Proliferation Resistance: Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis (PRADA)
This project was concluded in December 2010.
The overall objective of PRADA was to provide guidance on enhancing proliferation resistance of innovative nuclear energy systems and to contribute to strengthening the assessment area of ‘proliferation resistance’ of the INPRO methodology.
A key user requirement in the INPRO methodology demands that nuclear systems incorporate multiple proliferation resistance intrinsic features and extrinsic measures.
The PRADA project focused on an illustrative case - on identifying and analysing high level pathways for the acquisition or diversion of fissile material for a nuclear weapons programme using the DUPIC (direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors) fuel cycle as a case study with an assumed diversion scenario.
- The proliferation assessment should be performed at three levels:
- State level
- Nuclear energy system level
- Nuclear facility level including facility specific pathways.
- The robustness of barriers against proliferation depends on the State capabilities, and the relevance of each barrier is dependent on the assessment level.
- The robustness of barriers is not a function of the number of barriers or of their individual characteristics; it is an integrated function of the whole, and it is measured by determining whether the safeguards goals can be met.
- The INPRO methodology requires information regarding proliferation risks from more quantitative analyses performed jointly by technology developers (suppliers), safeguards experts, and experts in proliferation resistance.
Systematic approach to acquisition/diversion pathway analysis.
Scientific Secretary: Eckhard Haas