The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to play an important role as a catalyst for development and as a cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety. .
I will speak briefly today about the IAEA's activities in terms of our three fundamental functions: to bring about the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies; to build and maintain a global nuclear safety regime; and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure the security of nuclear material and facilities. I will begin with a subject to which the Agency has been devoting much attention in recent weeks: namely, the enhancement of our efforts to protect against nuclear terrorism.
Area: Efforts to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism
The Agency has been at the forefront of encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their overall nuclear programmes; however, the attacks in the United States were a wake-up call to us all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested that I initiate a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.
The Agency is engaged in a variety of activities relevant to combating nuclear terrorism - including programmes to ensure physical security, to help prevent and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources, to promote the safety of nuclear facilities, to safeguard nuclear material against non-peaceful uses, and to respond to emergencies. In all these areas of activity, the Agency develops legal norms and guidelines, promotes international co-operation, provides expert advice, training and equipment and performs varying degrees of oversight. In the past few years, we have focused on increasing nuclear security co-operation among relevant organizations - including customs organizations, Interpol and other law enforcement organizations, national governments and the Agency. We also have provided an expanding array of advisory services to States to upgrade nuclear safety, to protect nuclear material and facilities against theft and sabotage, and to manage and safely dispose of radioactive sources. We have equally strengthened our verification system to cover both declared and possible undeclared activities.
We are reviewing in-depth each of the programmes I just mentioned to identify additional measures that need to be taken in the light of the recent events. In particular, we are considering expanding the scope and reach of many of our security and safety services. Equally, we will review existing conventions and guidelines - including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - to ensure that they are comprehensive and effective, and we will make every effort to ensure that they are universally applied.
To enable the Agency to assist States that lack the resources to upgrade their security systems, we are also exploring the feasibility of establishing a Fund for Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. I trust that, in the light of the current threats, the development of an effective global system for protection against nuclear theft, sabotage and terrorism will be given the priority it deserves by all concerned. These are unconventional threats that require unconventional responses.
I will turn now to other Agency activities.
Technology
Nuclear Power
The rapid expansion in global energy demand - and the growing awareness of the need for sustainable development - has put increasing focus on the environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels. Nuclear power, which currently supplies about one-sixth of global electricity, is the principal alternative that can in the foreseeable future provide electricity on a large scale with practically no greenhouse gas emissions.
The past twelve months have seen some positive developments for nuclear power. In terms of performance, we have continued to see strong safety practices, reduced generating costs and the first extensions of power plant licences to 60 years. Six new plants were connected to national electricity grids in the year 2000, and 33 more were under construction by the end of the year. Views on the future of nuclear power, however, are still mixed because of safety and non-proliferation concerns. For example, the United States Government's new Energy Policy gave an explicit endorsement to nuclear expansion, whereas the German Government concluded an agreement with the industry to phase out nuclear power. This mixed outlook has also been reflected in the conclusions reached on the role of nuclear power at major conferences on climate change and sustainable development.
It may be too early to forecast how the future will unfold for nuclear power. Clearly there is a new, substantive debate on the role of nuclear power and a recognition in many quarters that its merits as a source of clean energy cannot simply be ignored. Three crucial questions, however, will determine the future of nuclear power: whether it will continue to prove itself as a safe technology; as a technology that can be effectively safeguarded against non-peaceful uses; and whether it can be a technology that is economically competitive.
These questions are among the subjects for review by the Agency's newly established International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), a project designed to support the safe, economical and proliferation resistant use of nuclear energy to assist in meeting the global energy needs of the 21st century. For the nuclear option to remain viable, it is important that nuclear power technology, like other technologies, be enterprising and innovative.
Non-Power Nuclear Applications
Nuclear technologies provide preferred solutions - and sometimes the only solutions - to many economic and social problems. A major portion of our nuclear technology activities, therefore, concerns applications other than electricity generation. Through both its co-ordinated research projects and its technical co-operation programme, the Agency works to strengthen the scientific and technological capacities of its Member States, and functions as a vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technologies to combat disease and child malnutrition, to manage water resources, to increase food production and to protect the environment.
For example, in the area of human health, radiotherapy has long been recognized as a valuable tool in both the cure and palliation of cancer. Agency attention to this issue in developing countries is becoming increasingly important, as life expectancies increase and cancer rates go up. The Agency seeks to build up indigenous capabilities by training practitioners, improving the quality of therapy equipment, and increasing treatment quality and effectiveness.
In the area of water management, nuclear techniques are gaining increasing recognition. Isotope hydrology is being used to plot groundwater aquifers for sustainable water resource management, with 75 active Agency projects in some 40 Member States. In Ethiopia, for example, the use of isotope hydrology under an Agency project helped to tap a new groundwater field to provide more than 40% of Addis Ababa's water supply. We are also joining with the Organization of American States, the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility to protect and manage the Guarani Aquifer - the largest groundwater aquifer in South America, with enough freshwater, if protected in a sustainable manner, to supply the needs of over 300 million people.
Agricultural yield and livestock production continue to be enhanced by the expanding application of the proven sterile insect technique (SIT), an environmentally friendly alternative to insecticides. At their July 2001 summit in Lusaka, the African Heads of State and Government approved a plan for the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign through the use of SIT, which will be supported among others by the IAEA, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The plan should result in significant health and economic benefits across the African continent. Radiation induced mutations are also being used to produce crops with greater yield and higher quality, and irradiation of agricultural products is being employed to preserve freshness and eliminate disease-causing organisms.
In the area of environmental protection, our Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco has been giving priority to the use of nuclear techniques for the sustainable management of coastal zones - the parts of the ocean closest to human use and needs. Progress is also being made on developing nuclear techniques for the detection of abandoned land mines - techniques that should be significantly less costly and labour intensive than conventional techniques.
In each of these areas of nuclear application, the Agency seeks to promote the development and transfer of techniques that serve the priorities of its Member States, with a focus on the special needs of developing countries. As we will report at the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development, of the more than $500 million worth of technical co-operation provided by the Agency since 1992, more than 800 projects, valued at more than $200 million, have specifically supported Agenda 21 priorities such as "Land and Agriculture," "Human Health" and "Fresh Water."
Safety
Safety in nuclear activities around the globe is vital to the continued credibility of nuclear technologies. While safety is primarily a national responsibility, it is equally a legitimate international concern. Nuclear safety, like environmental practices, has implications that transcend national boundaries. Since the Chernobyl accident, safety performance has continued to show significant improvement, but much remains to be done at the national and international levels to address the remaining unevenness in safety practices in different countries.
The development and adoption of international legally binding norms under the auspices of the Agency has significantly contributed to the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide. To date, conventions have been developed covering the safety of power reactors, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, and the physical protection of nuclear material. However, many States are not yet party to these conventions; certain key areas of nuclear activity are still not subject to conventions; and some of the conventions that exist are not comprehensive in their coverage. I urge all States that have not already done so to become Party to all safety related conventions. In addition, I believe we should continue to consider the merits of establishing legally binding norms in areas not currently covered by conventions.
Establishment of International Safety Standards
A second key Agency contribution to nuclear safety is the development and maintenance of a comprehensive body of safety standards. An increasing number of States use IAEA standards directly or as the reference basis for their national nuclear safety regulations. Over the past few years, the Agency Secretariat has been working intensively to update and complete an overall corpus of safety standards that covers the entire range of nuclear activities, including waste and transport safety.
Safety standards can only be effective, however, if applied in practice. The Agency assists States in applying its standards by providing education and training, promoting information exchange on best safety practices, and rendering a broad range of safety services. Agency safety services - such as our operational reactor safety assessments, design reviews and regulatory reviews - continue to be in high demand. The benefits of these international peer reviews and other services are demonstrated by the increasing degree to which follow-up missions find that identified safety problems have been resolved. In the past year, we have begun to develop a more comprehensive approach - an "Integrated Safety Evaluation" that would provide a diagnostic of a given country's overall nuclear safety profile, tailored to the degree of complexity of the country's nuclear programme, and identifying those areas where safety enhancements should be focused.
Safety in the Management and Disposal of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
A major issue in the current debate regarding the role of nuclear power is the safe management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Near term waste concerns - specifically the disposal of low-level and short-lived waste and the storage of waste in all categories - are already being dealt with safely and effectively. However, the public at large remains skeptical about high-level waste management and disposal, despite the confidence among experts that geological disposal is safe, technically feasible and environmentally responsible.
Some progress is worthy of note. The Finnish Parliament in May ratified the Government's decision to construct a deep disposal facility for spent fuel at Olkiluoto. In the USA, a recommendation to the President on the proposed geological repository site at Yucca Mountain may be made in the coming months. And research continues on waste disposal methods that are reversible - to allow later retrieval of the waste in case concerns arise or preferred solutions are developed - as well as research on transmutation and other techniques to reduce the radioactivity and volume of long-lived waste. The Agency continues to focus international attention on waste management issues, in order to accelerate progress towards the demonstration of successful solutions, which is key to public acceptance.
Common Forum on Chernobyl
This year marked the 15th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. With Agency support, two international conferences in Kiev focused on consequences of the accident, including health, environmental and social impacts. In a recent visit to some of the affected areas in Belarus, I continued to observe the lack of trust that prevails among the people of the region, due in no small part to contradictory data and reports concerning the precise environmental and health impacts of the accident - contradictions that continue among national authorities as well as among the relevant international organizations. I believe it would be helpful to establish a common forum on the consequences of Chernobyl, in which the relevant United Nations organizations and the governments of the affected countries would deliver a clear and unified message to the people of the region and the public at large. The Agency is currently exploring the feasibility of establishing such a forum.
Assessing the Effects of Depleted Uranium
Last November, the Agency participated in a field mission to Kosovo, led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to assess possible consequences of the use of depleted uranium (DU) in ammunition during the Kosovo conflict. The mission report concluded that no widespread ground contamination was found in the investigated areas and, therefore, that the corresponding radiological and chemical risks are insignificant. Nonetheless, the report called for certain precautionary actions.
The Agency is still working to respond - with UNEP and the World Health Organization - to requests received from various States in the Middle East and the Balkans regarding additional radiological assessments of DU residues. A preliminary mission was completed in Kuwait in September, we are participating with UNEP in a mission to Yugoslavia next week, and other missions may follow as resources permit.
Challenges in Nuclear Safety
Clearly, a number of challenges remain in the area of nuclear safety. Among them is the need to continue to improve safety in areas where vulnerability is apparent, and to cultivate a nuclear safety culture globally. This requires increased efforts for the international harmonization of safety standards and approaches and for the development of effective legislative and regulatory infrastructures in all countries.
and Security of Nuclear Material and Installations
The Agency's verification activities are designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community declared its readiness to give the Agency broader authority to strengthen its verification ability - particularly its ability to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but equally important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. Except in a limited number of countries, however, we still do not have that authority, because such authority requires that in every country in question a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol be in force.
Fifty States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remain without a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. For those countries, the Agency cannot provide any safeguards assurance. And since 1997, when the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol, the Board has approved additional protocols for only 58 States, and only 21 of these have entered into force. This is not a satisfactory situation. The Agency can only provide the required assurances if we are given the corresponding authority.
Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
For nearly three years, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions. As a consequence, we cannot at present provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions. The Agency remains prepared to resume its verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions at short notice. A number of questions and concerns remain regarding Iraq's past nuclear programme, the clarification of which would reduce the uncertainty in the completeness of the Agency's knowledge of that programme. Provided that the Agency could satisfy itself that the status of Iraq's nuclear activities have not changed since December 1998, the remaining uncertainties would not prevent the Agency from moving to the full implementation of its Ongoing Monitoring and Verification plan. Clearly, the longer the suspension of resolution related inspections lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more time it will take for the Agency to re-establish the level of knowledge that had been achieved at the end of 1998.
In January 2001, the Agency carried out a verification of the nuclear material remaining under safeguards, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. With the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities, Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of this material. However, as I have stated before, these safeguards activities do not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council.
Status of Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Since 1993, the Agency has been unable to fully implement its NPT safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Pursuant to the "Agreed Framework" between the USA and the DPRK, however, since November 1994, the Agency has been monitoring the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated nuclear reactor and related facilities. We have also maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Nyongbyong site.
The Agency continues to be unable to verify the DPRK declaration that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the DPRK has been declared to the Agency. As I noted last year, this verification process will take three to four years. In May of this year, the Agency proposed to the DPRK the first concrete steps that need to be carried out in that process, and we indicated our readiness to start implementing these measures as soon as the DPRK enables us to do so. We have not yet received a response from the DPRK, which continues to link its acceptance of Agency verification of its declaration to the degree of progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework. I continue to call on the DPRK to normalize its relations with the Agency, including the resumption of its membership. This would not only make for better interaction in the verification field, but also would enable us to provide important safety advice and expertise related to the ongoing light water reactor project.
Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle East
In keeping with my mandate from the Agency's General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region. Regrettably, I have not yet been able to make progress in fulfilling this mandate. I do hope that future progress in the Middle East peace process will make it feasible to make parallel progress in this major security issue.
Progress on Trilateral Initiative and Nuclear Disarmament Efforts
Within the framework of the initiative to submit nuclear material released from the military programmes of the Russian Federation and the USA to Agency verification, consultations have continued in an effort to resolve various legal and technical issues. In the past 12 months, progress has been made on developing technical criteria and methods for implementing verification measures. Agreement, however, is still to be reached on the scope of the verification measures, the nature of the material subject to verification, and the duration of verification measures under the agreements. Last month, I met in Vienna with the Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy and the United States Secretary of Energy to take stock of progress and to give impetus to this important arms control initiative, which, if successful, would ensure that large amounts of weapon usable material are irreversibly removed from these military programmes.
Challenges in Nuclear Verification
Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and moving towards nuclear arms control and disarmament continue to be a major human aspiration. A number of challenges are critical to our future success. High among them is the universal application of the Agency's safeguards system - through the conclusion of the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States that have made non-proliferation commitments, and through the attainment of the universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. But a closely linked challenge is the need to make tangible progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament. This is crucial for sustaining and consolidating the non-proliferation regime in the long run. The "unequivocal commitment" by the nuclear weapon States during the 2000 NPT Review Conference to "accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons" needs to be followed with concrete steps at an early date.
Management of the Agency
This review of some of the IAEA's activities makes it clear that the scope our work continues to expand. In the environment of zero real growth budgets, to which the Agency has been subjected for over a decade, some of these priorities cannot be accommodated. The compromises achieved to date to resolve near-term budget issues should not be mistaken for long-term solutions. If the Agency is to fulfil its mandate while maintaining the required balance among its priority activities, we must find better ways to ensure adequate and predictable funding. We must also have the foresight, when planning our activities, to invest in preventive measures rather than simply responding to crises - when it is often too late and much more costly.
Over the past four years, we have initiated a programme of reform in the management of the Agency. Of particular importance has been our accelerated introduction of results-based programming and budgeting, accompanied by a transition to biennial programming and budgeting. These changes have been facilitated by considerable restructuring within the Secretariat, and by a "one house" approach to improve co-ordination and efficiency among our diverse programmes. Thus, while reform will remain an ongoing process, our basic "machinery" is now sharp and focused .
The IAEA continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that peaceful nuclear activities are conducted safely, and that the international community is provided with a credible framework for curbing nuclear weapon proliferation and ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Naturally, our ability to effectively perform those functions depends on the political commitment and financial support of our Member States, which I trust will continue to be forthcoming.
Let me conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which has continued to be an exemplary and gracious host to the IAEA for over four decades.