into the environment. An international symposium on this issue was held in Australia in July, and it will also be the focus of an international conference in Stockholm next year.

Emergency Planning and Response
The 2001 General Conference reviewed the related issues of strengthening emergency response capabilities in Member States and enhancing the Agency's Emergency Response Centre. In March, the Board approved new safety requirements for preparing and responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, which should provide greater consistency in Member State programmes and improve the co-ordination of international response. The Secretariat is working on a number of improvements to its emergency response capabilities: upgrades to its communication and display systems; enhanced computer environment and web site; and standardization of procedures for ERNET - a network of qualified emergency response teams established by the Secretariat. We have been active this year in responding to emergencies under the Assistance Convention. In addition to radiological source recovery efforts to which I will refer later, the Agency provided assistance in the aftermath of overexposures involving radiotherapy patients in Poland, as well as overexposures from an industrial radiography source in Bolivia.

Management of Nuclear Knowledge
A final issue of growing concern that could have wide implications involves the potential loss of knowledge as the nuclear workforce ages and retires, as well as the decreasing support for university programmes in nuclear science and engineering. The primary issue is one of 'succession planning' - ensuring that, as nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians retire, a younger generation with appropriate educational backgrounds becomes available to take their place. Scientific and technical competence is essential for existing and future applications of nuclear technology, and a lessening in this competence brings obvious safety implications.

In June, the Agency convened a meeting with experts from Member States on managing nuclear knowledge - to compare notes on knowledge management issues, learn what Member States are doing and determine what more can be achieved through co-operative international efforts. This meeting came to the conclusion that to sustain the present level of deployment of nuclear technology (power and non-power alike) urgent action throughout the nuclear community is required. This action could include: facilitating the development of curricula for internationally accepted university degrees in key areas of nuclear science and technology; promoting better networking among academic institutions with nuclear education programmes; developing guidance documents on the preservation of nuclear knowledge; and integrating the Agency's existing nuclear databases in the form of an easily accessed "nuclear knowledge portal" on the Internet. International co-operation will play an important role in promoting mutually supportive networking among governments, industry leaders and academic institutions in this area.

I should conclude this review of the nuclear safety area by emphasizing that, although much has been achieved, much improvement is still needed in remaining areas of apparent vulnerability - such as research reactor safety, the control of radioactive sources, and certain power reactors and waste management facilities that were built to older standards. Many actions could accelerate and significantly contribute to this important process. One is achieving wide adherence to existing safety conventions, and the adoption of legally binding agreements for the remaining areas of nuclear activity. Another is the completion of an entire set of safety standards and the upgrading of all existing standards, with a simultaneous effort to ensure their universal application.

In the coming year, the Agency will focus on a number of specific safety issues that are of high priority: safety management during times of change; ageing management and plant licence extension; the potential impact of deregulation on safety; resolution of transport safety issues; both technology and safety aspects of knowledge management; and the effectiveness of regulatory processes.

Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of and dependence on nuclear weapons, are more important than ever for the continuing sustainability and credibility of the regime. The Agency continues to be central to that regime through its verification system.

Safeguards Implementation Report for 2001
In the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2001, the Agency was able to conclude that in the 141 States (and in Taiwan, China) which have safeguards agreements in force, no indication was found of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of facilities or equipment that had been placed under safeguards. On this basis the Agency concluded that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. Moreover, for several States - each of which had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force - the Agency was able to provide broader assurance - not only about declared but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. I am pleased to note that the levels of goal attainment for 2001 were comparable to those of 2000 - although the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities under safeguards continued to increase.

Status of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
During the past year, the Agency redoubled its efforts to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols in accordance with relevant General Conference resolutions. Regional seminars were held in Lima, Almaty and Johannesburg, with the active engagement of the host countries and generous support by the Government of Japan. These seminars were intended to deepen the understanding of participating State officials about the role of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in promoting global and regional security objectives.

Since last year's General Conference, new safeguards agreements entered into force for Kuwait, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mali and Yemen. Ten States signed additional protocols, and additional protocols entered into force for China, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Mali, Panama and South Africa.

Despite this incremental progress, the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force remains well below expectations. Forty-eight States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and additional protocols have entered into force for only 28 States. I would urge all States who have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date. For the Agency to provide the required assurances, it must have the required authority.

Completion of Framework for Integrated Safeguards
The Secretariat has continued its efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system and make it more cost-efficient. A major milestone was the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards and its presentation to the Board of Governors in March. The practical effect is that, for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and in which the necessary safeguards conclusions have been drawn, the Agency will be able to implement safeguards in a way that makes the verification process more robust and more efficient. Integrated safeguards, and the conceptual framework that guides them, usher in a new system of verification that is more comprehensive in its outlook and more effective and efficient in its measures. Naturally, further evaluation, newly available technology and practical experience and feedback gained through implementation will be used to refine elements of integrated safeguards as we proceed. While this integration ultimately offers the potential for cost reductions, changes to the safeguards system will have to continue to be driven by increased effectiveness and not merely by cost considerations. As countries bring their additional protocols into force - particularly those with large nuclear programmes - the workload will initially increase, but reductions will ensue after the initial conclusions have been drawn and integrated safeguards initiated.

Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
For nearly four years, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions. At the time of our last inspection in December 1998, we reported to the Security Council that - based on our inspections over a period of more than seven years - there was no indication of Iraq having achieved its goal of producing a nuclear weapon, nor were there any indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon usable material of any practical significance. Since that time, however, the Agency has been unable to draw any conclusion or provide any assurance regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. It will therefore be essential for the Agency to resolve, upon recommencement of inspections, the key issue of whether the situation regarding Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities has changed in any material way since December 1998. Currently we have no additional information that can be directly linked without inspection to Iraq's nuclear activities. Resumption of inspections is therefore a crucial step towards providing assurance to the international community that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme has been neutralized and is not being revived.

In May and July of this year, I participated in two rounds of talks between the United Nations Secretary-General and Iraq. During these meetings we made it clear that with the return of inspectors to Iraq, and provided that Iraq co-operates in all respects, the Agency could be in a position in about one year to report to the Security Council that as regards nuclear activities the conditions for the suspension of sanctions under Resolution 1284 had been met. I would therefore join the UN Secretary-General in urging Iraq to accept the resumption of inspections without delay. This indispensable step is clearly in the interests of both the international community and Iraq itself.

I should note that, with the co-operation of Iraq, an inspection of declared nuclear material subject to safeguards was again completed in January this year, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. However, these NPT measures - as I have often emphasized - are no substitute for the broader and more intensive Security Council mandated verification measures that are necessary for the Agency to provide the assurances sought by the Council.

I should also point out here that Resolution 1409, adopted by the Security Council earlier this year, requested the IAEA, in consultation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to evaluate applications submitted to the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme related to the export of products and commodities to Iraq, in order to identify nuclear related items referred to in Resolution 687 or in the Goods Review List referred to in Resolution 1409, to determine whether such items are either prohibited or require prior approval by the Sanctions Committee. Since the adoption of this resolution, the Agency has been receiving and processing nearly 1000 such applications per month.

Status of Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Since 1993, the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Agency continues to be unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration - specifically, that the DPRK has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. Despite many rounds of technical discussions, no tangible progress has been made. In accordance with the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the USA, however, the Agency since November 1994 has been monitoring the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities.

As I have made well known for a number of years now, our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration could take about three to four years, assuming full co-operation by the DPRK. This verification work is a basic obligation under the DPRK's safeguards agreement, as well as a prerequisite for the delivery of key nuclear components under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has informed the Agency that it has provided the DPRK with a construction schedule for the light water reactor project, according to which the delivery of the key nuclear components for the first reactor would occur by 2005. Further delays in the start of the Agency's activities to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial DPRK declaration could lead therefore to a delay in the KEDO project. I would urge the DPRK to agree to the initiation of this long overdue verification process without further delay, and to that end start soon the necessary dialogue with the Agency on this as well as on other issues relevant to the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the Agency.

Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East
Pursuant to the mandate given to me by the General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region. Once again, I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make progress in the implementation of this important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East. As before, I will continue to exert every effort within my authority and, I trust, with the co-operation of all concerned, to move this mandate forward.

Progress on Nuclear Arms Control Efforts
During the past twelve months the US and Russian presidents signed a treaty to further reduce their strategic nuclear arms, and agreed to remove additional amounts of fissile material from military use. Also, at their June Summit, the G8 Heads of State established a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund, inter alia, the disposition of fissile materials. These are clearly important steps that hopefully will lead to others.

In this regard, preparatory work under the initiative by Russia and the USA to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to Agency verification has now been largely concluded. Experts from Russia, the USA and the Agency have examined the technical, financial and legal issues associated with a future role in the verification of weapon origin fissile material. They have agreed that the technical solutions developed under that initiative could allow the Agency to verify any form of fissile material without disclosing sensitive information. Preliminary estimates of verification costs have been made, and a legal framework for this verification has been developed. I will naturally report to the Board once Russia and the USA have indicated the timing, modalities and types of material that they are ready to submit to Agency verification.

Agency verification continues to play a critical role in ensuring the health and vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is essential that we continue to make progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament and in that process achieve universal application of the Agency safeguards system. An immediate priority of direct relevance to our work is the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States that have made non-proliferation commitments through the NPT and other relevant agreements, and who have accepted as part of that commitment the legal obligation to apply IAEA safeguards. In the meantime, we hope to continue to implement integrated safeguards in States that have met the required conditions, in a manner that increases overall effectiveness while also achieving cost efficiency. I also sincerely hope that the Agency will be able to move forward in the near future with our verification mandate in Iraq and the DPRK. These are two longstanding non-proliferation issues that need prompt resolution.

Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism

Last year, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA, the General Conference adopted a resolution requesting that I initiate a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. We moved rapidly to respond. In just over five months, a plan of enhanced and new activities to upgrade nuclear security worldwide was developed by the Secretariat and approved by the Agency's Board of Governors.

The total cost of implementing the plan - initially through voluntary contributions - was estimated to be on the order of $12 million per year. Twelve Member States and one non-governmental organization - the Nuclear Threat Initiative - have pledged extrabudgetary funding totaling nearly $8 million for this year, and other Member States have pledged or already contributed in kind. While the primary responsibility for addressing these concerns continues to lie with individual States, it is essential that we work together to ensure effective national and international systems of nuclear security. I therefore call on all Member States to continue to contribute the resources needed for full implementation of our plan of activities.

The plan covers eight areas: physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; security of radioactive sources; assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities; response to malicious acts or threats thereof; adherence to international agreements and guidelines; and enhanced programme co-ordination and information management for nuclear security related matters.

Given the broad range of these activities, which cut across a number of Agency programmes, we have adopted an integrated approach to their implementation. I also established, in January, an Advisory Group on Nucle

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Last update: 26 Nov 2019

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