Plenary

Record of the First Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 20 September 2010, at 10.10 a.m.

Temporary President: Ms MACMILLAN (New Zealand)
President: Mr ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia)

Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item of the agenda</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening of the session</td>
<td>1–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Election of officers and appointment of the General Committee</td>
<td>6–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Applications for membership of the Agency</td>
<td>24–28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Statement by the Director General</td>
<td>30–69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2011</td>
<td>70–72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 GC(54)/16.
## Contents (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item of the agenda</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>General debate and Annual Report for 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Statements by the delegates of:**

- Belgium: 73–85
- Islamic Republic of Iran: 86–100
- China: 101–106
- Kenya: 107–121
- United States of America: 122–140
- Japan: 141–154

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(54)/INF/7.
**Abbreviations used in this record:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRA</td>
<td>African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPS</td>
<td>Agency-wide Information System for Programme Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPNM</td>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>high-enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INPRO</td>
<td>International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPSAS</td>
<td>International Public Sector Accounting Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRS</td>
<td>Integrated Regulatory Review Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto Protocol</td>
<td>Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEU</td>
<td>low-enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPCs</td>
<td>national participation costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Review and Extension Conference</td>
<td>Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>nuclear-weapon-free zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT</td>
<td>Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATTEC</td>
<td>Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New START</td>
<td>New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCF</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Abbreviations used in this record** (continued):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIC</td>
<td>Vienna International Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
– Opening of the session

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared open the 54th regular session of the General Conference.

2. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, she invited the delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

   All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT said that she had tried her best, during her tenure as President of the 53rd session of the General Conference, to work constructively with regional groups, national delegations and the Secretariat, encouraging dialogue and focusing on the resolutions before the Conference. The discussion on many of the issues had been brought to a constructive conclusion and exchanges of opinions on the more controversial issues had led in most cases to an acceptable result. She regretted, however, that the Conference had been unable to produce a consensual outcome on the Middle East issues.

4. She warmly thanked delegations for their engagement and collaboration and the Secretariat for its logistical, policy and moral support. It had often been necessary to compromise on difficult issues and she had sometimes stumbled over arcane Conference principles and procedures, but if her Presidency had proven successful, Member States and the Secretariat were central to that success.

5. The international environment had changed dramatically since the preceding session of the General Conference. The many positive developments in that time pointed to an increased willingness to move forward on disarmament and non-proliferation. The Agency had featured prominently at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the resulting agreed action plan highlighted its important role in disarmament and non-proliferation. One important outcome of the Review Conference had been the reaffirmation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the agreement to convene a conference in 2012 to discuss its implementation. That agreement represented the best opportunity in recent years to move forward in the Middle East peace process and to establish a regional zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD. The General Conference should support the initiative and refrain from hindering the process or creating roadblocks that would make the dream of such a region more difficult to realize.

1. Election of officers and appointment of the General Committee

6. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

7. Mr NAKANE (Japan), speaking on behalf of the Far East Group, proposed Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia).

8. Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia) was elected President by acclamation.
9. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT congratulated Mr Enkhsaikhan on his election and wished him every success in his task.

Mr Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia) took the Chair.

10. The PRESIDENT said that his election was a great honour which he viewed as an expression of Member States’ appreciation for his country’s constructive policy aimed at contributing to the attainment of the Agency’s goals. He thanked the Temporary President for her contribution to the successful outcome of the 53rd regular session of the General Conference.

11. With further advances in science and technology, the Agency was becoming one of the most important forums for international cooperation aimed at achieving the combined goals of freedom from fear and freedom from want. The former goal was reflected in the Agency’s efforts to ensure that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes only. As the renewed interest in nuclear energy placed additional responsibility on the Agency, it was unsurprising that the 2010 NPT Review Conference had expressed its full support for the Agency’s activities in its Final Document. The positive momentum of the Review Conference should be maintained by the General Conference, including through its promotion of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. A special effort should be made to contribute to the preparations for the 2012 conference on that subject.

12. The Agency also had enormous potential for contributing to the goal of freedom from want, including through cancer prevention. Over 20 million people were living with cancer and almost everyone was affected by the disease in some way. However, thanks to nuclear science and technology, cancer was becoming increasingly preventable and treatable. He thanked the Director General for maintaining the Agency’s focus on that issue and dedicating the 2010 Scientific Forum to cancer control in developing countries.

13. The achievement of the MDGs depended to some extent on wider application of nuclear energy and technology. The Agency could make an important contribution to food security through mutation breeding, crop improvement, livestock production, and soil, water and fertilizer management. He welcomed the start of construction of improved facilities at the Agency’s Seibersdorf laboratories that would enable timely and accurate isotope analysis of particles. It was to be hoped that further modernization of the laboratories would allow improved implementation of programmes in the vital areas of human health, food and agriculture, industrial applications and the environment so as to better serve Member States, especially developing countries.

14. Having served for two years as Mongolia’s Resident Representative to the Agency, he had become fully aware of the Agency’s enormous potential and had forged strong links with his diplomatic colleagues and the Secretariat. He knew that he could count on their support in ensuring a smooth, efficient and productive session of the General Conference. He would consult closely with Member States and regional and other groups to achieve that goal.

15. He drew attention to the fact that a High-level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly on the MDGs was being held from 20 to 22 September 2010 with a view to accelerating progress towards achievement of the Goals, including Goal 6 on combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Bearing in mind the importance of fighting cancer, he had undertaken consultations with the chairpersons of regional groups and some delegates, who had encouraged him to send the following message to the High-level Plenary Meeting:

“There is a growing awareness among the IAEA Member States about the enormous magnitude of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) globally and particularly in developing countries, which kill more than twice as many people as tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and malaria combined. Within the NCDs, the burden posed by cancer needs special attention due to its large incidence,
mortality and the often excessive cost and complexity of its treatment, involving surgery, radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Once known as the disease of the rich, today most new cancer cases are diagnosed in the developing world where access to cancer diagnosis and treatment is very limited. The IAEA plays an important role in supporting its Member States’ efforts in fighting cancer through its radiation medicine programme. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the IAEA with their mandates on public health and radiation medicine have established a Joint Programme on Cancer Control and are working together through the IAEA’s Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) to place cancer on the global agenda.

“The IAEA General Conference wishes to express its full support to the discussions of the UN-MDG High-level Plenary Meeting, and, in particular, strongly endorses the actions proposed by WHO in preparing for the next High-level Meeting planned in September 2011 at the UN Headquarters in New York. The Conference firmly believes that the support of the world leaders and the UN system is crucial to enhance the focus on the impact of cancer and other NCDs across the developing world. This must be followed by sustained action at the highest levels in Member States with support from WHO and the IAEA, and other key organizations, to develop the necessary infrastructure and capacity in developing countries to end the growing disparity in cancer survival between rich and poor countries and help save millions of lives.”

16. He took it that the Conference accepted the proposal to send the message to the High-level Plenary Meeting.

17. It was so decided.2

18. The PRESIDENT recalled that, pursuant to Rules 34 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference had to elect 8 Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and 5 additional members of the General Committee, resulting in a General Committee of 15 with himself as its Chairperson. However, he proposed that in the current session the General Committee should be composed of 16 members, consisting of 8 Vice-Presidents and 6 additional members, so that the area of the Far East, in addition to providing the President of the Conference, could also have a Vice-President. That would involve suspension of Rules 34 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, as had been done in comparable situations in the past.

19. It was so agreed.

20. He proposed that the delegates of Canada, China, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and South Africa be elected as Vice-Presidents, that Mr García Revilla (Peru) be elected as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and that the delegates of Kenya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and Sri Lanka be elected as additional members of the General Committee.

21. The President’s proposals were accepted.

22. He further proposed that the General Conference deal with items 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of its provisional agenda, in that order, pending receipt of the General Committee’s recommendation on the agenda.

23. The President’s proposal was accepted.

2 The decision was subsequently issued as document GC(54)/DEC/8.
2. Applications for membership of the Agency
   (GC(54)/17)

24. The PRESIDENT drew attention to document GC(54)/17 containing an application for membership by the Kingdom of Swaziland. The application had been endorsed by the Board of Governors, which had also submitted, in the same document, a draft resolution for adoption by the General Conference.

25. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution.

26. It was so decided.

27. Ms DLAMINI (Swaziland), speaking under Rule 30, conveyed her country’s deep gratitude to the General Conference for accepting its application for membership of the Agency. She also expressed appreciation for the Secretariat’s dedication and diligence.

28. Her Government was deeply committed to the Agency’s work and ethics. It looked forward to contributing to all its activities and to a fruitful partnership with other Member States.

3. Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

29. Mr DUARTE (United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) read out the following message:

   “I am pleased to send my greetings to the fifty-fourth session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I congratulate Director General Amano on his successful first year in office.

   “This has been a year of serious efforts to reduce the nuclear threat, and these included the NPT Review Conference in New York, the Washington summit on nuclear security and the agreement by Russia and the United States on a new START treaty. For my part, during my visits to the nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and then to Nagasaki and to Hiroshima, I was personally moved by the yearning of many millions of people for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

   “The IAEA’s technical expertise will be of vital importance as we seek practical solutions to obstacles on the road to global zero. The Agency has continued the constructive work to advance non-proliferation and to enhance nuclear safety and security. It has also undertaken fruitful efforts to promote the implementation of the additional protocol. I also welcome our close partnership in the Security Council committees on terrorism and on nuclear non-proliferation.

   “With respect to nuclear security, the Washington summit endorsed a strong role for the IAEA, while underscoring the fundamental responsibility of Governments. I call on all States that have not yet signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to do so immediately.

   “This has also been another year of active IAEA efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Here too the United Nations and the IAEA are pursuing similar goals, as shown by our
work in the inter-Agency UN energy mechanism. It was in this spirit of mutual cooperation that last January I organized the first ever joint meeting of the heads of the United Nations, the IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. I have also invited the IAEA to participate in the forthcoming High-Level Meeting of the United Nations on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations.

“Looking ahead, the IAEA is also well placed to help explore the technical, legal and political aspects of a nuclear weapons convention. The international community must build on the positive momentum that has been generated and I look forward to working with you across this agenda.

“Please accept my best wishes for a successful conference.”

4. Statement by the Director General

30. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said that pursuing multiple objectives in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including technical cooperation, in a balanced manner had been a constant theme of his first ten months in office. He was trying to change the widespread perception of the Agency as simply the world’s ‘nuclear watchdog’, which did not do justice to its extensive activities in other areas, especially in nuclear energy, nuclear applications and technical cooperation. The focus in 2010 was on cancer, which was the subject of that year’s Scientific Forum.

31. The growing importance of nuclear energy had had a significant impact on the Agency’s work in recent years, leading to a stronger focus on the needs of newcomer countries. In March 2010, he had addressed the International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy in Paris, where he had expressed his conviction that access to nuclear power should not be limited to developed countries but should be available to developing countries as well. The Conference had illustrated the growing international interest in nuclear power as a clean and stable source of energy that could help mitigate the impact of climate change.

32. The Agency had entered a new era with around 60 countries considering the introduction of nuclear energy and between 10 and 25 new countries expected to bring their first nuclear power plants on line by 2030. Many of the countries that already had nuclear power were planning or building new reactors or extending the operational life of existing reactors.

33. While it was up to Member States to decide whether or not to opt for nuclear power, the Agency had a key role to play in ensuring that the expansion of nuclear power took place in an efficient, responsible and sustainable manner. When countries expressed an interest in introducing nuclear power, the Agency offered advice on how to put the appropriate legal and regulatory framework in place and how to ensure the highest standards of safety and security, without increasing proliferation risks. It was able to offer independent know-how on the construction, commissioning, start-up and operation of nuclear reactors, with a view to enabling countries to introduce nuclear power knowledgeably and profitably.

34. The Agency should continue to respond to the needs of countries which were considering introducing nuclear power. Since he had taken office, new staff posts had been created and cost-free
experts taken on in order to strengthen assistance to such countries. In parallel, the Agency would continue to assist countries that were expanding existing nuclear power programmes through the construction of new reactors and the life extension of existing reactors.

35. He intended to encourage international lending institutions to be more open to supporting nuclear power projects, bearing in mind that a large number of countries recognized nuclear energy as a stable and clean source of energy which they might wish to include in their energy mix.

36. The Agency should further encourage a proper appreciation of the benefits of nuclear power in helping to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, which was widely recognized to be one of the most important items on the global agenda. Such benefits therefore deserved wider recognition in the discussions at relevant international forums such as those related to the Kyoto Protocol.

37. The Agency’s activities in sharing best practices and disseminating information on waste management and disposal should be expanded. Waste disposal remained an important challenge that needed to be addressed in a safe and sustainable manner by newcomers and established users alike.

38. The Secretariat would also continue to stress the importance of the Agency’s work as a catalyst for innovation, for example through INPRO, which brought together technology holders and users so that they could consider together the action needed to achieve innovation. He congratulated all involved in INPRO as it celebrated its tenth anniversary.

39. Discussions had been taking place for some time on possible measures to ensure reliable supplies of nuclear fuel. In March 2010, with the approval of the Board of Governors, he had signed an agreement with the Russian Federation to establish an LEU reserve that would help assure nuclear fuel supplies to Member States. While views clearly differed among Member States, all agreed that the issue needed to be discussed further. The Agency was the appropriate forum for such consultations and he encouraged Member States to find suitable ways of dealing with the issue. The Secretariat stood ready to provide any assistance required.

40. Turning to nuclear applications, he said that he was aware of the importance many Member States attached to the Agency’s work in areas such as health care and nutrition, food security, the environment, and water resource management. He had made the issue of cancer in developing countries a high priority for his first year in office. In developing countries, some 665 people died of cancer every hour: nearly three times as many as in developed countries. Around 70% of cancers in developing countries were diagnosed too late for life-saving treatment and many low-income countries did not have a single radiation therapy machine. Treatment that could slow, or even eradicate, cancer was often simply not available and millions of people who could be successfully treated died every year. Since 1980, the Agency had delivered over US $220 million worth of cancer-related assistance to developing countries. He wanted to build on those efforts in subsequent years.

41. Over the coming year, the Agency also aimed to establish a strong link between its own education curricula in radiation medicine and the professional competencies needed for capacity-building in Member States. A new human health e-learning website providing resources for health professionals who delivered radiation medicine would be launched in October 2010.

42. The availability of water for sustainable development was a growing concern. As Member States made increased efforts to address the challenge, they needed better scientific knowledge of their water resources — an area where nuclear technology could be very useful. The Agency had initiated a new Water Availability Enhancement Project aimed at helping Member States to acquire such knowledge.

43. In July 2010, he had visited the Agency’s Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco where he had met Prince Albert, who had been an outstanding partner for the Agency. The work of the
Laboratory was vital to help protect the world’s greatest natural resource: its oceans and seas. Hundreds of scientists from all over the world had been trained by the Agency in advanced methods for assessing marine radioactivity, isotopes and pollution. Demand for those unique Agency services would continue to grow. A recent reorganization of the Laboratory would allow it to meet the needs of Member States even more effectively in the future.

44. In all those areas, the Agency was working with others, strengthening existing partnerships — for example with WHO and FAO — and building new ones.

45. Turning to nuclear safety and security, he said that the safety performance of the nuclear industry had improved significantly since the Chernobyl disaster nearly 25 years previously, including through improved design, better operating procedures, a strengthened and more effective regulatory environment, and the emergence of a strong safety culture. While it was the responsibility of Member States to ensure safety, the Agency would continue to promote an integrated safety approach focusing on management systems, effective leadership and safety culture. The Agency would also help maintain a high level of nuclear safety by promoting international cooperation, providing review services to Member States, and supporting knowledge networks and training. There was already widespread international support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The adoption and implementation of the Code of Conduct by many States in cooperation with the Agency had produced significant improvements in regulatory infrastructure and capabilities in relation to radioactive sources.

46. Another important challenge faced by the Agency was the improvement of safety infrastructures surrounding the medical use of radiation. As medical technology using ionizing radiation continued to evolve and new technology and techniques were introduced globally, including in developing countries, it was important that countries’ safety and security infrastructures kept pace with developments.

47. Effective national and global response capabilities were essential to minimize the impact of nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies and to build public trust in the safety and security of nuclear technology. The Agency’s Incident and Emergency Centre was the global focal point for international preparedness for and response to nuclear and radiological safety or security related incidents. The Centre’s infrastructure would be further enhanced in the subsequent year. The Agency continued to assist Member States in developing sustainable nuclear security capacities, while recognizing that nuclear security was the responsibility of Member States.

48. In April 2010, he had attended the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which had been hosted by the President of the United States of America and attended by leaders from 47 countries. The participating Heads of State and Government had reaffirmed the essential role of the Agency in the international nuclear security framework and had pledged to ensure that it would have the resources required to discharge its functions.

49. Although adherence to the relevant international legal instruments on nuclear security had increased gradually, progress towards entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM remained slow. As it had been five years since its adoption, he called on parties to the Convention to work towards accelerating the entry into force of the amendment.

50. He took great pride in the fact that the Agency’s technical cooperation activities were making a real difference to the lives of many people in developing countries: the farmer in the Andes in Peru who could grow enough crops to feed his family and sell food at the market, thanks to nuclear techniques to boost crop yields in harsh environments; the child in Zanzibar who had milk to drink because the cows were not getting sick, thanks to the Agency’s work to deploy the sterile insect
technique which had helped to eliminate the tsetse fly; and the cancer patients in many developing countries whose disease had been diagnosed in time for treatment, thanks to the Agency’s assistance.

51. New resources for the technical cooperation programme as a whole had risen to $112.2 million in 2009 from $91.5 million in 2008. Human health remained the largest area of activity, followed by nuclear safety, and food and agriculture. He welcomed the prospect of increased funding for footnot-a/ projects in the subsequent five years through the $50 million contribution announced by the United States of America to the Agency’s Peaceful Uses Initiative. He invited other Member States that were able to contribute to match that commitment.

52. Capacity-building was at the heart of the Agency’s technical cooperation work. The ultimate goal was to make countries self-sufficient and to help them establish or maintain a sustainable, highly specialized and trained human resource base in all areas of nuclear sciences and applications. The Agency helped Member States to build the capacity to plan and introduce nuclear power and provided assistance to countries with existing plants to strengthen their capacities for training and management, long-term operation, and lifetime planning for more efficient decommissioning. In the human health area, the Agency had enabled countries to establish safe and effective radiotherapy capabilities and to provide higher quality treatment to cancer patients. Together with its partners at the FAO, it was helping countries to build up their expertise in food irradiation so that they could improve both the safety and quality of food and increase their exports.

53. At the start of his term in office, he had expressed the hope that the milestone of 100 additional protocols in force would be achieved at an early date. The number at present stood at 102, which was an encouraging development. The additional protocol was an essential tool for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurance not only that declared nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses, but also that there were no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. He strongly hoped that all those States that had not done so would conclude additional protocols as early as possible. He also asked the 18 States without NPT safeguards agreements in force to bring such agreements into force without delay. He called on States with small quantities protocols that had not done so to amend — or rescind — their protocols.

54. The Secretariat had realigned the management of the Agency’s laboratories, creating a new Office of Safeguards Analytical Services within the Department of Safeguards. Construction of the clean laboratory extension at Seibersdorf had started in June 2010. The ultra-sensitive mass spectrometer had been procured and the first factory tests had been completed successfully. Agency staff were currently undergoing training and the new clean laboratory was expected to be fully operational in the first half of 2011. The Agency hoped to award a construction contract for the nuclear material laboratory in December so work could start in July 2011. Despite extrabudgetary contributions by several Member States, for which he was deeply grateful, additional funding was still required to complete the project.

55. In order to enhance understanding of future verification challenges, the Agency would host its traditional international safeguards symposium in November 2010. The event would bring together technical experts from the Agency, Member States, the nuclear industry and other bodies to share information and exchange views on the best technical responses to the changes taking place in the field of nuclear verification.

56. He had continued to report regularly to the Board on implementation of Agency safeguards, including in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. His basic approach had been that all safeguards agreements between Member States and the Agency, along with other relevant obligations, should be implemented fully.
57. The nuclear programme of the DPRK remained a matter of serious concern. As Agency inspectors had not been in the country since April 2009, he had nothing new to report. The DPRK had not permitted the Agency to implement safeguards in the country since December 2002 and it had not implemented the relevant measures called for in UN Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). He reiterated his call on all parties concerned to make concerted efforts for a resumption of the six-party talks at an appropriate time.

58. Regarding General Conference resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and on the development of model safeguards agreements as a necessary step towards establishing a NWFZ in the region, he regretted to report that no progress had been achieved. Nor was there any convergence of views among Member States on convening a forum on the relevance of the experience of existing NWFZs for establishing such a zone in the Middle East. He would continue his consultations with concerned Member States in that regard.

59. Pursuant to the mandate conferred on him by resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities, he had sought the views of all Member States, and had received 44 replies from governments and from the High Representative of the European Union. He had also held consultations with representatives of concerned Member States, especially those in the Middle East. In August 2010, he had visited Israel where, at the highest political level, he had conveyed the General Conference’s concern about the country’s nuclear capabilities and had invited Israel to consider acceding to the NPT and placing all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. As requested by the General Conference, he had submitted a report on the issue of Israeli nuclear capabilities.

60. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had endorsed the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs in that region. Having been personally involved in the NPT process since 1995, he had been pleased that the 2010 Review Conference had produced concrete results. He hoped that the proposed 2012 conference would take place with the participation of all relevant States and lead to a productive outcome.

61. Credible verification systems were vital for further nuclear disarmament efforts. Through its verification activities, the Agency could make an important contribution to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. The Agency had recently received a joint letter from Russia and the United States requesting assistance to verify independently the implementation of their agreement on the disposition of plutonium no longer required for defence purposes.

62. He stressed the importance of continuing to enhance the quality of management in the Agency and defining clearer priorities so as to make maximum use of available resources. For enhanced management efficiency and transparency, the Agency was replacing numerous separate information systems with a single integrated system (AIPS) and introducing new accounting standards (IPSAS). The new enterprise resource planning system would be implemented in four phases, the first of which was well under way and was expected to go live in early 2011. However, the second phase was not fully funded in the Regular Budget for 2011. Extrabudgetary contributions were therefore urgently required to ensure that the project, which was fundamental to bringing further efficiencies in programme support, was not delayed. The implementation of the first phase of AIPS would be a significant factor in enabling the Agency to adopt IPSAS, in line with UN accounting practice. The Agency’s IPSAS project was on track to start on schedule in January 2011.

63. Securing proper funding for the Agency’s needs was not easy and required careful preparation. Preparations for the programme and budget for 2012–2013 would take into account the concerns expressed by Member States about the difficulty of funding the Agency’s activities at a time of serious
financial constraints and the need to address growing demands for new priority activities. As a first step, special efforts would be made to identify lower-priority projects and areas to improve efficiency. The second step was to identify areas where additional expenditure would be needed to meet new and expanding demands for assistance from Member States. Requests for funding for new projects would be scrutinized carefully to ensure they were in line with the Medium Term Strategy. The programme and budget estimate for 2012–2013 would reflect the Board’s decision in June 2010 that the 2011 budget level would be the reference for budget discussions for the 2012–2013 biennium.

64. Following his appointment of five new Deputy Directors General, an almost completely new senior management team would be in place from early 2011. He was grateful to the outgoing incumbents for their enormous contribution to the Agency, and looked forward to the fresh input of his experienced and capable new team. He had already begun to move towards more frequent, less formal and more substantive policy meetings of senior staff. As Director General, he had gained a deep appreciation of the quality of the Agency’s staff, who were highly trained and dedicated at all levels and who had his full support.

65. He recognized the need to improve communication, both within the Secretariat and between the Secretariat and Member States. He had travelled extensively over the preceding year in order to gain a better understanding of the views and needs of Member States. He looked forward to a strengthened dialogue with Resident Representatives in Vienna on how Agency programmes could better meet their various needs.

66. The question of the amendments to Article VI of the Statute, which dealt with membership of the Board of Governors, and Article XIV.A, on the introduction of biennial budgeting, had been pending for more than 10 years. He appealed to all Member States that had not yet done so to accept those amendments as early as possible.

67. The current year’s Scientific Forum, entitled: “Cancer in Developing Countries: Facing the Challenge”, was the culmination of the Agency’s special focus on cancer in 2010, which had already started to bear fruit. It had been successful in raising awareness of the problems of cancer in developing countries to a higher political level. The Agency’s cooperation with WHO was going from strength to strength and confirmed pledges and donations to PACT were at record levels. The Agency was also seeing a very strong commitment by developing countries to its activities, which had led to an improvement in the quality of some cancer-related technical cooperation projects. He appealed to all members to participate in the Scientific Forum and to support actively the Agency’s work on cancer control.

68. He thanked the Government of Austria for being an exemplary host for the Agency. He was deeply grateful for the excellent facilities provided both at the VIC and at Seibersdorf, and for the unstinting support Austria gave to the work of the Agency and to him personally.

69. He would continue to implement all aspects of the Agency’s mandate in a balanced manner in order to address the varying interests of Member States.
6. **Contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2011**
   (GC(54)/15)

The PRESIDENT said that on 11 June 2010 the Board of Governors had recommended a figure of US $85 million as the target for voluntary contributions to the TCF for 2011. He drew attention to the table in document GC(54)/15 showing the contributions each Member State would need to make in order to meet its share of that target.

The early pledging and payment of contributions to the TCF greatly helped the Secretariat in planning the Agency’s technical cooperation programmes and all delegations that were in a position to do so, but had not as yet, were urged to notify the Secretariat during the current session of the contributions that their governments would be making for 2011.

He would report at the end of the session, under a later agenda item, on the contributions which had been pledged up to that time. He hoped to be able to report favourably on the percentage of the 2011 target figure already pledged.

7. **General debate and Annual Report for 2009**
   (GC(54)/4)

Mr MAGNETTE (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Iceland, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, said that 2010 marked an important milestone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and had given it a new impetus. Committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the European Union warmly welcomed the consensus reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in May. The agreements on an action plan and a process for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, including a conference to be convened in 2012, demonstrated the common resolve of all parties to uphold and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was important to begin implementing the action plan immediately, building on the results of the Review Conference and continuing the spirit of consensus and cooperation which had characterized the negotiations therein. The European Union was particularly keen to ensure that the Agency operated in an effective and efficient manner and had adequate resources to implement the action plan, and so would fully support its efforts to that end.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference had reaffirmed the Agency’s role in verifying States’ compliance with their safeguards obligations with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. The European Union was deeply concerned by the protracted and serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime posed by Iran, the DPRK and Syria.

It was of great concern that Iran had thus far failed to comply with Security Council and Board resolutions, not only continuing but even expanding uranium enrichment activities. In February 2010, it had begun enrichment up to a level of 20% and had continued construction activities at the
enrichment plant at Qom, as well as activities related to heavy water production. Iran continued to refuse to cooperate with Agency investigations, had failed to provide design information as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement and had not implemented the additional protocol signed in 2003. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council had reaffirmed that Iran must suspend enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, including those which gave rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme. The European Union was committed to working for a diplomatic solution to the issue and reaffirmed the validity of the June 2008 proposals made to Iran, which included cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It urged Iran to address the Agency’s outstanding concerns and to meet with the High Representative of the European Union and representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany to discuss its nuclear programme, with the ultimate goal of establishing a comprehensive relationship involving cooperation in all fields — economic, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, political and security.

76. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes remained a grave concern to the European Union. It strongly condemned the actions taken by the DPRK, including the testing of nuclear explosive devices and the launching of missiles, which undermined stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region and represented a threat to international peace and security. The European Union called on the DPRK to abandon and completely dismantle any nuclear weapons-related programme in a prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner and to comply with its international obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and its comprehensive safeguards agreement. The European Union supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the efforts of the six-party talks and called on the DPRK to resume dialogue and allow an early return of Agency inspectors.

77. It was cause for concern that Syria had not cooperated on matters related to the Dair Alzour site for the preceding two years, not allowing the Agency to complete its assessment or determine the nature of the site. Some of the information related to the site was deteriorating or at risk of being lost entirely, and the European Union therefore urged Syria to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency. It welcomed the agreement reached between Syria and the Agency on a plan of action for resolving the remaining questions with respect to the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor and requested Syria to cooperate fully in the implementation of the plan of action in order to clarify the issue rapidly. Finally, it urged Syria to bring into force an additional protocol at the earliest possible opportunity in order to help the Agency verify the correctness and completeness of the country’s declarations.

78. The Agency’s safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. The measures contained in the additional protocol formed an integral part of that system, and comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols constituted the current verification standard. The European Union called for the universalization of those two essential instruments without delay as a means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, enhancing security worldwide and increasing the confidence needed for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to reach its full potential. Further measures were required to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system. It was important to resolve all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations, and States party to the NPT should respond resolutely and effectively to such cases. The Security Council was the final arbiter of international peace and security for taking appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, including safeguards agreements.

79. Each country had the right to define its own energy strategy. For countries planning to include nuclear power in that strategy, the Agency had a key role to play in assisting them to ensure that the
development and operation of nuclear power took place under the most stringent legal, operational, safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. Human resource development, including education and training, was of vital importance for the safe, secure and peaceful use of atomic energy. The International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy in Paris had indicated the need to maintain qualified expertise and further develop skills and competence in that regard.

80. The European Union remained firmly convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and was ready to continue discussions on the development of such approaches in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner. It reconfirmed its commitment to support financially the LEU bank proposed by the Secretariat once the conditions and modalities had been defined and approved by the Board, and called upon the Director General to update the proposal so that the Board would be in a position in the near future to take the necessary steps for implementing that important project.

81. The European Union attached the utmost importance to maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide and to promoting the global nuclear safety framework through international cooperation. It encouraged all countries, including those envisaging the launch of a civil nuclear option for the first time, to cooperate with the Agency and implement its standards and recommendations. Bearing in mind that all States with nuclear power programmes were currently party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the European Union was particularly concerned about the ongoing commissioning of the Bushehr nuclear power plant without Iran acceding to the Convention. It called on Iran to become a full member of the international nuclear safety community by doing so and by implementing the peer review mechanism. The world faced a new era of threats from non-State actors, particularly terrorists, who sought to acquire WMD and related technology and materials. The consequences of failing to prevent that from occurring would be severe. The European Union therefore actively supported the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) as well as a number of international initiatives and Agency activities in that regard. It also supported Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and welcomed the Nuclear Security Summit convened by the President of the United States on 13 April 2010. The European Union would actively follow up on implementation of the work plan to enhance global nuclear security that had been adopted at the Summit. Nuclear security was an essential part of the Agency’s work, and the European Union commended its activities aimed at preventing and combating nuclear terrorism. The 2010 NPT Review Conference and the Nuclear Security Summit had emphasized the Agency’s important role in fostering international cooperation in nuclear security, establishing a comprehensive set of nuclear security guidelines and helping Member States, upon their request, to enhance nuclear security. Effective physical protection was of utmost importance in preventing nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists or from accidental misuse, and in protecting nuclear facilities against unauthorized use and malicious acts. The European Union urged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the CPPNM.

82. The European Union welcomed Agency activities designed to increase the contribution of nuclear technology to peace, health and economic development. The Agency should continue to implement programmes aimed at improving safety, non-proliferation and waste minimization and management, as well as projects allowing interested countries to use nuclear energy applications in health and research. It was important to support research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to maintain competence and know-how across the nuclear sector.

83. The European Union was pleased that in 2010, the Scientific Forum to be held alongside the General Conference was taking up the issue of cancer in developing countries. Mindful of the importance of medical radioisotopes, it encouraged the Agency to pursue its work, in cooperation with other international organizations and stakeholders, to ensure the improved use of radioisotope supplies.
84. The European Union had always been a strong supporter of the technical cooperation programme, to which it was one of the main contributors. Addressing the global challenges of hunger, disease, poverty and water resource management and creating a cleaner and safer environment was of particular significance to developing countries, and the Agency’s efforts in those areas were valued. While it was important to ensure fair access to technical cooperation funding, there was a great need for technical assistance in the least developed countries. The commitment of a beneficiary country was a key factor in achieving a successful outcome in technical cooperation projects. The European Union underlined the importance of technical cooperation activities that contributed to achieving and sustaining solid nuclear and radiation safety and security infrastructures at all levels. Technical cooperation management and project implementation needed to become more efficient, effective and accountable, for the benefit of all Member States. The European Union supported transparent project management based on verifiable performance indicators and believed that regular and transparent interaction between the Secretariat, Member State representatives and national institutions would help accomplish clear project objectives and achieve sustainable results. In order to maximize the socio-economic impact of the technical cooperation programme, it was crucial for the Agency to further develop partnerships with other organizations, where appropriate, taking into account the fact that it did not have the leading mandate in every field in which it was active.

85. The Medium Term Strategy for 2012–2017 should reflect those areas where the Agency had a leading mandate and should focus on strategic goals, objectives and activities to provide practical guidance for formulating major programmes. It also needed to include specific targets for efficiency, effectiveness and transparency with clear performance indicators.

86. Mr SALEHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the General Conference provided an opportunity to assess the global community’s efforts in achieving the peaceful objectives of an organization that had been established primarily for humanity’s well-being and prosperity. It was an important gathering of Member States of various beliefs and backgrounds reflecting the international community’s collective will to share thoughts, exchange opinions and experiences, and attempt to find the best possible solutions to outstanding issues. In turn, the Agency should provide all the necessary elements and an environment conducive to the realization of that noble objective. His country, in accordance with its legal commitments, had always tried to extend its utmost cooperation to the Agency and had undertaken sincere efforts to perform its peaceful nuclear activities within the framework of the NPT and comprehensive safeguards.

87. Pursuant to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, all Iran’s nuclear installations were subject to the Agency’s routine monitoring and inspection. Since 2003 more than 5000 man-days of inspections had been conducted, which was unprecedented in the Agency’s history. The result of such huge efforts had always led to the conclusion that there had been no diversion to non-peaceful activities. Unfortunately, however, the Agency appeared to have ignored all the conclusive evidence and the cooperation extended by Iran. Certain parts of the Director General’s latest report on the issue did not coincide with the norms and procedures of the Agency’s mandate and were not based on impartiality and fairness, raising queries as to the political influence exerted by certain powers upon the decision-making of what was a unique international technical body. For the sake of credibility, the verification process envisaged in the safeguards agreement had to be implemented without any biased political interest or double standards. It appeared that the Agency was suffering from a crisis of moral authority and credibility.

88. The notion of political interference had regrettably left its mark in the field of technical cooperation as well. That area should clearly not be subjected to any political conditions, as stipulated in the Statute and the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency (INFCIRC/267). Yet, owing to pressure exerted by a few countries, certain unjustifiable constraints had been imposed by the Secretariat on Iran’s
participation in programmes in the nuclear safety domain. Nuclear safety was of global importance, and any negligence in rendering services in that field might lead to hazardous nuclear events of international dimensions. The inexcusable restrictions imposed on Iran ran counter to the Agency’s claim to be enforcing global nuclear safety standards and a global nuclear security culture. How could Iran enhance safety standards at its nuclear installations while the active participation of its experts in related international conferences, workshops and meetings organized by the Agency was being hampered? Undoubtedly, such an unjustified and unreasonable attitude and conduct would lead to undesired consequences regarding the establishment of mutual confidence among Member States.

89. Another issue was the provision of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor, which met the radiopharmaceutical needs of thousands of patients. Despite repeated efforts by Iran for mutual confidence building, no encouraging result had thus far been achieved. The Joint Declaration by Iran, Brazil and Turkey concluded on 17 May 2010 had been a positive gesture by Iran to resolve the fuel swap issue and sustain the ongoing dialogue. That had also been subject to unjust political pressure by a few countries that possessed nuclear weapons, resulting in the issue of the unjustified and illegal Security Council resolution 1929. The uncivilized double-track approach of threat and dialogue could not be fruitful, as demonstrated by the fact that there was no assurance of nuclear fuel supply. He therefore called upon the Vienna Group to resume talks with his country without further delay, based on the internationally acknowledged Tehran Declaration of 2003.

90. Forty years on from the inception of the NPT the world was still witnessing an imbalance between disarmament and non-proliferation; and the international community continued to suffer as a result of that imbalance. Although there had recently been seemingly positive progress in the field of disarmament, essential practical steps had to be taken urgently towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the achievement of disarmament goals. The achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons was one of Iran’s main priorities and would require all three pillars of the NPT to be pursued in an unbiased and balanced manner. The importance of that subject had led to the holding in 2010 of the Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, based on the principle of ‘nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for none’. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had also shed more light on the matter, making it more prominent than ever. At the Tehran International Conference, all participants — who came from 60 countries — had expressed their deep concern over the stockpiling, deployment and expansion of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. They had also reiterated the need to implement comprehensive disarmament as a priority, through the establishment of a mandatory convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

91. For many years Iran had been emphasizing the need for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East region in line with the unanimous resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and with the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as well as relevant UN General Assembly resolutions. For the first time a consensus had been reached on demanding that the Zionist regime of Israel promptly become a party to the NPT. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had stressed the need for Israel to place all its nuclear installations under the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards; however, due to the support given by its Western allies, no action had yet been taken in that regard. Iran invited all peace-loving countries to intensify their efforts to exert more pressure on the Israeli regime to submit unconditionally to that international demand. It was time to move away from political games and redirect collective efforts towards a balanced treatment of countries seeking peaceful nuclear technology, while putting intense pressure on countries which had defied international demands.

92. With regard to assurance of nuclear fuel supply, under the NPT, all Member States had the inalienable right to research, production, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That right included deploying national capabilities for manufacturing fuel for research and power reactors. Member States also had the right to choose how to obtain nuclear fuel, whether domestically or through foreign trade, without any constraints. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had
reaffirmed the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and without jeopardizing their access to the complete nuclear fuel cycle subject to Agency supervision.

93. It was of the utmost importance to differentiate between the safeguards commitments of Member States and confidence building measures taken on a voluntary basis. As the sole international verification body, the Agency was responsible for assuring the adherence of Member States to their safeguards agreements but should at no time declare the voluntary measures of Member States to be mandatory. Moreover, any verification by the Agency had to be performed without discrimination or double standards.

94. The issue of confidentiality was one of the issues that had caused Iran deep concern with regard to the Agency’s performance. Member States should not find their national security endangered and under no circumstances should their classified information be disclosed. The matter required close scrutiny, particularly with respect to recent developments at the Agency.

95. As an active member of the Agency, Iran had been able to make huge advances in nuclear technology through its diligent national efforts. It was ready to share its valuable nuclear experience with other Member States under the supervision of the Agency. In light of the recent interest shown by Iran’s neighbours in having nuclear power plants, his country suggested the formation of a regional technical group for the exchange of know-how and expertise, specifically in the area of nuclear safety.

96. In order to realize its national interests, Iran had incorporated the use of peaceful nuclear technology into its development plans; and by deploying state-of-the-art engineering techniques and standards had ably enhanced its domestic capability in that respect. The production of radioisotopes for medical, industrial and agricultural use, as well as the design and construction of various installations for the provision of nuclear fuel and the treatment of nuclear waste, were among the main objectives of Iran’s development plans. In that respect, he was pleased to announce that the Bushehr nuclear power plant, with a capacity of 1000 MW, would soon be producing electricity and that the IRRS mission to Iran in March 2010 had confirmed the activities of his country’s nuclear safety system for deploying the relevant standards at the plant. That confirmation by the Agency’s safety regulation monitoring body, as well as by a group comprising the highest-ranking safety authorities of some Member States, was another clear indication of Iran’s commitment to international nuclear safety regulations.

97. The protection of nuclear installations from armed attack was essential for the promotion of nuclear energy in the world. The 53rd session of the General Conference had unanimously adopted a decision prohibiting any attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations under construction or in operation (GC(53)/DEC/13). The 2010 NPT Review Conference had called upon all States Parties to abide by that commitment.

98. Iran’s parliament had decreed the construction of nuclear power plants totalling around 20 000 MW over the next 20 years, and he invited all potential suppliers to seize the opportunity to participate in the construction of those new plants.

99. Iran, while strongly defending its national rights, would continue to maintain its constructive efforts through sustained interaction and dialogue with its counterparts. While safeguarding its national interests, Iran would continue its sincere cooperation with the Agency, in the hope that the power of rationality would overwhelm the logic of power.

100. He thanked the Agency’s staff for their hard work and expressed the hope that their assiduous efforts, impartiality and objectivity would be instrumental in upholding the Agency’s valuable mission.
101. **Mr CHEN Qiufa** (China) said that the Agency was increasingly recognized by the international community for its promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, non-proliferation and nuclear security. The nuclear renaissance had given the Agency the opportunity to play a greater role in those areas by providing services to emerging nuclear power countries through technical cooperation projects related to nuclear power infrastructure, nuclear safety, human resources and uranium exploration. The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review service had also achieved good results and regional centres for technical cooperation had been established successfully. INPRO had made enormous progress over the preceding decade, becoming a key forum for international cooperation in nuclear technology innovation.

102. The China Advanced Research Reactor and the China Experimental Fast Reactor had both gone critical in 2010, laying a solid foundation for further research and development in advanced nuclear technology. China’s technical cooperation project with the Agency on enhancing the capabilities of national institutions supporting nuclear power development was proceeding smoothly. Such projects boosted domestic infrastructure development and human resource development, promoted the sound development of nuclear energy and provided a model for other developing countries in the region and beyond. China’s CPF for 2010–2015, signed in June 2010, provided a good blueprint for future cooperation with the Agency.

103. China had put in place a legal and regulatory system for nuclear safety, in line with international practice and based on the Agency’s safety standards. An IRRS mission had visited China in July 2010 to review the regulatory framework governing nuclear safety and associated laws, regulations and standards and radioactive waste management. Its observations and recommendations had provided important guidance for promoting the overall performance of the regulatory system and the development of a safety culture.

104. In the area of nuclear security, China had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in August 2010. President Hu Jintao had attended the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, where he had announced the proposed construction of a centre of excellence for nuclear security in collaboration with other countries. A seminar on cooperation between China and the Agency had been held in August 2010, attended by the Director General and over 200 participants. The seminar had explored ways of using Agency resources to meet China’s practical needs and had provided the setting for the signing of the practical arrangements on nuclear security between China and the Agency, which was intended to expand cooperation in nuclear security legislation and standards, nuclear security for major public events, capacity building and staff training based on the successful cooperation on the Olympic Games in Beijing. China was preparing to establish a technology demonstration centre of excellence on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security, and would welcome the cooperation of the Agency and interested States in that endeavour.

105. China deeply appreciated the Agency’s technical cooperation in nuclear energy development. His country had accumulated a great deal of experience in nuclear power design, construction and research and development, which could be useful to other countries which were new to nuclear power. His country would also contribute to the nuclear energy development of developing countries.

106. China recommended that the Agency should focus on three main areas in its future work. Firstly, it should strengthen technical cooperation for the sustainable development of nuclear energy, which had been called for by the majority of developing countries. Secondly, the Agency should promote capacity building in nuclear safety and security in Member States and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. It should pursue the development of a global system of nuclear safety and security legislation and standards, promote the exchange of knowledge, experience and lessons learned, and increase public confidence in nuclear energy development. It should also build up its own technical capabilities while cooperating with Member States and using their resources.
to achieve safeguards goals. Thirdly, the Agency should play an active role in addressing sensitive and high-profile nuclear issues. China believed that the nuclear situations on the Korean Peninsula and in Iran should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation and that the Agency should continue to promote their diplomatic settlement.

107. **Mr RUTO** (Kenya) said that his country attached great importance to the mandate and functions of the Agency in the peaceful use and application of nuclear energy and technology for economic and social development. Kenya continued to meet its obligations to the Agency in full, including through the timely payment of its assessed contributions and NPCs.

108. The Agency’s activities continued to make a remarkable difference in many areas of socio-economic development, such as crop and livestock production, energy generation, human health, water supplies, industrial development and nuclear security. Its safeguards and verification activities also illustrated the importance of its continued vigilance and contributions to international peace and security. It was therefore not surprising that the Agency’s unique role in that regard had assumed greater significance with the alarming scarcity of non-renewable energy sources, the escalating prices of fossil fuel and the unprecedented challenges of climate change. As a result, many Member States, including Kenya, had shown renewed interest in nuclear energy for meeting national development demands.

109. Balanced, impartial and non-political activities by the Agency would ensure global peace, safety and security, as well as sustainable development in all regions. Cooperation by all Member States and the universalization of the NPT and its additional protocol were prerequisites to the Agency fulfilling its mandate and Kenya therefore called on Member States who had not concluded the necessary instruments to do so.

110. As a result of the Agency’s increased technical cooperation support for human resource development and radiation detection equipment, Kenya’s competent authority had enhanced regulatory measures and opened additional regional offices. A draft radiation safety bill was also being prepared. The process was critical to Kenya’s future plans to develop a safe nuclear programme to help meet its energy needs.

111. The Agency’s technical cooperation activities in Kenya provided significant support for the Government’s efforts to develop national nuclear science and technology infrastructure. Kenya’s CPF for 2011–2016 had been finalized and submitted to the Agency for comments. It covered five thematic areas: energy, agriculture and livestock, human health, water and industry. Kenya was participating in six national projects and 28 regional and interregional projects in a variety of fields.

112. He commended the Agency for its ongoing measures to strengthen nuclear safety and security in the transport of radioactive sources and waste management. The equipment installed at the Mombasa seaport to screen for illicit radioactive and nuclear materials was expected to be operational by December 2010. He expressed appreciation for the collaboration of development partners in that project, which had also helped establish an ongoing training programme for border personnel.

113. In recognition of global efforts to ensure the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and the need to protect against potential hazards to society and the environment, Kenya’s accession to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was at an advanced stage, while the construction of a central radioactive waste processing facility, fully funded by the Kenyan Government, was due for completion in 2012. It would include an interim storage facility for disused conventional radiation sources and other radioactive material. He invited development partners to support the full realization of the project.
114. The availability of sustainable energy in developing countries was key to creating wealth and improving living standards. Kenya was committed to developing nuclear energy to meet its energy needs, to which end the Government had established a nuclear electricity committee and allocated US $2.5 million to the nuclear energy programme. A flagship project in the 2011–2016 CPF concerned nuclear energy development, and Kenya had hosted both a meeting on energy planning and a workshop on nuclear power evaluation. He called on the Agency and international partners to assist in achieving the project’s objectives.

115. With regard to PACT, he commended the Agency and in particular the Director General for their dedication to combating the looming catastrophe of cancer in developing countries, to which the Scientific Forum to be held on the margins of the present session of the General Conference would be dedicated. He hoped that the Forum would not only provide hope to the many millions suffering from cancer, but also identify concrete intervention measures appropriate to developing countries. Above all, it was hoped that the requisite technology would be provided to Member States in need, including Kenya.

116. Concerning activities related to nuclear science and applications, he commended the Agency for assigning high priority to agricultural and livestock development in Africa. He welcomed the steps taken to formalize the collaborative framework in support of PATTEC. The tsetse and trypanosomosis problem still posed a threat to the lives and livelihoods of communities and constrained livestock production in Africa. It was therefore important to develop techniques to create tsetse-free zones and to apply the mutation breeding technique. The release of test groups of sterile male tsetse flies in Lambwe Valley was under way, with the aim of creating the first tsetse-free zone under PATTEC in Kenya.

117. The mutation breeding technique to improve wheat varieties was being extended to other crops, such as bananas and cassava. He expressed appreciation to the Agency, other States and other UN specialized agencies for their support for the Kenya-led research project on the global threat of Ug99 stem rust, and encouraged others to support further research and development.

118. Within the framework of AFRA, and in view of the need to enhance skills development in the field of nuclear science and technology, the University of Nairobi was introducing a master of science programme in line with the AFRA harmonized syllabus. Kenya welcomed the Agency’s technical support in that regard.

119. Partnership between Kenya and the Agency had resulted in the establishment of a secondary standards dosimetry laboratory to maintain national standards for ionizing radiation and calibration. He appealed for support to equip the laboratory with a cobalt-60 calibration system for traceability.

120. Kenya was participating in a regional project on radioisotope applications for trouble-shooting and optimization of industrial processes in the petrochemical, cement, sugar and geothermal industries. Support was required for human capacity building, expert missions and the provision of equipment to expand the application of the technology. As part of the project, a non-destructive testing centre had been established to provide inspection services in industry.

121. Underscoring the importance of the Agency’s technical cooperation programme and the need to ensure adequate resources, he stressed that the development of nuclear technology for peaceful applications should be considered a matter of high priority. In the long term, nuclear technology could help to improve the socio-economic development of developing countries such as Kenya. His country pledged to pay the full share of its assessed contribution plus an additional €10 000 to the TCF for 2011.
122. **Mr CHU** (United States of America) expressed appreciation to the Director General for his exemplary leadership in his first year and welcomed his initiative to help fight cancer in developing countries.

123. He read out the following message from President Obama:

“The United States stands with the IAEA and its members in the effort both to harness the potential of nuclear energy for peace and development and to contain the dangers it poses for our collective security. These are inseparable challenges, reflected in the dual role played by this Agency as both a promoter of peaceful nuclear uses and an instrument for verification and security.

“We seek a future in which nuclear energy is made available to all nations that comply with non-proliferation norms and rules, and we also recognize the international non-proliferation system has not always worked as we would have hoped. For this reason, the United States has called for added resources and authorities for the IAEA, penalties against those who violate their non-proliferation obligations, and new international mechanisms that ensure the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

“No nation has a monopoly on nuclear power, and no nation alone can manage its inherent risks. This is a challenge we face together. Working cooperatively through international institutions and with a shared sense of commitment and obligation, we can succeed in building a safer future, one in which the barriers to proliferation are high and the obstacles to nuclear energy are low. The United States will continue to do its part, having this year convened the first Nuclear Security Summit which highlighted the risk of nuclear security at head of State level, revised our nuclear posture and reached agreement with Russia on a new nuclear arms accord. We are also developing measures that would ensure safe and secure access to the benefits of the peaceful atom. Among these is an IAEA fuel bank, designed to support countries’ access to peaceful nuclear energy by underpinning the international nuclear fuel market. This concept, which has its roots in the vision of Bernard Baruch, was proposed in 2006 and has been extensively analysed and debated. The time to act is now, and we will work pragmatically toward a decision this year.

“These are important first steps, but much more remains to be done if we are to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading or falling into the hands of terrorists. While we may not agree on every priority or remedy, it is essential we be defined not by our differences, but by the interests we hold in common. We can start here, at this General Conference, by taking action to strengthen the consensus against proliferation and encourage the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology.

“I hope you will join with my delegation in committing to these goals, and I wish you all the best for a successful conference.”

124. The Agency was at the nexus of two great challenges: helping a rapidly developing world unlock the promise of low-carbon electricity, and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons while working to realize the peace and security of a world without them.

125. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama had called for building a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries could access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. He had emphasized that such cooperation had to be the right of every nation that renounced nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programmes, and that no approach would succeed if it was based on the denial of rights to nations that played by the rules.
126. A strong and efficient market for nuclear fuel was vital to securing carbon-free energy on a global basis. The United States continued to support expanded and reliable commercial access to fuel supplies for peaceful nuclear programmes. Providing nuclear fuel assurances allowed countries to have more confidence in the international fuel markets. Specifically, an assurance of the availability of fuel through Agency mechanisms would empower governments to exercise their right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT. A number of initiatives had already been undertaken, and his country applauded the Agency’s positive decision on the fuel bank at Angarsk. The United States had downblended 17.4 metric tons of HEU into LEU, to be held in reserve for a fuel assurance mechanism. It had also contributed US $50 million to support an Agency-administered international fuel bank. Taken together with commitments from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and other Member States, $150 million had been pledged for that purpose. The offer to contribute had been extended several times and presented Member States with an excellent opportunity to realize one of the Agency’s founding objectives, but those resources would be at risk if a decision was not taken soon. It was time to move beyond general discussion and debate on fuel bank principles. The United States intended to work with other Member States to develop a common approach and seek adoption of a resolution approving an Agency-administered fuel bank at the December meeting of the Board of Governors.

127. Domestically, the United States had secured loan guarantees for new nuclear power and fuel facility construction, had established a Blue Ribbon Commission to make recommendations for the long-term management and disposal of used fuel and high-level waste and had committed itself to a robust, science-based nuclear research and development effort. Internationally, it was expanding its bilateral and multilateral technical cooperation and outreach to States pursuing nuclear power for the first time.

128. In June 2010, the Steering Group of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership had met in Accra, Ghana, and had unanimously agreed on a new name — the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation — and a new Statement of Mission that would provide a broader scope and engender wider international participation. Working closely with the Agency, the International Framework would provide advice on infrastructure development for nations expanding and developing nuclear power programmes, and help to create international mechanisms to assure reliable access to nuclear fuel services.

129. As part of the United States’ commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Secretary of State had announced a new Peaceful Uses Initiative at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Initiative would raise $100 million for new and underfunded Agency projects in developing countries in order to advance medical technology for human health, food security and water resource management, as well as infrastructure for the safe and secure use of nuclear power.

130. The Agency’s safeguards system was facing a growing imbalance between workload and resources. New facilities required safeguards, and technologies needed updating, yet the safeguards budget had remained relatively static. The United States therefore supported a significant increase in the Regular Budget.

131. The United States Department of Energy had launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to identify technology gaps and solutions, train new experts and develop new concepts and approaches to improve international safeguards.

132. The Agency had made it clear that the measures of the additional protocol were needed to ensure compliance with a safeguards agreement. The United States therefore urged all countries that had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol with the Agency without delay. There had to be real and timely consequences for countries that did not adhere to their safeguards commitments. The
United States supported the Agency in its efforts to resolve outstanding concerns related to the nuclear programmes in Iran and Syria, and encouraged the Agency to make full use of existing authorities. The DPRK also continued to present a challenge to non-proliferation efforts and needed to comply with international obligations. The United States hoped that all States would focus on meeting their essential international nuclear verification obligations rather than criticizing the Agency’s efforts to implement its legal mandate under safeguards agreements.

133. As outlined in the Director General’s report earlier in the month, Iran refused to cooperate fully with the Agency and had defied the resolutions of the Board and the Security Council. Iran’s intransigence represented a challenge to the rules to which countries must adhere. In recognition of that fact, the Security Council had adopted resolution 1929, the strongest and most comprehensive set of sanctions thus far in that regard. While the United States acknowledged Iran’s right to pursue peaceful civilian nuclear power and remained committed to pursuing a diplomatic solution, Iran must do what it had thus far failed to do — meet its obligations and provide assurances of the peaceful nature of its intentions. Otherwise, there was a broad and growing international consensus to hold Iran accountable if it continued its defiance. The United States had already levied sanctions against those trading with Iran, including the European-Iranian Trade Bank, effectively preventing the bank from operating in the United States financial system. Canada, Australia, the Republic of Korea and the United Arab Emirates were also to be applauded for taking similar steps to prevent foreign capital from funding enrichment efforts. The United States would continue to place pressure on the Government of Iran to fulfil its international commitments.

134. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama had declared that the United States would seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. His country was reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, extending a security assurance to nations that were in compliance with the NPT and their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. In April 2010, the United States and Russia had signed a landmark new START treaty that reduced the number of deployed nuclear warheads by a third and strategic delivery vehicles by half, while establishing a comprehensive monitoring regime and a pathway to further reductions in the future. His Government was working to ensure its ratification.

135. The United States was also pursuing the ratification and entry into force of the CTBT, and was seeking to negotiate a new treaty that verifiably ended the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Also, in cooperation with Russia, the United States had requested the Agency to verify the disposition of enough weapons-grade plutonium for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons, with a view to preparing the necessary verification agreement for consideration by the Board before the end of 2011.

136. It was important to work together to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. President Obama had called for securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. The United States was cooperating with the Agency and other international institutions and countries to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials. As a result, all HEU had been successfully removed from 18 countries. His country had also worked with international partners to convert research reactors and isotope production facilities from HEU to LEU fuel and targets. To ensure that the production of medical isotopes did not create new dangers, it was important for all new or expanded long-term molybdenum-99 production to be undertaken without HEU. The United States was developing medical isotope production processes that did not require the use of HEU.

137. In April 2010, 47 world leaders and representatives from the Agency, the European Union and the United Nations had met in Washington for an unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit. The participants had pledged to pursue the highest levels of nuclear security and had concluded that strong nuclear security measures were the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other...
unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. They had also reaffirmed the Agency’s essential role.

138. Although it was ultimately the responsibility of each country to improve its own security, material accounting and physical protection measures, his country welcomed Agency activities in support of such national efforts. It was particularly pleased with the Agency’s work in facilitating the Member State revision of the Agency’s guidance on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, which would assist countries in implementing physical protection measures for nuclear material at facilities and in transport.

139. The United States welcomed the announcement by the Republic of Korea that it would host the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012. It called on all Agency Member States to work to achieve universal adherence to the amended CPPNM and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by the 2011 General Conference.

140. Thanks to the joint actions taken over the preceding year, significant progress was being made towards the goal of a world that was safer, more secure and more prosperous. Nuclear power would play a growing role in meeting the world’s energy needs, and nuclear dangers would remain, thus increasing the Agency’s importance in the subsequent years. The relevant systems and safeguards had to be up to the task of ensuring that nuclear power was both peaceful and plentiful.

141. Mr KAIEDA (Japan) said that the international community had embarked on a new stage of the journey towards a world without nuclear weapons. In May 2010, the NPT Review Conference had agreed on an action plan incorporated into its Final Document, which presented all States with an opportunity to restart nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. His country encouraged all Member States to work together to implement the action plan in concert with the Agency.

142. Japan remained committed to its three non-nuclear principles — not possessing or producing nuclear weapons or permitting their introduction into Japan — and, as the only country to have suffered atomic bombing, was at the forefront of efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. In that connection, Japan and Australia were currently using the opportunity of the General Assembly in New York to co-host a meeting of foreign ministers on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, with a view to forming a new group of like-minded countries which would take a lead in those fields. His country welcomed the Director General’s attendance at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony and the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony in August 2010 and regarded it as an important contribution towards a world without nuclear weapons. Japan looked forward to his follow-up efforts, as the Director General had indicated that the Agency would be able to contribute to the implementing stages of nuclear disarmament.

143. The Agency played a key role not only in nuclear non-proliferation but also in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy by enhancing nuclear safety and security as well as technical cooperation, making it one of the most important international organizations for ensuring the peace and prosperity of humanity. Japan had been working with the Agency to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a Board member since the Agency’s foundation. It would make further use of the knowledge and experience it had acquired in the civilian use of nuclear energy and in improving the safeguards system to assist developing countries through technical cooperation. The Agency was becoming increasingly important to the international community, and Japan would continue to support its further development so it might fully discharge its responsibilities.

144. Japan greatly appreciated the Agency’s role in the world’s social and economic development through the application of nuclear science and technology. It welcomed the achievements of the Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010, and was now preparing to establish an integrated comprehensive support centre for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in Asia, as announced
at the Summit. The centre’s activities, including human resource development, would help to strengthen nuclear security, mainly in Asian countries.

145. Japan would share its experience on seismic safety for nuclear power facilities and contribute to developing Agency safety standards in that regard. In the areas of emergency preparedness and response, including disaster prevention, and radioactive waste management, Japan would support the Agency’s work through its ongoing extrabudgetary contributions to the Asian Nuclear Safety Network. Japan had decided to join the Agency’s Response Assistance Network and would share its own expert knowledge in the event of nuclear accidents.

146. Based on the principle of freedom of navigation, Japan would continue to transport nuclear material, while employing the most stringent safety measures in accordance with international standards. It would also continue to take part in confidence-building dialogues between shipping and coastal States.

147. Japan firmly believed that technical cooperation should continue to be one of the Agency’s core missions. With its long history and numerous achievements in fields such as the application of radiation for cancer therapy, his country would continue to attach importance to technical cooperation activities and to make technical and personnel contributions relating to the use of radiation in medicine, industry and many other areas. Experts from Japan would attend and lead discussions at the Scientific Forum held during the General Conference.

148. Japan supported the ongoing promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management and the development of fast breeder reactor technology. It particularly welcomed the progress made in the work of the Generation IV International Forum and INPRO.

149. The shortage of human resources to support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, whether in developed or developing countries, continued to be of great concern. Japan attached importance to the Agency’s human resource development efforts and would contribute to them by providing the services of experts to the Agency.

150. Japan would continue to engage in discussions on the development of a framework for assurance of nuclear fuel supply and the treatment of spent fuel. In 2006, Japan had proposed the establishment of an Agency standby arrangements system for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply intended to dispel uncertainties over fuel supply and to prevent market disturbances by registering each Member State’s supply capacity. He stressed the importance of groundwork to overcome the differences among the views of Member States on the issue and enable substantive progress.

151. The strengthening of Agency safeguards was especially vital for the enhancement of the non-proliferation regime. The most realistic and effective way to strengthen safeguards was through universalization of the additional protocol, which Japan would continue to promote by hosting the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) meetings and by contributing to relevant Agency seminars.

152. Japan attached importance to improving the Agency’s independent analytical capabilities through modernization of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

153. Japan would continue to support the implementation in good faith of safeguards obligations with a view to ensuring international confidence in the further promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His country intended to take a leading role in improving Agency safeguards, without compromising their effectiveness, by making efforts to move to a State-level integrated safeguards approach.
154. The DPRK nuclear issue continued to pose a grave threat to the peace and security of East Asia and the international community as a whole, and to the NPT regime. With regard to Iran, that country needed to dispel all concerns without delay and gain the confidence of the international community. Japan would continue to work towards settlement of those nuclear issues, including through implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.