

Chronology of Recent Events Associated with Iraqi High Explosives

- On **1 October 2004**, as mandated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General of the IAEA submitted to the UNSC its second semi-annual *report* for 2004. In this report (as in previous reports, including the one in April 2004ⁱ), he noted the absence of the semi-annual *declaration* by Iraq to the IAEA required under the Plan for Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV planⁱⁱ) approved by the UNSC in resolution 715 (1991), and consequently the absence of an updated inventory of equipment and items identified in the OMV planⁱⁱⁱ.
- On **10 October 2004**, the IAEA received, by email, a letter dated 10 October 2004 from the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology stating that approximately 350 tonnes of high explosive material, which had previously been declared by Iraq under the OMV plan, had been lost after 9 April 2003 “through the theft and looting of government installations due to lack of security.” Iraq sought an “urgent” updating of the relevant inventory. The Director General took measures, without delay, to verify, through the relevant government authorities of Iraq, the authenticity of the letter.
- On **14 October 2004**, a *CBS News* journalist called the IAEA Division of Public Information and indicated that his network had obtained a copy of the letter through its correspondents in Baghdad.
- Given the potential security risks associated with these unaccounted for high explosive materials, the Director General decided, as soon as the authenticity of the letter had been confirmed by the Government of Iraq on **15 October 2004**, to inform, first and immediately, the Multinational Forces, as the responsible authority for security matters in Iraq, in order to allow them to act on this information before it became more widely known.
- On **21 October 2004**, *CBS News* and *New York Times* journalists investigating the matter — who had confirmed the content of the letter that day through an on-the-record interview with the Iraqi Minister of Science and Technology — requested a meeting with the IAEA Division of Public Information for the purpose of fact checking of relevant historical information.
- On **25 October 2004**, a number of news sources (e.g. *The Nelson Report* and, later that day, the *New York Times*) released stories on the issue.
- As the issue had been released into the public domain, the Director General sent a letter on **25 October 2004** to the President of the Security Council informing the Council about the matter^{iv}.

ⁱ Earlier reports of the absence of Iraq’s semi-annual declarations were made in the Director General’s semi-annual reports in April 1999 (S/1999/393), October 1999 (S/1999/1035) and April 2000 (S/2000/300).

ⁱⁱ The OMV plan, inter alia, requires Iraq to “provide to the Agency, and subsequently maintain current, information in accordance with Annex 2 on ... an inventory of all material, equipment and items in Iraq identified in Annex 3” (para. 22(c)). The provisions related to information requirements, as set out in Annex 2 of the plan, stipulate that “... complete information shall be provided each 15 January and 15 July and shall cover the six-months period prior to the provision of the information” and that the inventory referred to in paragraph 22(c) of the plan on non-nuclear materials, equipment and items “shall be updated at monthly intervals”.

ⁱⁱⁱ Among the non-nuclear materials identified in Annex 3 of the OMV plan (S/2001/561) are high explosives (HMX, RDX and PETN). The HMX (around 200 tonnes) referred to in Iraq’s letter had been under IAEA seal and subject to routine monitoring by the Agency since 1991, except for the period between 1998 and 2002, during which some 32 tonnes had been used (as stated in Iraq’s declaration in October 2002 and reported in several statements and reports to the Council in early 2003). The use of that material was investigated by the IAEA after the resumption of Security Council related inspections in November 2002. The RDX (around 140 tonnes) and the PETN (around 6 tonnes) had also been subject to routine monitoring by the Agency.

^{iv} In addition to the semi-annual reports required under Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General also communicates with the Security Council on occasions where matters related to IAEA verification activities with respect to Iraq arise, for example: in July 1995, following the conclusion of the IAEA's investigations in connection with media reports of clandestine activities in Iraq (S/1995/604); in January 1998, reporting on progress made in resolving remaining questions and concerns (S/1998/38); in 1999, 2000 and 2001, on matters related to safeguards implementation in Iraq (S/2000/120, S/2001/26 and S/2001/121, respectively); and in July 2003 and July 2004 (S/2003/771 and S/2004/538, respectively), on matters related to the remaining nuclear materials in Iraq.