Plenary

Record of the Ninth Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Friday, 24 September 2010, at 10.15 a.m.*

**President:** Mr STACEY MORENO (Ecuador)
Later: Mr ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia)

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¹ GC(54)/16.
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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(54)/INF/7.

1. The \textbf{PRESIDENT} recalled that the theme of the Scientific Forum for 2010 had been “Cancer in Developing countries: Facing the Challenge”. He invited the Rapporteur, Mr Ngoma, to present the report.

2. \textbf{Mr NGOMA} (Rapporteur of the Scientific Forum) presented the report, which is reproduced in the Annex.

3. The \textbf{PRESIDENT} thanked Mr Ngoma for his most interesting report on the work and outcome of the Scientific Forum, and the Secretariat for its excellent preparation of the Scientific Forum.

\begin{quote}
Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia), President, took the Chair.
\end{quote}

18. Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (resumed)  
(GC(54)/12 and Corr.1; GC(54)/L.3 and Add.1 and 2, and L.4)

4. The \textbf{PRESIDENT} invited those delegations involved in the consultations following the preceding meeting to address the Plenary.

5. \textbf{Mr BARRETT} (Canada) said that the group for which his delegation had acted as facilitator had met and made a proposal which it hoped would expedite consensus; that proposal had been conveyed to the chair of the Arab Group, which had sponsored the amendment contained in document GC(54)/L.4.

6. \textbf{Mr ELAMIN} (Sudan), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that the Group was very keen to arrive at an understanding that would allow progress to be made and had thus made a further compromise in deciding to withdraw its proposed amendment to the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.4. He expressed the hope that that same spirit would be shown by other delegations. On behalf of the Arab Group, he requested a roll-call vote on the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.3.

7. \textbf{Mr SHIM Yoon-Joe} (Republic of Korea) expressed appreciation to the delegations of Sudan and Australia for having withdrawn their respective proposed amendments. There had been a general desire in the plenary to maintain the spirit of consensus which had prevailed on the resolution ever since its first introduction at the General Conference in 1993. There was no reason to make an exception on the present occasion, and he appealed to all Member States to try to achieve consensus by adopting the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.3.

8. \textbf{Mr FERNANDEZ RONDON} (Cuba) said his delegation had intended to support the amendment contained in document GC(54)/L.4, which would have made the draft resolution more balanced. However, Cuba would not block consensus. The proposed amendment enshrined a fundamental principle and had unfortunately been rejected by certain States for political reasons and
because of their unconditional support for Israel. He emphasized the importance of working more vigorously to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as only their total elimination and the prohibition of all nuclear testing could help bring about international peace and security. Cuba was deeply concerned at the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and called on all States possessing nuclear weapons to fulfill immediately and unconditionally their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. His country reiterated its support for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which could be achieved only through dialogue, and expressed its concern at the heightening tensions in that region.

9. The PRESIDENT, under Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure, invited the General Conference to proceed to a roll-call vote on the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.3. He requested those Member States wishing to explain their votes to do so after the vote and reminded them that, under Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure, sponsors of the draft resolution were not allowed to explain their votes.

10. Morocco, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

11. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Algeria, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen.

12. There were 94 votes in favour and none against, with 24 abstentions. The resolution was adopted.

13. Mr ELAMIN (Sudan), speaking in explanation of vote on behalf of the Arab Group, reaffirmed the Group’s support for international efforts to ensure the universality of the NPT and promote nuclear disarmament and the placement of all nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The final document adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference stressed the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty and of comprehensive safeguards. The Group also reaffirmed its support for international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, as a contribution to the denuclearization of the world as a whole, including the Middle East. The Arab Group considered that a
consistent position should be adopted on the matter in all resolutions and had therefore decided to abstain.

14. **Mr ALKAABI** (United Arab Emirates) said that his country had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it was convinced of the importance of ensuring universal adherence to the NPT, and thus of persuading the DPRK to return to the Treaty and the safeguards regime. A consensus on both the draft resolution and the principle of universality would, of course, have been preferable in view of the goal of ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclear threat.

15. **Mr DANIELI** (Israel) said that Israel had voted in favour of the draft resolution because the reckless conduct of the DPRK called for the strongest possible condemnation and action by the international community. The DPRK’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, its decision to cease all cooperation with the Agency and its continued defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime and regional peace and security. The conduct of the DPRK also had dangerous implications for the Middle East, since it was a major nuclear proliferator and supplier of ballistic missiles. Israel urged the Agency to pursue its investigation of the DPRK’s assistance to Syria’s covert nuclear programme without delay. The conduct of the DPRK highlighted the importance of determined and concerted action by the international community, which should also send the right message to Middle East violators of commitments and obligations in the nuclear domain such as Syria and Iran.

16. The **PRESIDENT**, responding to requests for the floor from sponsors of the draft resolution, said that, under Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure, sponsors were not permitted to speak in explanation of vote but only to make brief general comments.

17. **Mr SHIM Yoon-Joe** (Republic of Korea) said that, although he was not fully satisfied with the result, he appreciated the fact that an absolute majority of participants in the General Conference had voted in favour of the draft resolution, thereby expressing the international community’s determination to ensure the denuclearization of the DPRK. He urged the DPRK to abide by relevant resolutions of the Agency and the United Nations Security Council and the decisions of the six-party talks, and to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

18. **Mr NAKANE** (Japan) expressed appreciation for the diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring the original version of the draft resolution, and regret at the fact that it had not been adopted by consensus. His country sincerely hoped that a consensus could be achieved at the next session of the General Conference.

19. **Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East**

   (GC(54)/13; GC(54)/L.1)

19. The **PRESIDENT** said that item 19 had been included in the Conference’s agenda pursuant to resolution GC(53)/RES/16. The Director General had submitted the report contained in document GC(54)/13 pursuant to paragraph 13 of that resolution. The matter had been considered by the Board the preceding week on the basis of that report. Document GC(54)/L.1 contained a draft resolution submitted by Egypt.

20. **Mr SHAMAA** (Egypt), introducing the draft resolution, said that, although the General Conference had adopted resolutions by consensus several years in succession on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, it had become apparent that matters were, at best, stagnating,
since that consensus failed to lead to concrete results on the ground. Indeed, the General Conference seemed to be dealing with the item in an increasingly mechanical and ineffective manner.

21. As one of the driving forces behind the item, Egypt had a responsibility to prevent an issue of such importance from being sidelined. As a result, in 2006 his country had begun to introduce amendments to the draft resolution with the aim of reinvigorating the item and updating a text which, in some ways, no longer reflected the realities on the ground. In embarking on the process, his country had been aware that the amended draft resolution would run into resistance. Unsurprisingly, the strongest resistance had come from those who regarded themselves as champions of nuclear non-proliferation, but who in fact upheld inconsistent and highly selective positions on the NPT and Agency safeguards in the Middle East.

22. Following three challenging General Conference sessions and a long, intensive and inclusive process of consultations during the 2009 General Conference, a revised text of the resolution, incorporating proposals made, inter alia, by the European Union and the United States, had been agreed upon and subsequently adopted with 103 votes in favour, none against and 4 abstentions. Egypt regretted the fact that, despite all the efforts made to rebuild a consensus, the resolution had not been adopted without a vote. It also regretted that three States party to the NPT had abstained on a paragraph calling on all States in the region to accede to the Treaty. Such a vote was inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Treaty and the final documents adopted by consensus by successive NPT Review Conferences. It also sent a disturbing message to the world. With a view to maintaining the balance that had been achieved at the preceding session of the General Conference, Egypt had reintroduced the resolution without any changes to the text. It sincerely hoped that the General Conference would adopt it without a vote.

23. He thanked the members of the Arab Group and NAM that had consistently supported the resolution, as well as other States that had supported — not only in words but also in deeds — a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded nuclear activities.

24. Mr FAWZY (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM reiterated its principled position on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. It strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, allowing one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. NAM regarded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and it reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. NAM was convinced that the effective and efficient application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East promoted confidence among States in the region. It therefore considered that achieving universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the region constituted the first practical step towards that end and was a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

25. NAM welcomed the fact that its member States that were party to the NPT concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III.(1) of the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. All States in the Middle East region except Israel were party to the NPT and had accepted comprehensive Agency safeguards.

26. NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. It emphasized that there was no automatic sequence requiring the conclusion of a peace settlement prior to the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. The latter would in fact contribute to the former.
27. NAM also noted with regret that the Director General had not been able to make further progress in fulfilling his mandate pursuant to resolution GC(53)/RES/16 regarding the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. It urged all Member States to cooperate to reverse that unacceptable situation and to participate actively in achieving universality of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region.

28. NAM also noted that the Director General would continue with his consultations regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East region. It welcomed his efforts to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that could help move his mandate forward and requested him to brief Member States regularly on such efforts.

29. NAM State Parties to the NPT welcomed the endorsement by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the measure that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, should convene in 2012, in consultation with States in the region, a conference to be attended by all States of the Middle East on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. NAM noted that the 2012 conference would take the 1995 resolution as its terms of reference.

30. NAM noted with appreciation the Director General’s recent efforts to develop an agenda and modalities aimed at ensuring a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including confidence-building and verification measures, for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. For the forum to be successful, its agenda should reflect the consensus within the international community on the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Accordingly, NAM requested the Director General to continue consultations with Member States in the region with a view to achieving consensus on the agenda and modalities of the forum.

31. NAM was fully committed to cooperating with the Director General in implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/16 and it expected all other Member States to do likewise.

32. Finally, NAM endorsed the draft resolution submitted by Egypt on the item under discussion.

33. Mr POURMAND TEHRANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that more than three decades had elapsed since the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had first been put forward. It had been proposed by Iran in 1974 as an important disarmament measure in the Middle East region and had led to a United Nations General Assembly resolution. Since 1980, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on the issue each year by consensus, demonstrating global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Iran, having ratified all major treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, supported the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

34. It was regrettable that, notwithstanding global attempts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East, 30 years later no progress had been made towards realization of that aim owing the intransigent policy of the Zionist regime. Owing to that regime’s non-adherence to the NPT and, more importantly, its refusal to place its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under the Agency’s verification system, the aspiration of the countries in the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone had not been realized. Moreover, that regime’s irresponsible behaviour cast serious doubt on the possibility of one being established in the near future.
35. The Zionist regime was the only country not party to the NPT in the region. Despite repeated calls by the international community, such as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and related resolutions of the General Assembly, the Agency and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, that regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States of America, had neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards. It had not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty. Its clandestine nuclear activities seriously threatened regional peace and security and endangered the non-proliferation regime.

36. Unfortunately, the imposed inaction of the United Nations Security Council over several decades as regards the well-documented nuclear weapons programme of the Zionist regime had given that regime the audacity to acknowledge explicitly its possession of nuclear weapons. That regime’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons not only violated basic principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the NPT and numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, it also clearly defied the demands and concerns of the overwhelming majority of United Nations member States and obstinately disregarded repeated appeals by the international community for Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. The Zionist regime was the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Peace and stability in the region were unattainable while its nuclear arsenal continued to threaten the region and the rest of the world.

37. As a State Party to the NPT, Iran was fully committed to its international undertakings and believed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to the NPT, particularly in the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Pending the realization of such a zone in the Middle East, no country in the region should acquire nuclear weapons, or permit the stationing within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and countries in the region should refrain from actions that ran counter to both the letter and spirit of the NPT and other international resolutions and documents relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It was a matter of regret that, while no practical measure was being taken to contain the threat posed by the Zionist regime as the real source of nuclear danger in the Middle East, Iran, a party to the NPT and the initiator of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, was under tremendous pressure to renounce its inalienable right to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

38. The Director General in a communication on the issue dated 24 June 2010, had stated that there was an urgent need for all States in the Middle East to accept forthwith the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure. In his report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East contained in document GC(54)/13, he had stated that all States in the Middle East region except for Israel were party to the NPT and had undertaken to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards. That point was also emphasized in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 NPT Review Conference of the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Conference had called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving universality of the Treaty at an early date.

39. Iran firmly believed that an agreed plan of action and a timetable for achieving universality of the NPT, especially in the Middle East, should be a top priority on the agenda of all States party to the Treaty, especially the nuclear-weapon States. Pressure should be brought to bear on the Zionist regime to eliminate its nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in order to pave the way for realization of the long-sought goal of the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the achievement of peace and security in the region.

40. Mr AZOULAY (Israel) said that in the Middle East, as in other regions, attaining regional peace, security and stability was a fundamental goal. Progress on general regional arms control measures in the Middle East could only be made through a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional States with their arms control and non-proliferation obligations. Furthermore, progress towards realizing the vision of the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction required a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a significant transformation of the attitude of some States in the region to Israel. The exclusion of Israel from the Agency’s Middle East and South Asia regional group was a clear example of what ought to be changed. The lamentable regional realities in the Middle East included large-scale terrorism practised by non-State actors and nurtured by terror-sponsoring States like Iran and Syria, and a culture of non-compliance manifested in recent years by Libya and Syria, which had pursued a military nuclear programme under the guise of their NPT membership.

41. While a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East remained a vision shared by many, its applicability seemed more remote than 20 years previously. Until all States in the region came forward with clean records and in good faith, there could be no progress towards the establishment of such a zone. As his country’s neighbours fully understood the consequences of the grim regional realities, Israel questioned their statements to the contrary in the General Conference, which were detrimental to regional security and the arms control process.

42. The General Conference had been increasingly politicized and abused by some Member States from the Middle East region, which sacrificed the Agency’s credibility in the interests of their short-sighted anti-Israeli goals. How could one realistically expect to move forward towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East at a time when Israel’s adversaries made every effort to undermine its position in the region and some were even calling explicitly for its destruction? Premature advocacy of misguided concepts relating to such a zone in the Middle East was not only divorced from regional realities but also an exercise in futility. The Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction remained a long-term goal and must include all States in the greater Middle East and other relevant countries, as determined by joint agreement. The delineation of the region must be carefully thought through and the zone should be the result of free and direct negotiations among all members of the region. Moreover, the issue of regional security extended far beyond weapons of mass destruction to all categories of conventional weapons and systems for their delivery. That was of particular importance for the State of Israel, which was small in size and devoid of strategic depth. Its population centres were within range of tens of thousands of missiles and rockets in the hands of States in the region and their proxy terrorist organizations, which repeatedly levelled threats against it.

43. As Israel and the Palestinian Authority strove to move forward jointly by means of dialogue, the citizens of Israel were subject to intensified attacks by the Hamas terrorist organization, encouraged by Syria and Iran. At the same time, Israel was extending cooperation to the Palestinian Authority in many aspects of nuclear medicine, as could be confirmed by a large number of Palestinian physicians and patients. He called on Palestinian participants in the General Conference to work together with Israel to expand that cooperation.

44. All aspects of regional security had been addressed by Middle East States within the framework of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, which had been launched in the context of the Madrid political process and had met from 1992 to 1996. Israel had proposed a comprehensive programme for enhancing security in the region, but meaningful progress had been blocked by the insistence of Egypt and others on the nuclear issue.
45. Israel attached great importance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and had supported and, wherever possible, acceded to arms control and other international treaties. In view of the four recognized cases of violations of legally binding NPT obligations by parties to the Treaty from the Middle East region, Israel could not subscribe to the notion that universal adherence to the NPT was an adequate remedy for the region’s problems. Israel’s regional approach to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction was also anchored in the vast experience gained in similar processes in other regions, including Latin America, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa. Thus, his country believed that, in the months and years ahead, efforts should aim at moving towards comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world, reversing the Iranian pursuit of military nuclear capabilities and promoting confidence and trust in the Middle East.

46. Finally, he requested that the draft resolution be put to the vote and that a separate vote be held on operative paragraph 2 thereof.

47. Ms GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that making sustainable progress with respect to the situation in the Middle East was a priority for the international community. That could only be achieved if the military imbalance in the region was corrected, comprehensive Agency safeguards were applied in all the region’s States and a nuclear-weapon-free zone was established. Her country supported all efforts towards that end.

48. She urged the Secretariat to pursue its efforts to encourage Israel’s accession to the NPT, as it was the only State in the region that was not a party. That jeopardized security in the region and destroyed confidence in non-proliferation. Therefore Israel must accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, subjecting all its nuclear facilities to comprehensive Agency safeguards and conducting its nuclear activities in accordance with the non-proliferation regime. The United States Government should also be transparent about the equipment, materials and facilities and scientific and technical assistance it provided to Israel in the nuclear field.

49. The PRESIDENT asked whether a vote by show of hands on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.1 was acceptable.

50. At the request of Mr Shamaa (Egypt), a roll-call vote was taken.

51. The Philippines, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

52. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel.

Abstaining: Canada, India, Marshall Islands, United States of America.

53. There were 120 votes in favour and 1 against, with 4 abstentions. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was adopted.

54. The PRESIDENT asked whether a vote by show of hands on the whole of the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.1 was acceptable.

55. At the request of Mr Shamaa (Egypt), a roll-call vote was taken.

56. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

57. The result of the vote was as follows:

58. In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Canada, Chad, Haiti, Israel, Marshall Islands, United States of America.

59. There were 120 votes in favour and none against, with 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was adopted.

60. Mr KHULLAR (India), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution because it believed that it introduced matters extraneous to the Agency.

61. Mr UZCÁTEGUI DUQUE (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his country supported non-proliferation initiatives aimed at eliminating all arsenals of nuclear weapons in all States without exception. Given that Israel was the only State in the Middle East region that had not acceded to the
NPT and was believed to possess nuclear weapons, Venezuela considered the resolution to be an essential tool for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He called upon all countries, and in particular Israel, to accede to the NPT without delay.

62. He recalled that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had agreed on the holding of a conference in 2012 on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which should provide a good opportunity for reviewing what had been achieved thus far and would be complemented by the resolution just adopted.

63. Mr DAVIES (United States of America), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his delegation had felt compelled to abstain as it felt that the resolution had not been put forward on a consensus basis. However, that abstention should not be taken as an indication that his country was any less committed to the goal of universality of the NPT, a commitment it had demonstrated in its efforts to achieve consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, despite its reservations about that Conference’s outcome. It was his country’s belief that the only way to make progress towards peace in the Middle East region and the achievement of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction was through agreement among all States of the region.

64. Mr AZOULAY (Israel), speaking in explanation of vote, said that resolutions on the issue in question had enjoyed consensus at past General Conferences for 14 consecutive years until 2005, demonstrating a shared vision — despite many differences — of the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The situation had changed in recent years and his country attributed that to a loss of interest on the part of the sponsor of the resolution, Egypt, in the achievement of such a zone. Israel regretted the current state of affairs, particularly in view of the years of intensive dialogue and efforts by it and other States to formulate an agreed package on Middle East issues at the General Conference.

65. His country had worked in good faith and had striven to build bridges, despite differences in approaches and attitudes. In 2009, those efforts had culminated in its full engagement with Egypt and other parties, but its positive attitude had not been reciprocated but had been met with a confrontational attitude on the part of Egypt, which preferred to pass a resolution by majority vote rather than work at achieving consensus. Egypt’s carefully crafted statements and mastery of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference could not prevent his country from concluding that it had no real interest in advancing cooperative regional security measures.

66. Mr RECKER (Belgium), speaking in explanation of vote on behalf of European Union member States, said that the European Union was firmly committed to universality of the NPT, but it also placed great importance on full compliance with the provisions of that Treaty. It therefore would have preferred the resolution to call on all States party to the NPT to ensure such compliance. The European Union would continue to urge all States in the region to implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols fully, and it felt that the resolution would have been stronger had it included a call for implementation of additional protocols. Despite those reservations, it had supported the resolution as part of an earnest effort to ensure that the decisions of the General Conference were taken by consensus.

67. Mr BARRETT (Canada), speaking in explanation of vote, said that his country continued to call on all States that had not yet done so to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. Canada was also a strong supporter of the additional protocol and the establishment of a verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

68. In past years, resolutions on the issue in question had enjoyed broad support and his country regretted the introduction of language that had led to the collapse of that consensus. The current resolution unduly politicized a forum that had historically adopted a more technical perspective.
Canada was also disappointed that the resolution did not address the important issue of compliance with safeguards obligations.

20. Israeli nuclear capabilities
   (GC(54)/14; GC(54)/L.2)

69. The PRESIDENT noted that item 20 had been included on the agenda pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(53)/RES/17. Pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Director General had submitted the report contained in document GC(54)/14. Also before the General Conference was document GC(54)/L.2 containing a draft resolution submitted by a group of countries.

70. Mr ELAMIN (Sudan), introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the Arab States that were members of the Agency, said that all Arab States without exception had adopted a united stance in favour of the non-proliferation regime, had acceded to the NPT and had approved the initiative aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel, on the other hand, was the only State in the region that possessed nuclear weapons and had refused to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Its attitude rendered peace and security difficult to achieve and was a source of increased tension in the Middle East that could trigger an arms race.

71. The goal of the Arab States in raising the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities at successive sessions of the General Conference was not only to draw attention to that dangerous situation but also to propose a practical solution, which consisted in adopting a comprehensive approach that took the security of all countries in the Middle East into consideration instead of dealing in a biased and selective manner with each country individually and applying double standards.

72. At its 53rd regular session, the General Conference had adopted resolution GC(53)/RES/17 which called upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. Resolutions had also been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council and by the NPT Review Conferences, including the Conference held in May 2010, calling on Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards as a prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

73. Impartial reports had confirmed that Israel possessed a significant arsenal of nuclear weapons. The Arab States and the international community as a whole could not afford to ignore that situation or tolerate Israel’s efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities, taking advantage of the lack of any real international pressure to impede such an escalation. Some countries did their utmost to prevent any light being shed on Israel’s nuclear capabilities and to impede the adoption by the General Conference of a resolution that mentioned Israel by name. At the same time, charges were levelled against other countries without solid proof.

74. Some States had sought to block a vote on the draft resolution submitted to the preceding session of the Conference. They had argued that the Agency’s role was a technical one and that it was inappropriate for it to address political issues. However, the item had been discussed at numerous previous sessions of the Conference and the resolution adopted at the preceding session focused on technical issues that fell within the Agency’s mandate, namely accession to the NPT and application of comprehensive safeguards.

75. The argument that a single resolution on the Middle East was sufficient was also untenable. The resolution on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East fell under a different agenda item and
constituted a basic and necessary step towards the achievement of the goal of the current resolution. Moreover, there was nothing in the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference to prevent it from adopting two resolutions dealing with the same region. Israel was not being singled out by the Arab States but was singling itself out and isolating itself by failing to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards.

76. In spite of all the arguments put forward, a majority of Member States had voted against the motion of no action tabled at the preceding session and in favour of the draft resolution, thereby demonstrating that the international community recognized the danger posed by Israel’s sole possession of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and the need to ensure that country’s accession to the NPT and the placement of its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.

77. The Arab Group had expressed appreciation for the Director General’s report in a statement delivered to the Board of Governors the preceding week. It regretted the fact that some States — including nuclear-weapon States — continued to claim that they espoused the principle of universality of the NPT but set aside that principle completely when the question of its applicability to Israel arose, impeding implementation of the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities and applying double standards. Israel itself had repeatedly refused to cooperate with the Agency in implementing the resolution and all other relevant international resolutions, as attested by the message from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Director General dated 26 July 2010. The Israeli representative had stated immediately after the adoption of the resolution at the 53rd regular session of the General Conference that his country would not cooperate in any way with the resolution. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister had stated after the 2010 NPT Review Conference that he rejected all its decisions concerning the Middle East and would not cooperate in their implementation.

78. In view of the lack of progress in implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17, the Arab Group had decided to resubmit it to the current session in order to reaffirm its importance. Some States were again trying to block its passage by putting forward new arguments. For instance, they argued that its resubmission would obstruct the initiatives stemming from the 2010 NPT Review Conference. That argument was baseless, since the prospects of holding a successful conference in 2012 on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be boosted if Israel were to comply with the provisions of the resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities and other similar international resolutions.

79. Some States argued that the resubmission of the draft resolution would distract attention from other more important agenda items. That position again demonstrated the application of double standards, since priority was given to matters concerning certain States at the expense of those with a direct bearing on the achievement of security and peace in the Middle East.

80. The argument that the resolution lacked legitimacy because it was not based on a consensus was refuted by public international law. If applied more widely, that argument would cast doubt on other resolutions of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

81. The draft resolution represented the minimum acceptable to the Arab States, inasmuch as it focused on technical points, i.e. the universality of the NPT and the aim of ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons; and the Arab States had demonstrated flexibility and a desire to achieve consensus. They had spared no effort over the preceding few days to address concerns and eliminate sources of contention. Unfortunately, however, their efforts had run up against the determination of some parties to return to the past and reverse the progress achieved at the preceding session when the resolution had been adopted. Clearly some States were determined to exempt Israel from compliance with international standards and to offer it preferential treatment, applying double standards when it came to nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East.
82. The Arab States that were members of the Agency, emphasizing the inalienable right of every country to express its concerns and seek to resolve them, a right enshrined in the basic instruments of all international organizations, urged the General Conference to give the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities the attention it deserved and to vote unanimously for the draft resolution with a view to ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons and laying the basis for peace and security in the region and the world as a whole.

83. The Arab Group thanked the Member States that had supported the resolution at the preceding session of the General Conference, especially NAM, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the African Group, and urged them to vote in favour of the draft resolution. It called on Member States that had abstained or voted against the previous resolution to reconsider their position and adopt a stance that was consistent with the principle of universality of the NPT and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

84. Mr FAWZY (Egypt), speaking on behalf of NAM, reiterated NAM’s principled position on the issue under discussion. NAM strongly believed that stability could not be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities were maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allowed one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. NAM welcomed the fact that its member States party to the NPT concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III.1 of the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It noted that all NAM member States in the Middle East had done so. NAM considered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East a positive step towards the objective of global nuclear disarmament and it reiterated its support for the establishment of such a zone in accordance with relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

85. NAM noted with concern that a selective approach to the issue of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East undermined the viability of the Agency’s safeguards regime. That approach had also resulted in the continued and dangerous presence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and activities in Israel, despite repeated calls on that country to submit those facilities to comprehensive safeguards, and despite the conclusion by all other States in the region of comprehensive safeguards agreements. NAM was greatly concerned over the acquisition of a nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and over the fact that scientists from Israel continued to have access to the nuclear facilities of a certain nuclear-weapon State. Those factors could have dire consequences for international security.

86. NAM urged all Member States to cooperate to reverse that unacceptable situation. It encouraged them to contribute to achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East region, noting that implementation of General Conference resolution GC(53)/RES/17 was a first step towards that end.

87. NAM had looked forward to the Director General’s strong and active involvement in implementing that resolution, and to comprehensive reporting on the issue to both the Board of Governors and the General Conference which would not only reflect the views of Member States but would also disclose all information available to the Secretariat on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear facilities and activities that would be covered by any comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with that country, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to it, and which would outline how the Agency viewed the way forward, inter alia identifying all necessary measures to be undertaken by the parties concerned.

88. NAM was fully committed to implementing resolution GC(53)/RES/17 and expected other Agency Member States to do likewise. It therefore found it regrettable that, almost a year after the adoption of that resolution, the Secretariat was not in a position to provide the Board and General
Conference with a list of those nuclear facilities and activities that could be subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement should Israel conclude such an agreement. The Secretariat was also not in a position to provide information relevant to Israel’s nuclear capabilities beyond what was included in Section C of the Director General’s report and in each year’s SIR. NAM requested further clarification regarding the Secretariat’s efforts to obtain such information and the responses received from Member States.

89. NAM also regretted the fact that the Director General’s report did not address its formal requests to outline how the Agency saw the way forward, and that it thus fell short of addressing concerns that had been expressed by more than two thirds of the Agency’s Member States. NAM therefore requested that the Director General issue an addendum to his report that would fully address its concerns.

90. NAM regretted Israel’s continued insistence that the issue of Agency safeguards could not be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process. It emphasized that there was no automatic sequence that linked the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter.

91. NAM continued to be concerned at Israel’s apparent determination not to cooperate in any way with resolution GC(53)/RES/17. In that connection, it reiterated its call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices, and the extension of assistance in nuclear-related scientific and technological fields, to Israel.

92. NAM further noted that the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, in a letter attached to the Director General’s report, had stated that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had over the years demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain. In NAM’s view, the official records of the Agency contradicted that assertion. In that context, NAM drew attention to the resolutions issued by the General Conference prior to 1994 regarding South Africa’s nuclear capabilities, as well as a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions which had strongly condemned the extensive collaboration between Israel and South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields.

93. Mr AZOULAY (Israel) said that the draft resolution was political in nature and contradicted the basic aims and goals of the Agency. Its only purpose was to condemn one Member State, diverting attention from the true nature of the Agency’s work. A fact that some Member States tended to overlook was that, while Israel was not the only State to exercise its sovereign rights in deciding not to accede to the NPT, it was the only such State to be singled out, indicating the real political intentions behind the draft resolution. He encouraged Member States that wished to contribute to the improvement of regional security in the Middle East to focus on improving the cooperative relationship among States of the region, rather than pushing forward a controversial draft resolution that would widen divisions and increase mistrust.

94. He asked how progress towards a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction could truly be envisioned when Israel was not allowed to become a member of the Agency’s Middle East and South Asia regional group, and how real dialogue could take place while some Member States were calling for Israel’s annihilation.

95. True dialogue could not be based on dictation, coercion or resolutions imposed by a majority vote. The uncompromising and negative path taken by the sponsors of the draft resolution indicated their real aims, which were political and had nothing to do with the Agency’s mandate and the maintenance of its credibility as a technical organization.
96. His country saw a similarity between the list of sponsors of the draft resolution and the list of countries that had been criticized in the SIR. The draft resolution was being used by those States as an instrument to divert attention from their gross violations and to sabotage the Agency’s capability to fulfil its mission and legal mandate. The Agency should focus on violations of safeguards obligations rather than wasting time and resources on a cynical, politically motivated resolution. The most significant threats to the non-proliferation regime and the NPT came from Member States that breached their NPT obligations, pursuing nuclear weapons under the cover of their NPT membership.

97. It was Iran and Syria that posed the greatest threat to peace and security in the Middle East and beyond. Neither of those countries, nor any other State that breached its safeguards obligations, could conceal those breaches behind a barrage of statements. Some might see it as advantageous to make accusations against Israel, but to do so was a disservice to the efforts being made to stem dangerous proliferation trends and promote a meaningful regional arms control dialogue.

98. The agenda item under discussion and the draft resolution were clearly incompatible with the basic principles and norms of international law. The General Conference was not the guardian of the NPT and the Agency was not the Secretariat of the NPT. The Agency was required by its Statute to carry out its activities with due respect for the sovereign rights of States. To call for States to accede to international treaties went far beyond the purview of the Agency’s statutory functions. Moreover, the preamble to the NPT clarified that it was designed for a political environment where States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and that parties to the Treaty should share the overall objective of attaining peace and security.

99. In including the current item in the agenda of the General Conference, it was clear that the sponsors of the draft resolution were not looking for real progress in the Middle East but were scoring political points. Adoption of the resolution would be a fatal blow to any hope for future cooperative efforts aimed at achieving better regional security in the Middle East.

100. Mr DAVIES (United States of America) said that his country continued to be committed to the goals of universality of the NPT and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. Based on those commitments, his country opposed the draft resolution which it viewed as divisive. Adoption of the draft resolution could also put at risk any chance of convening in 2012 the conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that had been envisioned at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

101. It was also unfortunate that the draft resolution was being pursued at a time when peace talks in the Middle East had just restarted after a long delay. Prior to the General Conference, the United States of America had put forward a proposal to avoid confrontation on the issue at the current session, without asking any group to change its principled position. His country had asked for a one-year moratorium on the agenda item, so as to give the nascent peace process a chance to proceed without the risk of being poisoned by a confrontation at the General Conference. He found it regrettable that there had been no positive response to that proposal.

102. His country believed that the only route towards peace in the Middle East and towards a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction was through agreement among all States in the region. He urged Member States to vote against the resolution and, by doing so, to preserve the outcome of the NPT Review Conference and avoid undercutting the peace negotiations.

103. Ms GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that her country believed that the adoption of the draft resolution by the General Conference would complement the efforts being undertaken in other contexts. Its implementation would pave the way for the 2012 conference decided upon by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities should be addressed by the
General Conference because it constituted a serious threat to international peace and security and hence fell within the scope of the Agency’s mandate, which required that it verify that nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The fact that Israel was the only State in the Middle East that had not acceded to the NPT or expressed an intention to do so, and whose nuclear facilities were not subject to Agency safeguards, warranted the continued inclusion of the item in the agenda of both the Board of Governors and the General Conference.

104. Cuba thanked the Director General for his efforts to discharge the mandate conferred on him by the General Conference, including his recent visit to Israel.

105. Ms FEROUKHI (Algeria) emphasized that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not intended to sow division among the participants at the General Conference. The draft resolution was in keeping with the Agency’s mandate, which required it to ensure that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes and contributed to the socio-economic development of Member States, and it expressed the serious concern of the countries of the Middle East region over Israel’s nuclear capabilities. It supported the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the final document of which, which had been adopted by consensus, recalled the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. She joined the representative of the United States in urging States to make every effort to ensure the success of the conference on the Middle East scheduled for 2012. She also encouraged the Director General to continue his work with the States concerned, which was greatly appreciated.

106. Mr PUJA (Indonesia) said that his country strongly believed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which initiative constituted an essential component of the peace process, could be achieved only if all countries became constructively involved in the process with the support of the nuclear-weapon States. Indonesia had consistently supported General Conference resolutions on Israeli nuclear capabilities as a manifestation of its strong belief that all nuclear-weapon-related issues in the region must be addressed in a holistic manner. It was therefore encouraged by the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which had tasked the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East with the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Such an event should provide a unique opportunity to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

107. Indonesia noted with deep regret that one country in the region had stated immediately after the NPT Review Conference that it would not attend the 2012 conference. Such a negative reaction demonstrated that country’s disregard for the painful process that had led to the agreement to hold a conference, and it jeopardized the prospects for its success. His country also found it regrettable that the efforts to facilitate a compromise solution at the General Conference and prevent confrontation had not met with the full support of all Member States.

108. Mr AZOULAY (Israel) requested a roll-call vote on the draft resolution.

109. The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to vote on the draft resolution contained in document GC(54)/L.2.

110. Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

111. The result of the vote was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan,

Against: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Holy See, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay.

112. There were 46 votes in favour and 51 against, with 23 abstentions. The resolution was rejected.

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.
Report to the 54th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference
from the 13th Scientific Forum
24 September 2010
delivered by Mr. T.A. Ngoma

Mr. President, Director General, Distinguished Delegates

I am pleased and honoured to be given this opportunity to present to the General Conference my report on the IAEA Scientific Forum 2010, whose theme was Cancer in Developing Countries: Facing the Challenge.

Mr. President
When the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set, priority was given to HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. As a result of this, cancer and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs) were marginalized in the global development agenda.

However, today, cancer and other non-communicable diseases are the major causes of death globally accounting for more than double the number of deaths from malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS combined.

Statistics show that the majority of cancer cases and deaths today occur in developing countries, some of which are so poorly equipped to respond to the looming crisis. It is estimated that by 2030, over 13 million people worldwide will die from cancer every year and that 9 million of these deaths will be in developing countries.

Mr. President,
In view of the above, and the lack of global awareness about the enormous magnitude of cancer in developing countries, the Director General decided to make cancer control the highest priority of the Agency in his first year of office. He also decided to make it the theme of this week’s Scientific Forum. It brought together the entire spectrum of people committed to fight cancer - governments, World Health Organisation (WHO) and other international organizations, NGOs, including Union for International Cancer Control (UICC), Livestrong Foundation, Breast Health Global Initiative (BHGI), doctors, advocates, industry, and many individuals from the public and media.
During the opening session, the Director General stressed that the aim of the Forum was to give the participants an opportunity to learn more about how best to work together to fight cancer in developing countries. He expressed the hope that at the end of the Scientific Forum, all the participants would have a better understanding of what they could do to contribute to the fight against cancer.

He noted that, at the international level, work on cancer control is fragmented and cancer is an overlooked aspect of global health. There was therefore a need to address this by strengthening international cooperation, building public–private partnerships and mobilizing new resources. The Director General further said that the IAEA partnership with WHO is vital and a great example of international organizations working together in a common cause. The DG stressed that although the international organizations cannot build cancer care infrastructures in developing countries, they can assist by providing training, expertise and advice, and by helping to ensure that the voice of developing countries is heard. For example, the Agency’s Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) is working with a growing number of Member States. PACT bridges the gap between the work of the IAEA in human health and the work underway in developing countries to establish comprehensive cancer care networks.

Mr. President
The Scientific Forum was fortunate to have two first ladies at the opening session, who are already bringing their influence to bear at the highest level. The first lady of Mongolia told the conference that cancer is the second main cause of death in her country and said “It is unacceptable that we let our people die at their prime age because of a disease which is both preventable and treatable, at the age when they would have otherwise lived and enjoyed the beauties of life and contributed to the good of humankind”.

Egypt’s First lady reminded us not to lose sight of the ultimate goal of eradicating cancer. To those who say we will not find a cure for cancer, she said: “Sixty years ago they said the same about polio. They were wrong then and I sincerely hope they will be wrong now.”

After the opening session, a simulated tumour board was held, in which a multi-disciplinary team of doctors – including radiation oncologists, medical oncologists and surgeons – discussed the best treatment for a hypothetical patient with breast cancer.

Subsequent sessions dealt with Cancer as part of the Global health Agenda, Bringing Partners together, IAEA’s role in combating cancer, Emerging technologies: challenges and Opportunities and safe and appropriate use of New Radiation Medicine Technology in New Surroundings. There was hope, passion and energy in the discussions and some heart-rending stories. There was a young
radiation oncologist from Malawi, the only one in his country, who has no radiotherapy equipment and can only prescribe chemotherapy. There were surgeons who said they can only offer mastectomies to breast cancer patients rather than less disfiguring lumpectomies because they have no radiotherapy facilities.

The details of the technology and resource gap in the real world were discussed. The critical need for Government support in the development of health systems was recognised. In this connection, the IAEA’s significant role in providing radiation medicine know-how and training was acknowledged to be a key component of the fight against cancer. The development of partnerships through PACT around technology, training and services was recommended. The need to put in place regulations for the safe and appropriate use of radiation medicine technology was stressed. There was general agreement in the Scientific Forum that having cancer as part of the Global Development Agenda is an essential prerequisite for addressing the growing cancer problem in developing countries.

Mr. President
Finally after two days of intense and productive deliberations the Scientific Conference closed with the following recommendations:

1. The Agency should maintain the priority given to cancer within its programmes and in particular continue to support, allocate and mobilize resources for the implementation of its cancer related programme.

2. The Agency should continue to advocate for a comprehensive approach to cancer control, from prevention to palliative care, integrating the safe and effective use of radiation medicine in close cooperation with WHO.

3. The Agency should strive to further pursue the necessary steps to place cancer on the development agenda and to support the cancer control capacity building efforts to its member states.

4. The Agency, Member States and NGOs should actively participate in the UN General Assembly debate and discussions on the review of the MDGs. The participants in the Scientific Conference firmly believe that the support of world leaders and the UN system is crucial to turn the focus on the impact of cancer and other NCDs across the developing world.
In summary, the Scientific Forum concluded that there was indeed a need for International Organizations to put cancer on the development agenda. The message the participants took away was one of hope, and an expectation that this must be a continuing process whose momentum must be maintained to make sure that cancer in developing countries get the top level recognition it deserves.

Thank you, Mr President.