

**Address by the Executive Secretary  
Of the Preparatory Commission for the  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

**Mr. Tibor Tóth**

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International Atomic Energy Agency  
(Vienna, 16 September 2009)**

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Madam President,

Your Excellencies the distinguished Heads of Delegations,

Dr. Mohamed Elbaradei,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Madam President,

Allow me to express my congratulations on your election, and my wishes for a successful and fruitful conference.

The IAEA and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO share much more than just neighbouring offices. Together, the IAEA and the Commission constitute a formidable multilateral-based regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

This Conference marks three special occasions which cannot go unnoticed.

First, the IAEA is starting a new era with the new Director General, Ambassador Yukiya Amano. I wish to extend my full support to Ambassador Amano. My sincere wishes for success as he prepares to face the many complex challenges ahead. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei leaves the IAEA after his many years of outstanding service to international peace and security. The Commission and I personally are grateful for the support of Dr. ElBaradei throughout the past years. As a citizen of the world and the Director General Emeritus of the IAEA, Dr. ElBaradei will continue to carry his message of peace, and contribute to the realization of the dream of a world free of all nuclear weapons.

Second, this year's General Conference is some six months ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is hoped that the 2010 Review Conference shall overcome previous failures. The continued success, and for some observers, the very cohesion of the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime depends on the successful conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference. I believe that progress on the CTBT is one of the measures where consensus can be built in advance of 2010. The CTBT is a strong complement to the NPT. The entry into force of the Treaty signals commitment to disarmament, strengthens non-proliferation, and facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Third, the General Conference is held a few days before the CTBTO's own high level Conference to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Article XIV Conference will take place in New York on 24 and 25 September by invitation of the UN Secretary General. The Conference shall be co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of France and Morocco. Foreign Ministers from some 100 countries are expected to attend the Conference. The final declaration is expected to detail a strategy for the entry into force of the Treaty. It is noteworthy that the Conference's outcome document has always been adopted by consensus. This was even the case in the 2005 Conference, which came only a few weeks after the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In one word the CTBT has always been a uniting issue, even at difficult moments for the multilateral non-proliferation regime.

As you are aware, the CTBT today boasts a near universal membership. 181 countries have signed the Treaty. Ten years ago, there were only 50 ratifications. Despite the challenges of the last decade, 149 states have now ratified, bringing us close to the magical

benchmark of 150 ratifications. This is indeed an outstanding achievement. Yet there remain 9 among 44 nuclear technology-capable states whose ratification is needed for entry into force. We in the Preparatory Commission are gratified that the prospects of the entry into force of the Treaty appear much more positive than they did for many years. Today the question is not “if”, but rather “when” will the treaty enter into force. But we need leadership, leadership, and more leadership. We need determined action by the international community to go the very last mile.

The CTBT has returned to the heart of the global multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, both for governmental and non-governmental actors. There is a renewed impetus for nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Several bold initiatives are now taking central stage in the debate. The political will of the international community is evident. But it is high time to translate political will into concrete action.

We in the Commission have come within sight of the fulfilment of our mandate. Through dedication, commitment and very hard work, we are approaching the point of readiness for the entry into force of the Treaty. The Commission has built up a one billion dollar verification system. Almost 80% of the International Monitoring System’s global monitoring stations are already sending operational-standard data to the headquarters in Vienna. The volume of the data transmitted from the stations to the data centre in Vienna has tripled during the last five years. A new global communications infrastructure for relaying that data has been installed. Important advances have been made in processing methods and software in all the verification technologies.

The system has been tried and tested. Tried by the two DPRK test explosions in 2006 and 2009. These tests are deplorable, but they proved the reliability of the system. The system has also gained the trust and approval of the scientific community in the context of a 500 scientist strong Scientific Studies Project.

Madam President,

As the member states of the IAEA know, there are several indications that a resurgence of nuclear energy is imminent. There are projections for significant increases in nuclear energy production and nuclear capacity. More and more States will master the nuclear fuel cycle to

satisfy the growing demands of their economic development, and to combat climate change and global warming.

The amount of fissile material that will be in circulation when compared with today shall increase significantly. But this begs the question: where is the corresponding strengthening of the non-proliferation regime? Is the nuclear security and non-proliferation system ready for this?

The international community needs to put a robust protection system in place. A system that works in which we can have confidence. The expected renaissance of nuclear energy must go hand in hand with a strengthening of the relevant legal regimes. With more fissile material in circulation, and more actors handling that material, we need a comprehensive system of barriers against misuse.

This means a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in force; the application of full scope IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol as the norm; tighter export controls; and multilateral fuel assurances. And downstream of the nuclear fuel cycle: the CTBT. I am convinced that a CTBT in force is a logical and necessary element of this system, if today's and future nuclear non-proliferation challenges are to be addressed credibly.

Thank you.