Plenary

Record of the Third Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Tuesday, 21 September 2010, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Mr STACEY MORENO (Ecuador)
Later: Mr ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia)
Mr BARRETT (Canada)

Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item of the agenda¹</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1–152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General debate and Annual Report for 2009 (continued)

Statements by the delegates of:

Austria 1–11
Senegal 12–16
Germany 17–33
Sudan 34–45
France 46–58
Niger 59–67
Iraq 68–78
Switzerland 79–90
Czech Republic 91–103

¹ GC(54)/16.
**Contents (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>104–112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>113–123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>124–132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>133–144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</td>
<td>145–152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(54)INF/7.
**Abbreviations used in this record:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRA</td>
<td>African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance Convention</td>
<td>Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Country Programme Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPNM</td>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Notification Convention</td>
<td>Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New START</td>
<td>New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Review and Extension Conference</td>
<td>Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT</td>
<td>Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Convention</td>
<td>Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelindaba Treaty</td>
<td>African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention</td>
<td>Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. **General debate and Annual Report for 2009** (continued)  
(GC(54)/4)

1. **Mr Kyrle** (Austria) commended the professionalism, impartiality and independence with which the Agency’s mandate was being carried out, particularly at a time of major changes in the management team. The issues before the General Conference reflected the Agency’s wide-ranging technical responsibilities, as well as a number of issues whose solutions depended on political discussions in other forums. He called upon participants to work for constructive solutions to the fundamental challenges which faced all countries in the areas of promoting peace and development and protecting health and the environment.

2. Cancer, the subject of the 2010 Scientific Forum, had once been thought to be a problem mainly affecting industrialized countries. Now, however, it had been recognized as a threat to everyone in the world. Nuclear science and technology, together with other preventative and curative measures, could substantially increase cancer patients’ chances of survival so that they could provide for their families and remain productive members of society. Other non-power applications of nuclear science and technology could be used to address such global threats as climate change, food insecurity, shortages of drinking water and environmental deterioration.

3. Austria would do its utmost to make its full contribution to the TCF but, owing to delays in national budget negotiations and planning, his Government would be unable to make its formal pledge until later in the year.

4. Nuclear power was often cited as one way of helping to counter the threat of climate change. Although Austria valued the work of the Agency in assisting countries which chose to use nuclear power to do so safely, his Government believed that the risks of nuclear power far outweighed the advantages, given the high initial capital costs, the environmental and financial costs over time and the lack of a sustainable solution to the problem of nuclear waste. Opting for nuclear power was a long-term commitment which would be binding on future generations and divert resources from more cost-effective and urgent measures to combat climate change. Also, expanding the use of nuclear power increased the risk of proliferation, particularly since the international community had still not agreed on a multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle.

5. The Agency’s verification and technical expertise were crucial for the implementation of the NPT and the Agency’s work had been frequently referred to at the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. In particular, the Conference had adopted an action plan which included implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the Agency had been requested to be part of that. In that context, his Government urged all States to refrain from action which might jeopardize the success of that nascent process, particularly while discussing the General Conference resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities. Austria welcomed the fact that the Review Conference had reaffirmed the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

6. It was essential for the international community to be sure that nuclear power was being used for exclusively peaceful purposes. That was, however, not the case at present. Austria therefore urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to address the international community’s outstanding concerns and engage in a constructive dialogue. Also, his country looked forward to full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the Agency, including the application of an additional protocol to its safeguards
agreement. Furthermore, Austria joined other countries in urging the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons and missile programmes and comply with its international obligations.

7. The Agency safeguards system was an indispensable part of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The current verification standard was a comprehensive safeguards agreement plus an additional protocol. The effective application of that standard would go a long way to rebuild international confidence in countries which had given cause for concern. Austria recognized the need to foster the Agency’s capacity to perform credible and timely analyses of safeguards samples. As the host country, it fully supported plans for the modernization of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria, under the full control of the Agency, using land adjacent to the Agency’s existing laboratories. Austria likewise supported the construction of the Clean Laboratory Extension (CLE) and the related project on Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services (ECAS).

8. Austria, a strong supporter of the Agency’s safety standards programme, looked forward to publication of the remaining general safety requirements. The Agency’s safety services could provide additional confirmation of national compliance with safety standards. Austria hoped that European Union Member States would make use of the Agency’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions when implementing the relevant provisions of the recent European Union nuclear safety directive.

9. His country had followed with interest the discussions on the possible creation of a global nuclear liability regime. However, the conventions under discussion provided less protection for potential victims than his own country’s nuclear liability system, which provided for unlimited liability and awarded jurisdiction to the court in whose territory damage was caused. Austria was concerned that the maximum liability amounts laid down in the Paris and Vienna Conventions were inadequate and that the principle of channelling liability claims was unsatisfactory.

10. The security of nuclear material and facilities was a legitimate concern of all States. Countries must continue to demonstrate to their populations, to neighbouring countries and the entire world that they had strong security systems. He called upon all States Parties to the CPPNM to ratify the amendment to the Convention, which substantially strengthened it.

11. Austria further supported the Agency by facilitating links with the United Nations, for example through the planned establishment of a liaison office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in Vienna. Austria also supported the establishment of a competence centre for civil society in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Vienna.

12. Mr BA (Senegal) expressed appreciation for the Agency’s technical cooperation with his country, covering such essential areas as training, technology transfer, the provision of up-to-date medical and nuclear safety equipment, expert exchanges and the organization of scientific meetings, and support for research into water resource management, improving agricultural practices, radiation protection and malnutrition. The successes achieved had strengthened his country’s determination to continue developing technical cooperation in order to promote socio-economic development. Senegal fulfilled its financial commitments to the TCF and the Agency’s Regular Budget and contributed its national participation costs. Since joining the Agency, Senegal had consistently affirmed its support for the global objectives of non-proliferation and had ratified the NPT and other relevant international instruments.

13. He highlighted the challenge presented by the global energy crisis, which was particularly acute for oil-importing developing countries such as Senegal. Energy security, while not a new issue, had become a major concern in light of increasing fluctuations in oil prices and contradictory opinions on the use of nuclear energy. Given the need to optimize the use of all conventional energy sources in
order to meet population needs, the potential of nuclear energy could not be ignored. For many developing countries it was important for energy self-sufficiency, even if its use was not free from challenges, such as managing waste and ensuring safety and security.

14. Senegal currently obtained around 90% of its energy from bio- and fossil fuels, but a government strategy adopted in 2003 also focused on new and renewable energy and nuclear power. At the fifty-third session of the General Conference, Senegal had declared its intention of pursuing nuclear power in order to meet its energy needs. A working group bringing together all relevant national bodies had been established for that purpose and was following the recommendations of IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1, entitled “Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power”.

15. To demonstrate its commitment to nuclear power, Senegal had ratified the principal legal instruments that served to strengthen the global security and safety regime for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the Vienna Convention, the Assistance Convention, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention and the Early Notification Convention. Also, it intended to adhere to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and to conclude a safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the Agency under the NPT. An act on radiation protection and nuclear safety had recently been adopted and the President had issued a decree creating the Senegalese Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority, an independent body, to regulate the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Senegal was also participating in an AFRA project to put in place national regulatory structures, in accordance with international nuclear safety and security standards, and create a network of regulators in Africa.

16. His country was fully committed to the Agency’s ideals of peace, security and development, and would spare no effort in promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and strengthening the Agency’s non-proliferation and verification regime. Senegal would work with the international community to build peace and stability worldwide. He reiterated his country’s appreciation for the technical support it received from the Agency, which he hoped would continue as new nuclear applications were developed locally and globally with the aim of achieving peace and sustainable development.

17. Mr. HOMANN (Germany) said that two key events had taken place in the area of nuclear power in 2010, namely the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the President of the United States of America in April in Washington, which had raised international awareness in that crucial and urgent field, and the NPT Review Conference in May.

18. The expected global expansion of nuclear power and research needed to go hand in hand with further progress regarding the security of nuclear material and radiological sources. While that responsibility fell first and foremost to States, it nonetheless required effective international coordination and expertise as nuclear security was a transboundary issue. Preparations had begun for the second Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in 2012 and Germany would again play an active role and contribute to a successful outcome, as it had done for the Washington Summit.

19. The final document of the recent NPT Review Conference could serve as a basis for further achievements, especially in the areas of nuclear verification and disarmament. Germany fully supported the ‘global zero’ concept as a practical necessity.

20. In June 2010, the Board of Governors had taken a decision, after long and difficult negotiations, to increase the Agency’s Regular Budget for 2011 by 4.1%. Given Germany’s well-known position, lending support to that increase had been painful, but his delegation had done so in the Vienna spirit of consensus. In the light of the global financial crisis, Germany’s position needed to remain realistic. A zero-growth policy was required in all international organizations, including the Agency. One example
of how costs could be streamlined was implementation of the integrated safeguards system in the framework of the additional protocol. Also, Germany welcomed such future-oriented initiatives as the safeguards by design process.

21. He emphasized Germany’s willingness to support the Agency where specific needs arose. In 2009, his country had pledged €10 million in support of the Agency’s work in the field of nuclear security and had made good progress in delivering on its pledge.

22. Germany remained gravely concerned over the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Consecutive Agency reports, including the most recent one, stated that Iran was continuing to develop its uranium enrichment activities and was not extending the necessary cooperation in relation to the alleged military dimension of its nuclear programme, thus violating the binding resolutions of the Security Council and the requests of the Board of Governors. In so doing, Iran regrettably would not convince the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. His delegation reaffirmed the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to engage in immediate talks with Iran. That group of countries had presented a comprehensive offer of cooperation and Iran should follow up its words by deeds and return to the negotiating table promptly.

23. Germany was also gravely concerned over the DPRK nuclear weapons programme. The complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remained the ultimate goal. He called on the DPRK to return to the six-party talks without delay and allow the Agency to resume its work in the country. Preventing nuclear proliferation to and from the DPRK was a matter of great concern. He called on all States to comply strictly with their obligations under Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).

24. Germany shared the Agency’s concern over possible undeclared nuclear activities in the Syrian Arab Republic in breach of its commitments under the safeguards agreement concluded with the Agency. He called on Syria to improve its thus far insufficient cooperation with the Agency. It should respond to the Agency’s questions, which had remained unanswered to date, and provide full cooperation, including access to related sites.

25. The above-mentioned developments underlined the essential need for an effective and efficient safeguards regime. Comprehensive safeguards agreements in combination with an additional protocol should be considered the relevant standard for verification.

26. Together with its European partners, Germany had affirmed on various occasions its commitment to full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The time had now come to move ahead as agreed upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Singling out Israel in a resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities would be detrimental in that respect. The resolution would not strengthen consensus within the Agency on the matter and, for that reason, should not be put to a vote. The draft resolution submitted by Egypt entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” seemed far more balanced and more likely to attract consensus.

27. Over the past year, the issue of multilateral nuclear approaches had been high on Member States’ agendas. Germany had introduced its own proposal on a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project and had been following the debate closely. It was regrettable that no consensus had been reached and that positions diverged considerably. Germany had engaged in bilateral consultations with several partners in order to enhance understanding of individual interests and would continue to do so.

28. Germany greatly appreciated the Agency’s activities in the field of nuclear safety, which were of growing importance in the light of the number of emerging nuclear power States. Strengthening the
global nuclear safety framework was a precondition for achieving a higher level of nuclear safety worldwide. Germany fully supported the Agency’s crucial role in that process and, in that connection, he was pleased to announce that Germany would host the International Conference on Radiation Protection in Medicine scheduled for 2012.

29. Germany also greatly appreciated the Agency’s technical cooperation work, which had led to noticeable improvements in such important areas as health, especially cancer treatment, water management, agriculture and environmental protection.

30. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), Germany, as a founding member, commended the INPRO team for its achievements. Germany had endorsed the statement of mission of the new International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) and intended to participate as a full member in that important initiative.

31. Turning to the nuclear energy situation in Germany he said that, in the framework of a new energy plan, his Government would extend the life of its nuclear reactors by 12 years on average. That meant that nuclear power would remain a substantial part of Germany’s electricity mix for some time to come. That energy plan affirmed ongoing efforts to ensure nuclear safety and provided for a resumption of exploration at the Gorleben site for a final depository for highly radioactive waste. The German Atomic Energy Act would be amended accordingly.

32. His delegation fully supported the topic of the 2010 Scientific Forum; cancer treatment was truly a global challenge and endeavour. The current bottleneck in radioisotope production for medical applications, especially molybdenum-99, was a major concern and he said that the German research reactor in Munich was prepared to shoulder part of the burden.

33. The continuing expansion of nuclear energy and related technologies required intensive international collaboration. The Agency played a central role in that regard and Germany attached the utmost importance to maintaining the Agency’s ability to fulfil that function.

34. Mr BASHARI (Sudan) thanked the Agency for its support for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries and emphasized the importance of ensuring balance between verification and safeguards activities and the technical cooperation programme. Sudan fully complied with all its obligations under the relevant international instruments that it had ratified, and urged all States that had not yet ratified them to do so at the earliest opportunity in the interests of peace and sustainable development.

35. A national commission was drafting the nuclear legislation required to establish an independent regulatory authority in Sudan, thereby enhancing the country’s compliance with the international safety and security standards applicable to radioactive sources and nuclear installations. Another national commission was working on a recommendation concerning relevant international treaties.

36. Sudan had benefited greatly from the Agency’s technical cooperation programme in vital areas such as human health. Support had been provided for cancer prevention and treatment in the form of equipment for diagnosis and treatment of the disease and the training of human resources. In the area of malaria prevention, the Agency had supported Sudan in the preparation of laboratory studies and in obtaining the human resources required to use radiation technology to sterilize male mosquitoes. Sudan hoped to receive support from the Islamic Development Bank for the field implementation stage.

37. In the agricultural field Sudan had received Agency support in using nuclear techniques to increase the productivity of selected crops. It was also seeking to use radiation techniques to increase
fruit exports, to prevent tuber germination and to sterilize single-use medical devices by obtaining a gamma irradiator.

38. The Agency had supported Sudan in establishing a network of laboratories to investigate diseases affecting animal stocks, which accounted for a large proportion of the country’s gross domestic product.

39. Sudan had also received assistance under the technical cooperation programme in devising a national strategy for the establishment of infrastructure for electricity generation. It attached great importance to the project and looking forward to receiving Agency support for the next stage involving implementation of the national strategy for the use of a nuclear reactor to generate electricity. Sudan trusted that the Agency would approve the continuation of the project in 2011 so that the long-term work plan could be successfully implemented.

40. In addition, his country had greatly benefited from the Agency’s support for the conduct of a feasibility study concerning its first research reactor. Sudan hoped to build a 5 MW reactor within the next five years. It would be used to train the human resources required to operate power reactors and to produce radioisotopes for the medical field and industry.

41. Sudan had participated in the conduct of studies concerning the use of the waters of the Nubian sandstone basin.

42. Sudan highly appreciated the support of the Agency and AFRA for its programmes to develop human resources for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had benefited from higher studies programmes leading to master’s degrees in radiation protection, medical physics and nuclear science and technology at the Sudan Academy of Sciences. More than 100 Agency experts had participated in the projects and a large number of Sudanese had attended the training courses.

43. AFRA had recorded successful results in the areas of food security, health and the training of human resources. It had implemented important regional projects with Agency support, coordinating various applications of nuclear technology. Sudan had hosted three AFRA events during the current year and hoped to host even more in 2011. Congratulating the Agency and African countries on the 20th anniversary of that Agreement, he urged the countries concerned to increase their budgetary allocations to national science and technology programmes, to set up an AFRA fund to support scientific and technological development in Africa, and to establish national infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear waste management in compliance with international rules.

44. The Ministry of Science and Technology had been assigned responsibility under Republican Decree No. 22 of 2010 for regulating the use of new and renewable forms of energy with a view to protecting the environment, human beings and animals from the associated risks. It had also been mandated to elaborate policies aimed at increasing the contribution of such forms of energy in view of their effective role in preventing climate change and reducing the impact of greenhouse gases.

45. Everyone was aware of the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. All States in the region had acceded to the NPT and demonstrated their resolve to take practical steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel, however, continued to challenge the international community by its refusal to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear installations under comprehensive Agency safeguards and its rejection of all international initiatives in that connection. Its conduct in that regard impeded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Sudan called for immediate action to compel Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear installations under Agency control. It also urged all Member States to support the Arab draft resolution entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”. Sudan was seriously concerned about Israel’s disregard for Agency resolutions calling for such action, and urged the Director General and Member States to step
up their efforts to have Israel’s installations placed under comprehensive Agency safeguards, a step that would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia), President, took the Chair.

46. Mr BIGOT (France) said that nuclear proliferation threatened international peace and security. To guarantee that peaceful nuclear activities were not diverted to harmful ends, the international community should respond resolutely to proliferation crises, particularly with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the DPRK.

47. Iran’s pursuit of sensitive activities, particularly enrichment, and its failure to cooperate with the Agency continued to give the entire international community serious cause for concern. Since the previous session of the General Conference, clear messages had been sent to Iran in resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council urging it to fulfil its international obligations. Iran’s behaviour had left the international community with no choice but to impose new sanctions, demonstrating to Iran the high and mounting cost of its actions and reminding it that there was an alternative available through negotiation. A negotiated solution was still possible, and he called on Iran to choose cooperation.

48. The two nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, in violation of its international commitments, had drawn international condemnation. The DPRK should comply with Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and abandon all its nuclear weapons and programmes in a verifiable and irreversible manner. It was essential for the DPRK to comply strictly with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and he expressed support for the Agency’s actions in that regard. Also, the DPRK should permit the return of Agency inspectors, cease all proliferation activities and abstain from export activities prohibited under the relevant Security Council resolutions. He called on the DPRK to return unconditionally to the six-party talks and to refrain from taking any action likely to increase tension in the region.

49. In the same vein, he called on the Syrian Arab Republic to show the necessary transparency and cooperation in applying its safeguards agreement.

50. France welcomed the ambitious and balanced final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which would give new impetus to the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. He expressed support for actions agreed upon to strengthen and universalize the Agency’s safeguards system, the credible and effective application of which gave assurances to Member States that provided technical cooperation that the activities they supported were exclusively peaceful. The expansion of nuclear energy could thus be viewed with confidence. In France’s view, nuclear cooperation with States that did not respect their obligations should be suspended. Under Article III of the NPT, the verification standard was now the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Universalization of those instruments remained a priority, and France invited all States that had yet to do so to implement them as soon as possible. With a view to strengthening safeguards, France would continue to assist the Agency by making its knowledge and expertise available through its Member State Support Programme.

51. Rigorous and universal export controls for the most sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment and material were a necessary condition for developing nuclear trade. To that end, France participated in the Nuclear Suppliers Group in order to promote credible and balanced export controls and provide the necessary framework for responsible nuclear development. Transfer of the most sensitive technologies, particularly in the areas of enrichment and reprocessing, should be evaluated based on a set of criteria; first and foremost of those criteria should be the credibility of the recipient country’s need in view of its nuclear power capacity. Appropriate measures should be taken to guarantee that, as a result of such transfers, there was no diversion from peaceful purposes.
52. The current potential for developing nuclear power existed alongside the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. As had been reaffirmed at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010 and at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Agency had a central role to play in coordinating international efforts to strengthen nuclear security and protection against nuclear terrorism. France would continue to provide financial and technical support for the Agency’s Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013.

53. A growing number of Member States were expressing interest in introducing or reintroducing nuclear power. France was ready to cooperate with any country that demonstrated its scrupulous respect for all non-proliferation commitments, particularly those arising from the NPT, and pursued its peaceful nuclear activities in good faith and full transparency. The International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy, held in Paris in March 2010 and attended by 63 States with an interest in nuclear energy, had provided an opportunity to share expertise and experience and engage in dialogue on the challenges of developing civil nuclear energy programmes. To respond to those challenges, new nuclear governance was needed, based on common principles and supported by a strengthened Agency, so as to create the necessary conditions and framework for responsible nuclear energy development.

54. Financing nuclear power programmes was a major challenge. Significant financial commitment was needed for the building, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and he called on international financial institutions to provide appropriate funding for that low-carbon energy source. Another key challenge was training of human resources. Nuclear training in France was open to people from other countries and included an international master’s degree programme in nuclear energy. Efforts were being made to make such programmes more accessible to overseas partners. Also, France had recently established an International Institute for Nuclear Energy and the number of grants available to foreign students for nuclear science training was set to increase.

55. France would pursue its bilateral cooperation arrangements in the nuclear field in close collaboration with the Agency which, in accordance with its Statute, had a central role to play in promoting cooperation among Member States. France had always supported the Agency’s technical cooperation programme and remained convinced that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could make a significant contribution to meeting basic human needs. It demonstrated its commitment to fighting cancer, which the Director General had made a priority area during his first year of office, by mobilizing its expertise to benefit PACT.

56. Nuclear safety was not only a national challenge but a collective concern that went hand in hand with global public acceptance of nuclear energy. Under the aegis of the Agency, a common understanding of which reactors were the safest to build should be sought, based on agreed safety objectives that would ensure that nuclear safety was a high priority in developing national civil nuclear programmes. He drew the attention of all States, with or without nuclear power programmes, to the importance of universalizing a civil nuclear liability regime. All must demonstrate that that dimension of nuclear power was fully taken into account, particularly through adherence to current regimes, such as the Paris or Vienna Conventions, and by adopting supplementary legislation, as appropriate.

57. France, having opted for large-scale nuclear power, currently had 58 reactors in operation producing 80% of its electricity, and two European pressurized water reactors (EPRs) were under construction. Responsible nuclear energy development required long-term solutions for spent fuel and waste management. France used a closed fuel cycle and recycled its spent fuel, thus enabling uranium resources to be used to their full potential and waste stockpiling to be reduced to a minimum. It would continue to make its processing and recycling facilities available to a number of countries. France would soon be allocating major funding to research into fourth-generation systems and work was under way to build a fast reactor prototype by 2020. In the area of fusion, he welcomed the adoption
with respect to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) of a road map for the next three decades. ITER had now entered a decisive phase: the construction of a reactor at its European site in Cadarache, France.

58. He reaffirmed the importance his country attached to the place of nuclear energy in managing the world’s energy sources, facilitating progress and promoting responsible development. The Agency made a vital contribution through its activities to promote international peace and security and to allow a growing number of countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of the atom. France would continue to support the Agency and its Director General in fulfilling their mission.

59. Mr ABBA (Niger) expressed his country’s full support for the Agency’s objectives of preventing the use of nuclear energy for military purposes and establishing a peaceful and secure world without the threat of nuclear arms. Niger, a major uranium producer, was working actively to promote the peaceful use of nuclear techniques and to strengthen the relevant international legal framework.

60. Throughout its long history of cooperation with the Agency, Niger had acquired practical experience which had enabled it to achieve significant progress towards national and international goals in relation to non-proliferation, the regulatory framework for nuclear safety and security, and radiation protection of workers, the public and the environment. Niger welcomed the establishment of various technical cooperation programmes with Agency support, particularly in the fields of human health, agriculture, stockbreeding, water resource management, environment and energy.

61. In collaboration with PACT, the Agency and other development partners, Niger was implementing a national cancer control programme to provide for the prevention, detection, diagnosis and treatment of cancer in the country and the West African subregion. Niger’s Government had made great efforts to facilitate the construction of a radiotherapy centre enabling the treatment of cancer patients.

62. The use of nuclear techniques in such fields as improving crop varieties and animal nutrition could make a significant contribution to meeting development challenges. Niger was also using radioisotopic techniques to study the silting-up of the Niger river.

63. At the regional level, Niger was actively involved in the work of AFRA and appreciated the Agency’s assistance through subregional and regional programmes. Niger’s CPF, which was currently in the process of being finalized, would be helpful in identifying, formulating and implementing projects aimed at benefiting the people of the country and relieving poverty.

64. In connection with the revision of Article VI of the Statute relating to the composition of the Board of Governors, Niger encouraged Member States very seriously to consider the status that should be accorded to uranium-producing countries.

65. Niger’s uranium exploration and production capacities had expanded rapidly, 130 exploration permits having been issued for a total area covering 20% of the country. The development of uranium production activities was based on diversified partnership and respect for international standards. Thus, together with the start-up of the Imouraren mine in 2013, expected to produce 11 000 tonnes for 40 years, Niger intended to make a major contribution to satisfying the growing global demand for uranium.

66. Niger’s electricity production was insufficient for the needs of its population and its industry. It suffered regular blackouts which were not only unpopular but also harmful to economic growth. To address that problem, Niger hoped to achieve self-sufficiency and meet the energy needs of the subregion by introducing nuclear power, which it intended to do in conformity with all relevant Agency norms.
67. As the third largest producer of uranium in the world and having opted for nuclear power, Niger took a permanent interest in the work of the Agency and had put itself forward as a candidate at the present General Conference for a seat on the Board of Governors, on which it had not been represented for 22 years. His country would be honoured to receive the invaluable support of other Member States for its candidacy.

68. Mr FAHMI (Iraq) said that the Iraqi Government was heavily dependent on the Agency’s assistance to developing countries in taking advantage of nuclear technology in such areas as health, the environment, agriculture, water resources and industry, and in ensuring the safe use of such technology. Following the establishment of the Iraqi National Atomic Energy Commission in 2009, a number of effective measures aimed at the enactment of nuclear legislation had been taken in cooperation with Agency experts.

69. Iraq was now seeking to implement rules, guidelines and regulatory legislation with a view to controlling radioactive material and sources and their movement in accordance with international standards aimed at preventing radioactive contamination or environmental pollution in Iraq. An integrated plan to decontaminate destroyed Iraqi nuclear installations had been developed in cooperation with the Agency. Action to implement it had begun in 2008 notwithstanding major difficulties associated with the state of the installations in question. Decontamination work on a facility belonging to the Ministry of Industry and Mines in central Baghdad had recently been completed.

70. Iraq appreciated the Agency’s support for the development of a solid scientific base in the area of nuclear technology. However, it needed even greater assistance in ridding the Iraqi environment of all radioactive contaminants and in using nuclear technology to detect landmines, which prevented the cultivation of a large proportion of the country’s agricultural land and took a heavy human toll. There were more than 25 million mines in various parts of the country. Their clearance called for cooperation with international bodies such as the Agency.

71. Iraq was currently seeking to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as electron and ion accelerators for use in scientific research and for medical, environmental and agricultural applications. In the area of agriculture, Iraq was seeking to use nuclear technology to develop strains of salt-resistant crops. In 2009 the Government had trained some of its officials in those areas in cooperation with the Agency, the Arab Atomic Energy Agency and friendly countries. It looked forward to increased support from the Agency in the areas in question.

72. A memorandum of understanding had recently been signed between the European Union and the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology concerning an initiative aimed at training Iraqi experts in the decontamination of nuclear installations and the safe disposal of the resulting radioactive waste.

73. The Iraqi Government appreciated the Agency’s humanitarian role in implementing PACT and applying advanced nuclear techniques in the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. Iraq required additional support and cooperation in that area to reduce the mortality rate among cancer patients, especially children. The rate was increasing for many reasons, particularly the lack of specialized facilities and of qualified medical staff.

74. The Iraqi Government supported international efforts to ensure that atomic energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It reaffirmed the need to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. To that end, the nuclear installations of all States in the region should be subject to verification. It followed that Israel should accede to the NPT and place its nuclear installations under comprehensive Agency safeguards.
75. Iraq also supported international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and to prevent the proliferation and unlawful acquisition of nuclear material and radioactive sources. It had taken a variety of measures to that end, including the tightening of control over border crossings and the strengthening of the accounting system for nuclear material.

76. In 2009 the Iraqi Government had adopted a package of legislative measures aimed at implementing its obligations under international instruments concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Cabinet had approved the Law on the Iraqi National Atomic Energy Commission and had submitted it to the Parliament for enactment. The Law would guarantee compliance with Iraq’s obligations under international treaties concerning nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as dual-use materials and equipment. The Government had also decided on 17 January 2010 to apply an additional protocol on a voluntary basis and had submitted its initial declarations ahead of schedule.

77. The Government had agreed in 2010 to sign the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The competent authorities were currently studying the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention with a view to submitting them to the Government for approval.

78. He commended the Director General’s letter dated 11 March 2010 to the Security Council reporting the Iraqi authorities’ excellent cooperation in implementing Iraq’s obligations. He trusted that such action would lead to the lifting of international resolutions concerning Iraq under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

79. **Mr STEINMANN** (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, said that over the past year the encouraging signs glimpsed in the field of nuclear disarmament had taken on a firmer shape. In particular, he noted the commitment made in 2009 by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to achieving a nuclear-free world that had led to the New START, which he hoped would be ratified as soon as possible. Also, the 2010 NPT Review Conference had culminated in the adoption of a final document, which represented a significant development even if the recommendations for follow-on actions were rather modest in substance.

80. Progress on other disarmament matters had been less satisfactory, however. The CTBT had still not entered into force and the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked. Despite various developments, regional proliferation issues had not been fully resolved, which was particularly worrying because some were questioning the ability of the Agency fully to play its verification role.

81. Switzerland and Liechtenstein saw no way out of the crises in question other than a diplomatic approach that fully involved the Agency, reaffirming the unique role it should play in verification. The countries called on all parties concerned to seize the opportunities offered to them, even if they did not immediately meet all their expectations.

82. In the context of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Switzerland had brought up the idea of looking into reducing the efforts and costs involved in safeguards in States with an additional protocol in force. In that way, the States that were the most transparent about their nuclear activities would gain tangible benefits from applying the additional protocol. That, in turn, made the additional protocol more attractive to other States.

83. Regarding the Agency’s budget, he said that it was essential to avoid spreading resources too thinly and to avoid disproportionate budgetary increases that were unrealistic in the context of the economic difficulties of most Member States. He expressed regret that Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference calling for a report by the Director General on the administrative
and financial implications of any new proposal was only followed perfunctorily at best. Not only was that rule generally implemented in the United Nations organizations and agencies, but it would help the Secretariat to discharge its duties better and would help Member States to make more effective decisions.

84. He expressed appreciation to the Chairperson of the Working Group on Financing the Agency’s Activities, charged with holding consultations on the budget for 2011. Unfortunately, the agreement reached was not satisfactory. On a number of occasions, Switzerland had asked that efforts be made to ensure that all expenditures be included in the Regular Budget and, after various exceptions, it expected future budget increases to be limited to offsetting inflation both as regards the Regular Budget and the technical cooperation budget. His country had proposed resorting to loans to finance some investments to demonstrate the real cost of the Agency and had requested a cap on extrabudgetary contributions, which were detrimental to good management. While some progress had been made, such as the introduction of two currencies for technical cooperation programmes and the creation of a fund for major investments, the Regular Budget still failed to cover all investments.

85. During the discussions on the future of the Agency, hopes and fears had been aired regarding current initiatives in the nuclear field. However, it had become clear that divisions within the Agency were proving an obstacle to reforming the main activities or introducing new projects, such that no reforms or large-scale projects could get off the ground without changes in the context in which the Agency found itself. That echoed the finding of the Commission of Eminent Persons that significant progress on nuclear disarmament and the availability of the benefits of nuclear energy were prerequisites to agreement on the measures needed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

86. The issue of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and the role of the Agency in that context had provoked a lot of discussion. While a first fuel bank project had been approved by the Board of Governors in November 2009, the debate on the technical, legal, economic and political aspects that most Member States had expected had not yet taken place. Switzerland remained willing to participate in all discussions on the conceptual framework for any project on the assurance of nuclear fuel supplies.

87. Switzerland and Liechtenstein attached great importance to the Agency’s promotional activities, which should be conducted using the standard management principles and tools in the United Nations system. Since technical cooperation was the primary and fundamental task of the Agency, it should be funded under the Regular Budget. Such a step could help bridge the widening gap between the developed and developing Member States.

88. Turning to nuclear developments in Switzerland, he said that under the plan for the creation of deep geological repositories, disposal sites would be selected for low, medium and high level radioactive waste following consultations with all interested parties. In view of the fact that Switzerland’s oldest nuclear power plants were now 40 years old, three companies had requested authorization to build new plants on the existing sites. The Government would probably make a decision in that regard at the beginning of 2012.

89. Finally, with reference to recent television programmes giving contradictory information about the international transport of nuclear material, he said that comprehensive information must be provided on that subject, with a transparent explanation of the purpose of the transport in the context of the fuel cycle.

90. He concluded by thanking the Secretariat and the Director General for the high quality of their work and their dedication to the Agency’s fundamental objectives.
Ms DRÁBOVÁ (Czech Republic) said that the events of the 2010 ‘nuclear spring’ had further reinforced ‘the spirit of Prague 2009’ and the commitment of the international community to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit had confirmed the ever-increasing importance of international cooperation to avert the risk of nuclear terrorism, which was one of the most challenging threats to international security. Stressing the need for strong nuclear security measures, it had also reaffirmed the key role of the Agency in providing guidance in that area, together with a commitment to ensure continued appropriate resources to enable the Agency to carry out its nuclear security mandate.

The Agency’s crucial role in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy had also been widely recognized by the successful 2010 NPT Review Conference. The adoption of concrete measures relating to all three pillars of the NPT by the Conference was a significant achievement. The Agency’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, constituted the current verification standard. When identifying possible cost-savings within the Agency, it was important to ensure sufficient financial resources for full and equal implementation of those key verification instruments in all countries concerned. At the same time, only stringent export controls could effectively prevent the uncontrolled dissemination of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies. Thus, relevant control policies, practices and regimes must be further strengthened. The Czech Republic had always supported the Agency’s and other non-proliferation initiatives, both through its active engagement in all corresponding activities and by providing voluntary financial contributions whenever possible. In that context, she recalled that her country had hosted the New START signing ceremony in 2010, which provided for further reductions and limitations of nuclear arsenals.

The Czech Republic has always placed emphasis on the area of human health as one of the Agency’s top priorities. It continued to support relevant Agency activities and provided assistance to Agency Member States in need. One example was the project through which the Czech Republic was helping Moldova to strengthen its radiotherapy services and associated regulatory practices by providing both expertise and financial resources amounting to over US $600 000.

In response to the severe global shortage in the supply of medical radioisotopes, the Czech Nuclear Research Institute at Rež, together with the Belgian Institute for Radioisotopes at Fleurus, had initiated cooperation on alternative molybdenum-99 production in April 2010. The partnership aimed to address the ever-increasing demand for reactor-produced radioisotopes, in particular the critical gap in the production of metastable technetium-99. In so doing, the Czech Republic was backing up the few countries in the world producing reactor-based radioisotopes for medical purposes.

Turning to the issue of the nuclear energy renaissance, she thanked the Agency for the assistance it provided to Member States that were introducing nuclear power for the first time or expanding their present capacities. In particular, her country valued the Agency’s assistance in building and sustaining the necessary infrastructure and regulatory framework, as well as the comprehensive set of safety standards it had created and continued to review and update. Also, her country welcomed the independent safety assessments, expert advice and invaluable technical support offered by the Agency, and its involvement in establishing topical networks and facilitating experience and best practice sharing.

In the light of the expansion of the nuclear power, relevant safety conventions and renewed momentum for their implementation were essential. Looking ahead to the fifth review meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety scheduled for April 2011, she underlined the pivotal role played by the Convention in the establishment of a global nuclear safety regime. The Contracting Parties to the Convention would help further to improve the effectiveness of the review process.
97. The Czech Republic, as a country that had decided to expand its nuclear power programmes, was conducting an ongoing environmental impact assessment of two additional units at the existing nuclear power plant at Temelin, which was expected to be completed in 2011. The operators and relevant Czech authorities continued to demonstrate their strong commitment to maintaining and further strengthening a high level of nuclear safety at operating nuclear power plants and as regards the new units to be built.

98. The Czech Republic used Agency’s mechanisms not only as a beneficiary, but also as tools to assist other countries. Her country’s long-standing assistance to Ukraine and Armenia in enhancing the safety of their nuclear power plants testified to the priority her country attached to nuclear safety worldwide.

99. Among the new challenges the nuclear revival brought with it was the need for sufficient and qualified human resources in the States concerned. That was a problem currently faced by a number of countries, including her own. The Agency’s technical cooperation programme was a vital instrument for addressing those issues. The programme continued to serve as a unique platform for sharing information, experience and know-how among countries at different levels of development in all regions. Her country’s involvement in the technical cooperation programme had evolved from being a recipient to becoming a net contributor whose contributions to the TCF now substantially exceeded the assistance it received from the Agency.

100. To shift attention to other priority countries, regional programmes and new partnerships and to highlight the invaluable role of the technical cooperation programme, European Member States participating in the programme, including the Czech Republic, had formulated a strategy for the technical cooperation programme in the Europe region. The relevant document, adopted on 19 February 2010, offered a basic vision of the technical cooperation programme in the region and set forth the main strategic objectives and mechanisms for their implementation. It was an essential step in further increasing the transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the technical cooperation programme and reconfirmed the principle of shared responsibility. It could also serve as a reference when revisiting the overall technical cooperation strategy.

101. She was pleased to announce that the Czech Republic had completed payment of its three-year contribution to help ensure the safe repatriation of spent nuclear fuel from the Serbian research reactor at Vinča to the Russian Federation. In so doing, it had provided almost one million dollars to facilitate the implementation of the largest technical cooperation project ever.

102. As regards the latest developments at the Temelin nuclear power plant, she said that on 9 September 2010 a newly built spent fuel storage facility had started trial operation. It had been designed to accommodate the spent fuel generated over 30 years of plant operation. A similar facility had been operating at the Dukovany site, which had sufficient capacity to store all the spent fuel generated during the remaining lifetime of the plant.

103. A large-scale emergency exercise was about to take place at Temelin with the participation of the relevant local and central State administration and crisis management authorities and interested partners from neighbouring States. While such an exercise was conducted in Czech nuclear power plants every three years, nuclear power plants themselves were required to verify their emergency preparedness annually. Spent fuel management and emergency preparedness and response were other areas where the Agency was an indispensable partner and in which international cooperation was fundamental.

Mr Barrett (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.
104. Mr GRIMA (Malta) said that the Agency provided valuable assistance to Member States through its technical cooperation programme by matching specific technologies to States’ individual requirements.

105. Since its accession to the Agency in 1997, Malta had benefited from technical cooperation in several areas, particularly human health and the environment. It had also participated in several regional programmes and, in early September 2010, had hosted a meeting of the Agency’s RER/8/015 project on using nuclear techniques for the characterization and preservation of cultural heritage artefacts in the European region.

106. Recent years had seen an expansion of existing civilian nuclear programmes or interest in the development of new nuclear capabilities. The inalienable right of every State to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes came nevertheless with onerous international safety and security obligations. New or expanded nuclear energy programmes must be developed only when the strictest safety standards could be assured. The Agency played an important role in assisting Member States to enhance the safety of their nuclear infrastructures and to improve emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

107. Illicit trafficking of sensitive nuclear material continued to present an enormous non-proliferation challenge. The potential of malicious acts involving nuclear material remained an ongoing threat and required constant vigilance. Malta welcomed the increase in the number of States participating in the Illicit Trafficking Database programme and supported measures that enhanced the capabilities of States to prevent and respond to illegal acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. The Agency’s efforts in implementing activities under the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, including to control nuclear material and radiological sources, protect nuclear facilities and strengthen border controls, were particularly relevant in that regard.

108. Over the past 12 months, the international community had demonstrated a renewed willingness to move forward on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference was commendable. Malta was particularly encouraged by the agreement reached on a process for the implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East and looked forward to the planned 2012 conference producing a positive result.

109. The Agency’s role in ensuring that States complied fully with their safeguards obligations under the NPT was an integral and indispensable part of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its verification programme remained at the centre of multilateral efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear material. Through its verification activities, the Agency also had an important role to play in nuclear disarmament. Comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with an additional protocol, constituted the current verification standard. All Member States had an obligation to preserve and strengthen the verification regime and to refrain from actions that could hamper its application. He urged Member States that had not done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement without delay, as required under the NPT, and to sign and ratify an additional protocol as soon as possible.

110. The nature and scope of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme continued to be a matter of serious concern, in particular its recent decision to enrich uranium to up to 20% and its heavy water production activities. Malta called on Iran to refrain from further enrichment activities and to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the Agency. The implementation by Iran of an additional protocol would be an important step towards rebuilding trust with the international community. His delegation thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their continued impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in that regard.
111. Similarly, his delegation remained concerned by developments in the DPRK and shared the international community’s concern that the Agency had been prevented from implementing safeguards for more than eight years. Malta urged the DPRK to resume cooperation with the Agency without delay and to restart dialogue towards the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

112. He commended the Director General for his able leadership of the Agency over the past 12 months, enabling it to continue contributing to sustainable strategies that addressed the challenges of hunger, disease and poverty and that furthered the cause of peace in the twenty-first century.

113. Mr CHOREV (Israel) said that in his address he would have wished to dwell on the many important issues such as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safeguards, security and safety, as befitted the spirit and mission of the Agency. Regrettably, the General Conference’s agenda contained anti-Israeli items submitted with the clear purpose of avoiding discussion of serious violations of the NPT and safeguards obligations by States in the Middle East. Having listened to statements by Arab countries, especially that of Egypt, it was clear that that observation was an accurate one.

114. Recently the General Conference had witnessed continuous ill-motivated efforts to single out and condemn the State of Israel. Not surprisingly there was much similarity between those countries that were at the forefront attacking Israel and the Middle East violators of the NPT and Agency safeguards agreements. Such a tactic was intended to divert the attention of the General Conference from the real challenges and cases of dangerous proliferation and non-compliance.

115. The Director General’s recent reports to the Board of Governors on Iran and Syria had been extremely disturbing. It should be recalled that just a few days after the closure of the 2009 General Conference, the international community had been stunned by the incriminating revelations about Iran’s Qom enrichment plant, which had been constructed in secrecy for years in violation of Iran’s international obligations. In response, the Board of Governors had urged Iran to suspend construction at Qom immediately. However, Iran continued its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons in complete disregard of all relevant resolutions taken by the international community. Syria’s non-cooperation with the Agency had also been the subject of Agency reports.

116. Israel was gravely concerned by those and other negative developments in the Middle East, which had brought the region further away from attaining peace and security. It was therefore highly regrettable that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had also failed to address the greatest threat of proliferation in the Middle East today, namely Iran’s nuclear programme. Any approach that instead singled out Israel not only weakened the ability of the international community to confront proliferators and violators but also impacted negatively on the prospects for the advancement of arms control measures in the Middle East region.

117. The resolution sponsored by the Arab League entitled “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” was a major tool in the service of a continuous political campaign to defame Israel. As the General Conference was being forced to deal once again with what had become an annual detracting element in its discussions, he wished to state loudly and clearly the position of Israel that the proposed resolution was incompatible with the basic principles and norms of international law, and did not fall within the mandate of the Agency as defined in its Statute. Moreover, the resolution, which called upon Israel to accede to the NPT, ignored adverse reality in the Middle East region. He reminded delegates that four Middle Eastern Member States party to the NPT, namely, Iran, Syria, Libya and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, had grossly violated their Treaty obligations. Those four cases made it absolutely clear that the NPT was unable adequately to address the security challenges of the Middle East. A serious threat to the NPT and the non-proliferation regime was being posed from within by States that pursued nuclear weapons under the cover of their NPT membership. NPT accession could
not therefore be a goal in itself, separated from the broad agenda of regional peace and security in all its aspects. Genuine regional arms control arrangements in the Middle East could be advanced only as a consequence of a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all States of the region with their arms control and non-proliferation obligations. That had also been the proven experience of other regions. Majority votes at international forums could not serve as a substitute for a wide regional consent and cooperation.

118. A leading Member State in the Middle East, with the support of others in the region, was constantly disrupting the conduct of the General Conference by introducing anti-Israeli agenda items. Instead, those States that were truly interested in regional security should demonstrate the much needed regional goodwill and trust by admitting Israel to the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) regional group where it belonged geographically and to which it had so far been denied membership. How could one realistically expect to move forward towards establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East when Israel’s basic rights were denied? Was it not an imperative to advance reconciliation, mutual recognition and peace prior to embarking on ambitious arms control plans?

119. The preamble to the NPT clarified that the Treaty was designed for a political environment where “States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. It also clarified that States should share the overall objective of attaining “peace and security”. The Middle East had yet to make progress towards such a desirable environment. Moreover, it was the sovereign right of any State to decide whether it consented to be bound by any treaty. The Agency itself was required to carry out its activities “with due observance of the sovereign rights of States”, as was clearly stipulated in Article III.D of its Statute. The advancement of States’ accession to international treaties did not fall within the Agency’s mandate. Israel was not the only Member State in the MESA region to have exercised its sovereign right not to accede to the NPT, yet Israel was the only State that had been singled out and was called upon to take a decision which was against its best national interests. He emphasized that Israel valued the non-proliferation regime, acknowledged its importance and had always demonstrated a responsible policy of restraint in the nuclear domain.

120. Agenda item 19 entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” had enjoyed consensus by the General Conference for 14 consecutive years until 2005. That consensus demonstrated a regional common understanding about the vision of the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Regrettably, consensus had become unattainable ever since, as the sponsor of the resolution, Egypt, must have lost its interest in the conversion of the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Instead, the singling out of Israel had been set as a principal goal, given priority over meaningful discussion of regional security in the Middle East. No less troubling was the apparent evidence in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2009 that Egypt, the sponsor of the resolution, was not itself in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. Furthermore, Egypt had not ratified the Pelindaba Treaty, which had recently entered into force. Israel rejected that double standard. Had Israel’s neighbours truly wished to move forward in the Middle East region, they would have turned to dialogue instead of embarking in the General Conference on a harmful political campaign.

121. The threat of proliferation in the Middle East was closely associated with the threat of nuclear terrorism supported by rogue States. That recognition had brought Israel to join the Megaports Initiative led by the United States Department of Energy to prevent possible illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials, and to combat nuclear terrorism. Living up to its responsibilities as an active member state of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Israel had in June 2010 hosted a successful GICNT workshop on nuclear forensics and legal aspects of fighting radiological and nuclear terrorism attracting more than 100 participants from over 20 countries.
Nevertheless, Israel’s participation in the subsequent GICNT meeting which took place in the Middle East region had regrettably been denied by the host country, the United Arab Emirates. Such political discrimination harmed the prospect of improved regional trust.

122. His Government was appreciative of the recent visit by the Director General, during which he had been shown various projects carried out under the Agency’s technical cooperation programme. He had visited the Sharett Institute of Oncology and Radiotherapy at the Hadassah hospital and had been introduced to the activities of scientists and physicians in the field of cancer treatment and nuclear medicine. Israel, a founding member of the Agency, recognized the importance of the Agency’s education and training programme for the safe, secure and efficient development of the nuclear field. Accordingly, it participated in a significant number of Agency activities and strove to increase such contributions. Israel made the results of its extensive scientific researches available to developing countries. The Hadassah Medical Center in Jerusalem was constantly providing training and assistance to Israel’s Palestinian neighbours, as well as to many developing countries.

123. Israel rejected the transparent policy of violators of the NPT and safeguards agreements in the Middle East of blaming Israel for all their ills instead of addressing and correcting their gross violations of international norms and obligations. The international community was at a critical crossroads in confronting fundamental threats posed by a small number of States, which were challenging the world’s order and putting regional and global peace and security at risk. It was incumbent upon the General Conference to prevent those Member States from inflicting irreparable damage on the non-proliferation regime and on the Agency itself.

124. **Mr OSMAN** (Bangladesh) said that his Government was firmly committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and to acceleration of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind. It deeply appreciated the cooperation with the Agency in the country’s research and development efforts.

125. The leader of Bangladesh independence 38 years ago, Bangabandu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had dreamt of a prosperous and bountiful Bangladesh, but the country had been struggling since then to break out of the vicious circle of poverty. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, his daughter, had announced “Vision 2021 — Digital Bangladesh”, a commitment to end the state of crisis and build a modern, technologically advanced and prosperous country to realize her father’s dream. Science and technology and an expanded role for nuclear energy in various sectors of the economy such as energy, agriculture, industry, medicine, health and the environment, were identified among the key tools for meeting the goals of Vision 2021.

126. Bangladesh’s nuclear programmes and activities were firmly based on the principles of non-proliferation, safety and security. Bangladesh’s commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament was impeccable, having signed the NPT, a bilateral safeguards agreement, an additional protocol and the CTBT, and it had pledged to continue its policy of consistent transparency and support of the international verification regime. Bangladesh was also strongly committed to strengthening the nuclear safety and security infrastructure necessary to implement its nuclear power programme.

127. Sustainable development was closely linked with adequate availability of energy in general and electricity in particular. Demand for electricity was expected to experience strong growth in the future as Bangladesh strove to achieve its socio-economic development targets. Meanwhile, indigenous primary energy resources were inadequate to meet that demand, and nuclear power was therefore a viable option for the country’s long-term energy mix.

128. The current Government had taken a decision to expedite implementation of the Rooppur nuclear power project initiated more than 40 years earlier and a Cabinet committee had been formed to
set policy guidelines for implementation of the project. Bangladesh was grateful to the Secretariat for the support being provided to its nuclear power programme and hoped to continue such cooperation.

129. The Agency’s technical cooperation programme had always been very important for Bangladesh. Recent technical cooperation projects had addressed establishing nuclear power, improving livestock production, improving agriculture in drought areas, medical isotope production, non-destructive testing in industry, isotope hydrology for water management and, above all, the development of human resources. In all those areas, the Government’s commitment had been supported by technical cooperation with the Agency and Bangladesh hoped that such support would continue.

130. Cancer accounted for about 13% of all deaths worldwide, which was more than those caused by HIV/Tuberculosis and malaria combined. By 2020, there would be 15 million new cases of cancer every year, 70% of which would be in developing countries. Currently in Bangladesh, 200 000 new cases were detected each year, but there was very limited access to services for diagnosis and treatment, in particular for breast and cervical cancer in women, which could be treated successfully if detected early. PACT was one way the Agency could significantly contribute to combating cancer in developing countries, and that programme deserved Member States’ support and participation. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission had taken the initiative to develop human resources and strengthen facilities to fight cancer, and Agency technical assistance and cooperation were being sought in that connection.

131. The Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) was a powerful tool for addressing the problems of individual Member States through use of the experience, expertise and resources available in the Asia-Pacific region. Bangladesh had been an active member of the RCA since its inception, participating in almost all of its programmes. Growing over the years, RCA programmes had come to address a range of issues in sustainable development. That had been made possible through the adoption of innovative approaches such as participatory actions in project formulation, implementation and management, the concept of lead countries and regional resource units. Such strategies had helped increase the exchange of expertise and sharing of facilities in the region. Bangladesh was confident that the RCA would continue to promote regional capabilities and expertise in thematic areas including health, agriculture, industry and environment, research reactors, radioactive waste management and radiation protection.

132. Bangladesh reaffirmed its commitment to support the Agency’s efforts in reinforcing world peace and prosperity. There was a common understanding that the most important issue for Member States was the peaceful use of nuclear energy for power. All must come together to protect the planet and civilization. While much had been done, there was still much to do. In the words of the poet Robert Frost, “The woods are lovely, dark and deep. But I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep”.

Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia), President, resumed the Chair.

133. Mr ENKHBAT (Mongolia) expressed appreciation for the commendable efforts and achievements of the Agency in the fields of technical cooperation, nuclear safety and security, and verification.

134. Mongolia recognized the importance of effective and efficient implementation of the technical cooperation programme. During the 2009–2011 cycle, Mongolia had been implementing 11 technical cooperation projects with cooperation set to continue addressing some of the country’s development goals in 2012–2013. Mongolia was also participating in 14 regional projects and in the RCA, which had contributed to the development of nuclear research and technology transfer, as well as expanding
cooperation on the development of human resources and training. Cooperation between the Agency and Mongolia had been fruitful and effective in terms of human resources development, public health and livestock production, contributing to achieving the country’s socio-economic goals. That was clearly reflected in Mongolia’s CPF for 2009–2014, which also addressed uranium mining regulations and radiation protection and nuclear safety.

135. In the agriculture sector, a major area for development, the Government was pursuing its efforts to improve animal health and animal productivity, including through an Agency technical cooperation project on using nuclear technology to increase animal productivity. A specialized radioimmunology laboratory to monitor reproductive efficiency and the nutritional value of feed had been established at the Mongolian State University of Agriculture and the Research Institute of Animal Husbandry. Improved nutritional management had reduced input costs for farmers by almost 67% and raised the resistance of livestock to the harsh winter.

136. There had also been improvement of the national capacity for the utilization of the artificial insemination of yaks and cattle, the assessment of the nutritional value of feeds and the identification of toxic plants and plants containing bioactive compounds from industrial products.

137. The ongoing project “Supporting the sustainable production and supply of vaccines and diagnostic kits for transboundary animal diseases” played an important role in identifying Mongolian livestock free from rinderpest disease; Mongolia hoped that cooperation in that area would continue.

138. Mongolia attached great importance to PACT. Cooperation with the Agency focused on the prevention and early detection of cancer and on the provision of radiotherapy. After the PACT mission to Mongolia in 2009, the country has been designated the eighth PACT Model Demonstration Site country. That would enable Mongolia to combine its resources and expertise with PACT, the World Health Organization and other partners and stakeholders. In accordance with the recommendations of the PACT mission, Mongolia’s Ministry of Health had established the National Cancer Control Steering Committee on 13 May 2010 to implement the national subprogramme. The Steering Committee was headed by the Deputy Minister of Health and included representatives of various stakeholders, such as relevant departments of the Ministry of Health, the Nuclear Energy Agency, the Health Sciences University and the Cancer-Free Mongolia National Foundation.

139. Despite its financial difficulties, Mongolia had met its commitments to the TCF including its national participation costs.

140. Mongolia was one of the countries that had expressed an interest in expanding their nuclear programmes and constructing nuclear power plants to meet growing electricity demands. The Agency had already provided recommendations on the first steps towards the development of the country’s nuclear programme and uranium production. To ensure public acceptance and the active participation of all stakeholders, the Government was preparing a long-term programme for the research, development and utilization of nuclear energy. It was important that the Agency continue to provide technical assistance and support to developing Member States on all aspects of uranium mining. Currently, Mongolia was exploring its uranium reserves and aimed to start uranium production in 2012. It would work closely with the Agency’s Uranium Production Site Appraisal Team to promote best practices and safety in the uranium production cycle.

141. Protecting workers, the public and the environment from ionizing radiation was one of the most important priorities of the Government of Mongolia. It would also continue to give priority to the controlled and secure management of radiation sources as described in the Agency’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
142. Under the Second Line of Defense Program initiated by the United States of America, 10 State border points had been equipped with radiation detection equipment. Execution of the project would help to improve the efficiency of inspections and implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

143. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime was one of the pillars of Mongolia’s foreign policy. The country’s nuclear-weapon-free status made an important contribution not only to the nuclear non-proliferation regime but also to strengthening confidence in the region.

144. Finally, Mongolia welcomed the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Agency must play a greater role in the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

145. Mr TÓTH (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that, together, the Commission and the Agency constituted a formidable multilateral advocate for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The current session of the General Conference was taking place a few months after the successful conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which had overcome the failure of 2005 and re-confirmed the NPT as the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference had reassured the international community of its own capacity to act, and of the merits of multilateralism and collective action in the face of common challenges.

146. The Review Conference had also reaffirmed the essential role of the CTBT in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The participants had agreed on the vital importance of prompt entry into force of the CTBT as a core element of the non-proliferation regime and in the current security environment. It was essential for the international community to implement the recommendations of the Review Conference.

147. A strong and verifiable final barrier to a nuclear weapons capability was vital to any comprehensive approach to assessing common security challenges. States which already possessed nuclear weapons needed to test in order to develop new and more sophisticated weapons, and would-be nuclear-weapon States needed to test the technical and scientific aspects of their proposed nuclear programmes. The entry into force of the CTBT making the de facto international norm against nuclear testing legally binding would close that door once and for all.

148. Considerable progress had been made in development of the CTBT verification regime. Once the CTBT was fully operational, issues of non-compliance would be addressed in a pre-determined and pre-agreed manner. In view of the concerns over non-compliance in other areas of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the compliance mechanisms built into the CTBT were very important for pursuing the overall objectives of the NPT.

149. Furthermore, the CTBT could promote nuclear disarmament. Providing a strong legal barrier against nuclear testing, it would curb the development of new designs of nuclear weapons. As a strong confidence- and security-building measure, it was an essential element of the process of deeper arms cuts currently being discussed by the nuclear-weapon States. A CTBT in force would help to bring about multilateral disarmament involving all States in possession of nuclear weapons. It could also serve as a confidence- and security-building measure in regions such as the Middle East and Asia.

150. The NPT-based non-proliferation and disarmament regime was facing many challenges and the common enemy was the very real prospect of nuclear terrorism. With much more fissile material in circulation, it was essential to create a comprehensive set of barriers against misuse. Existing standards should be strengthened, and new standards established and enforced. The CTBT offered such a systematic approach to address those challenges.
151. The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT had been held in September 2009 in New York, attended by over 110 countries including 40 ministerial-level participants. The Conference had been an unequivocal expression of the international community’s continued faith in the CTBT and the Commission. In its strongly worded final declaration, adopted by consensus, States which had not yet done so were urged to sign and ratify the CTBT so that it could enter into force. The final declaration had been supported by the non-ratifying States China, Egypt, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel and the United States of America. The United Nations Security Council, in its turn, had called for the entry into force of the CTBT at an early date.

152. On 23 September 2010, a Commission ministerial meeting was due to be held in the margins of the General Assembly session in New York. To date, 182 countries had signed the CTBT and 153 of them had ratified it. Nine of the 44 States with the relevant nuclear technology capability still had to ratify the Treaty before it could enter into force. The Commission believed that the prospects for entry into force were more positive than they had been many years in light of the renewed impetus for nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The political will of the international community was evident, but it must be translated into concrete action. The CTBT’s verification regime was almost complete and it had been tried and tested following the two nuclear test explosions conducted by the DPRK. While not the answer to all non-proliferation concerns, the CTBT was an integral part of a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and its entry into force could help to solve many of the current and future challenges facing that regime.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*