

IAEA 51st General Conference 17 – 21 September 2007

Statement by Denmark

as delivered by Ambassador John Bernhard, Permanent Representative to the IAEA

Mr President,

Denmark fully associates itself with the intervention of Portugal on behalf of the European Union. I would like to add a few points on a national basis.

In the midst of this festive occasion – the 50th Anniversary of the IAEA, which comes right after the 50th Anniversary of the Statute last year, which again followed the award of the Nobel Prize the year before – let me begin by underlining that the IAEA indeed deserves the praise it has received on these occasions. The Agency is a trusted, highly professional and dedicated player in our common efforts to secure non-proliferation. The world depends, and will continue to depend, on the IAEA as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

There can be no doubt that the IAEA safeguard regime remains the fundamental instrument for securing nuclear non-proliferation. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the IAEA and its Director-General for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way. However, the IAEA can only be as effective as its tools allow it to be. Some states with

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in force have still developed secret nuclear programmes. Therefore, it is important that all states recognize that the current IAEA verification standard is constituted by adherence to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol.

Not only the IAEA but also the UN Security Council has a key responsibility for non-proliferation. The credibility of the Security Council as well as the IAEA is at stake when it comes to the importance of reacting promptly and consistently when states are breaching their safeguards commitments or seeking to break out of the NPT regime. Denmark supports an increased involvement by the Security Council in the area of non-proliferation, both thematically and in relation to specific cases like those of the DPRK and Iran. The adoption in 2004 of Security Council Resolution 1540 was a fundamental step forward in this respect. During its membership of the Security Council in 2005-2006, Denmark also stood fully behind the adoption of resolutions 1695 and 1718 in relation to the DPRK and resolutions 1696 and 1737 in relation to Iran's nuclear programme.

Encouraged by the positive development in the North Korean case, Denmark fully supports the intensified dialogue among the participants of the 6 Party Talks. The shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, which is being monitored by IAEA inspectors, is an important first step with a view to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It is obvious that the IAEA should receive the necessary funds to continue the verification efforts, and Denmark supports such activities.

In relation to Iran, Denmark continues to support a consistent approach in the Security Council process as laid out in the latest resolution in this case. Resolution 1747, adopted by consensus, again expressed the intention to move to further appropriate measures if Iran continues to fail to suspend its enrichment and heavy water related activities. We urge Iran to take the steps of suspension as required by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council in order to create confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and to allow for negotiations. The door to negotiations remains open. The generous offer from the EU3+3, as presented by the EU High Representative in Tehran in June last year, is still on the table, and it is for to Iran to take it up.

A new challenge in recent years is the threat posed by proliferation to non-state actors such as terrorists. The IAEA's work in the area of nuclear security is crucial. Denmark is committed to securing that sufficient resources are given to the Nuclear Security Fund towards this work. Nuclear and other radioactive materials must not fall into the hands of terrorists. While responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual states, we must work together to strengthen non-proliferation, nuclear verification and export controls. We welcome further, practical initiatives and any steps that can be taken on the ground. Denmark has, from the outset, aimed at providing a committed contribution to the development of the PSI by taking leadership on containerised shipments in the maritime domain and facilitating outreach to the industry. Recently, we have joined the new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and look forward to participating in further, concrete activities under this initiative.

Let me turn to the IAEA's role in relation to nuclear technologies. Denmark has taken the stance that nuclear power is not a sustainable form of energy and that it should not be included in our own energy planning. While respecting the opinion and choice of others and noting the role of the IAEA as stipulated in the Statute, we are, therefore, not in favour of a promotional role for the Agency in this field.

The step from mastering sensitive civilian nuclear technology to being able to build a nuclear weapon is becoming smaller. This is a cause of proliferation concern, especially as regards the technology in relation to the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle like uranium enrichment which can also be used for military purposes. With a view to furthering non-proliferation, Denmark would therefore positively consider supporting a multilateral proliferation-safe mechanism for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel for those states that have chosen the nuclear power option.

Allow me to conclude by underlining Denmark's continued support for the IAEA's comprehensive work to ensure a high level of nuclear safety and security worldwide.

Thank you, Mr President.