

## IAEA 52nd General Conference 29 September – 3 October 2008

### Statement by Denmark

as delivered by Ambassador John Bernhard, Permanent Representative to the IAEA

Mr President,

Denmark fully associates itself with the intervention of France on behalf of the European Union. I would like to add a few points on a national basis.

The IAEA is a trusted, highly professional and dedicated player in our common efforts to secure non-proliferation. The world depends, and will continue to depend, on the IAEA in the fight against nuclear proliferation. Denmark is looking forward to occupying a seat in the Board of Governors from next year.

There can be no doubt that the IAEA safeguard regime remains the fundamental instrument for securing nuclear non-proliferation. The IAEA can only be as effective as its tools allow it to be. Some states with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in force have still developed secret nuclear programmes. Therefore, it is important that all states recognize that the current IAEA verification standard is constituted by adherence to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol.

Speaking about non-proliferation, we must also not forget the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the corner stone of the global nuclear non-

proliferation regime. We welcome the improved atmosphere during the second Prep.Com. in Geneva in April/May this year and we hope that this will be the beginning of a process leading us to a positive result at the next review conference in 2010. We must avoid a repetition of the deadlock we experienced during the last review conference in 2005.

The UN Security Council also has a key responsibility for non-proliferation. The credibility of the Security Council as well as the IAEA is at stake when it comes to the importance of reacting promptly and consistently when states are breaching their safeguards commitments or seeking to break out of the NPT regime. Denmark supports an increased involvement by the Security Council in the area of non-proliferation, both thematically and in relation to specific cases like that of Iran. The adoption in 2004 of Security Council Resolution 1540 was a fundamental step forward in this respect.

In relation to Iran, Denmark continues to support a consistent approach in the Security Council process. By adopting the sanctions resolution 1803 on Iran's nuclear programme confirmed by resolution 1835 from this Saturday, the international community sent for the fifth time a strong message to Iran: Iran's continued failure to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the IAEA is not acceptable. The latest Iran-report by the IAEA Director General concluded, (and I quote,) "that the IAEA is not able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran" (end of quote). We share the serious concern expressed by the Director General and urge Iran to take the steps of suspension as required by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council in order to create confidence in

the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and to allow for negotiations. The EU High Representative presented a "revised" negotiation package in Tehran in June this year. It is a constructive and generous offer and it is for Iran to take it up.

Concerning Syria, we welcome the efforts made by the IAEA during inspection visits to the installation at Al Kibar. While the samples taken from the site are still being analyzed and evaluated by the Agency, we urge the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to show maximum transparency, including providing access to additional information and locations in order for the Agency to complete its assessment.

The current stalemate in the denuclearisation process and the reports from DPRK concerning the intention to reopen the Yongbyon facilities and to exclude the access of IAEA inspectors to the facilities is causing serious concern. Since the October 2007 agreement, we have seen substantial and tangible progress culminating with the handover of the declaration on June 26 this year. It is of utmost importance that this progress is not reversed. We would like to see the IAEA play a central role in the process.

A new challenge in recent years is the threat posed by proliferation to non-state actors such as terrorists. The IAEA's work in the area of nuclear security is crucial. Denmark is committed to securing that sufficient resources are given to the Nuclear Security Fund towards this work. Last year Denmark decided to make a national contribution of approximately 1 million EURO to the Nuclear

Security Fund. The funds are being used for the purpose of the Fund's activities in Asian development countries.

Nuclear and other radioactive materials must not fall into the hands of terrorists and we must work together to strengthen non-proliferation, nuclear verification and export controls. Denmark has, from the outset, aimed at providing a committed contribution to the development of the PSI by taking leadership on containerised shipments in the maritime domain and facilitating outreach to the industry. We see a need for further regional cooperation in this field and we are therefore planning to host a regional Nordic-Baltic PSI-seminar in November in Copenhagen.

Let me turn to the IAEA's role in relation to nuclear technologies. Denmark has taken the stance that nuclear power is not a sustainable form of energy and that it should not be included in our own energy planning. While respecting the opinion and choice of others and noting the role of the IAEA as stipulated in the Statute, we are, therefore, not in favour of a promotional role for the Agency in this field.

Due to the Danish position on nuclear energy, Denmark has from the outset had some reservations concerning the ideas of setting up a multilateral nuclear fuel assurance mechanism. We note, however, the renewed interest in nuclear energy expressed by a number of countries and we, consequently, find it important to ensure that an expansion of civilian nuclear power is not going to result in a further spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology; a technology which could be used for military purposes. Therefore, with a view

to furthering non-proliferation, Denmark is - together with our partners in the EU - considering supporting a multilateral proliferation-safe mechanism for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel for those states that have chosen the nuclear power option. We would like to see the IAEA in a crucial role in this regard.

Allow me to conclude by underlining Denmark's continued support for the IAEA's comprehensive work to ensure a high level of nuclear safety and security worldwide.

Thank you, Mr President.