

48<sup>TH</sup> IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE, 20-24 SEPTEMBER 2004

PLENARY

STATEMENT BY UNITED KINGDOM

Thank you Mr President

I would like to join other speakers in congratulating you on your election as the President of this Conference. Under your guidance, and that of your colleagues, we are confident that our Conference will be successful. I would also like to compliment the Secretariat on providing, once again, a first class service to Member States for this **General** Conference. You have, Mr President, my assurance of the full co-operation of my delegation.

Mr President, I would like to start by associating the United Kingdom fully with the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands on behalf of the European Union. In my comments, I will not reiterate the many points already made by the European Union but, rather, focus on those aspects of the work of the Agency which warrant specific mention in this context.

The United Kingdom sets great store by the work of the Agency, which we regard as playing an essential role in helping to ensure global nuclear safety and security. All areas of the Agency's work continue to enjoy the support of the United Kingdom. The Agency itself needs the assurance that it will be properly and promptly funded to enable it to do its job. That is why we have regularly paid our Regular Budget and

target Technical Co-Operation Fund payments in full and on time. We would again urge others to do likewise.

## SUPPORT FOR SAFEGUARDS

Mr President, the events of this last year have illustrated, once **again**, the uncertain world in which we live and the increasing risk of nuclear proliferation. Last year we were amongst those who stressed the importance of the Agency being able to meet that growing challenge through safeguards and other means. We very much hope the European Commission will strengthen its links with the Agency in the coming year in this area, especially as it comes to consider the outcome of its review of its safeguards arrangements.

On 25 February 2004, the British Foreign  in a statement to the House of Commons, said  Agency has done well to meet a growing verification workload within the constraints of its budget. But we should not ask it forever to do more within the same resources. We may need seriously to consider further strengthening of its Safeguards Division". The increase agreed last year for the Regular Budget is now delivering some of what the Safeguards Department has badly needed. Despite this, more can and needs to be done.

Mr President, I am delighted to announce today that the United Kingdom has made a further Voluntary Contribution to support the Agency's safeguards work. In addition to the £560,000 that we have already provided through the UK Safeguards Support Programme, we have donated a further £1.1 million (around \$2 million) in support of

the IAEA Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project, ISIS. This Project is essential to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards function, especially strengthened and integrated safeguards with their greater emphasis on information collection and evaluation. Our contribution has enabled the Agency to take an important step in the implementation of this project. But it is not enough on its own. We call on all other Member States to provide support to the Agency in upgrading its capabilities in this important field.

There are many other ways in which we can support the Agency's work. As recognised by the Director General, Additional Protocols are essential in enabling the Agency to discharge effectively its responsibilities. Take up of these is still disappointing. We urge all Member States that have not yet done so to agree and bring into force an Additional Protocol as a matter of urgency.

We are now beginning to learn the lessons from the discovery of the A Q Khan network. The Agency is uniquely well placed to understand and combat international procurement networks. We encourage them in their efforts. We must all assist them. The UK is already active in this field. In addition to the information which we provide to the Agency under the terms of our Additional Protocol, the United Kingdom maintains a close informal dialogue with the Agency to give them the practical benefits of our national experience, for example on export controls. We urge others to act likewise.

I turn now, Mr President, to specific issues which have challenged the Agency and us all in the last year.

## **LmYA**

On 19 December 2003, Libya declared that it would dismantle its WMD programmes, and limit the range of its missile activities. It is the first time a regime has agreed voluntarily to dismantle its WMD programmes under international supervision in a transparent process. The United Kingdom is pleased to have been able to assist in this process. We worked in close cooperation with Libya, the United States and the Agency to facilitate the removal from Libya of sensitive nuclear-related equipment and material, and at Libyan request, we have provided advice and technical assistance throughout the dismantlement process.

We congratulate the Agency on the thorough work it has done in investigating and analysing Libyan past non-compliance, and we congratulate Libya for the corrective measures it has since taken. The case of Libya demonstrates that where there is genuine transparency and full cooperation, problems of nuclear proliferation can be resolved through diplomacy and negotiation. A small number of important questions remain to be answered. We hope they can be quickly so that we can begin soon to consider closing the file on Libya.

## **IRAN**

On Iran, we are pleased to note that the Director General has assessed that the Agency is making steady progress towards understanding Iran's nuclear programmes. But there are still serious questions outstanding. We regret to note that the Director

General still finds that co-operation by Iran has not been sufficiently proactive. We reiterate the need for Iran to give the Agency the [redacted] and access it requires in a timely manner. This is not simply a matter of meeting legal obligations but of demonstrating a willingness to enable the Agency to fulfil its task, and so provide the international community with the assurances it requires about the peaceful [redacted] of Iran's nuclear programme. It is now over two years since significant doubts were openly raised about the purpose of Iran's programme and we look forward to being able to reach conclusions about this purpose in November, and decide whether any further steps are required.

We would also urge Iran to ratify its Additional Protocol without delay. Ratification would contribute to the process of rebuilding the international community's confidence in Iran's nuclear programme - confidence **that** was shattered by Iran choosing over an extended period to conduct [redacted] is clandestine, nuclear activities.

In this [redacted] the immediate full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including the commissioning tests and any other production processes [redacted] the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, remains of the utmost importance. We are therefore deeply concerned that Iran has never fully introduced a suspension of all activities in this [redacted] and [redacted] it has instead chosen to demonstrate its contempt for the Board's opinion by reversing previously announced commitments. International confidence is not something to be turned on and off like a tap.

commitments. International confidence is not something to be turned on and off like a tap.

Let me be quite clear: it is not our intention to limit the right of Member States under the NPT to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as long as the right is exercised in strict compliance with treaty obligations. Nor would we argue that suspension is among the legal obligations of Iran or any other Member State of this organisation, and we are convinced ~~that~~ the Resolution just adopted by the Board does not contain such an **implication**.

But I must equally make clear, Mr President, that my Government does see the Resolution adopted last week as a final call for full, verifiable suspension. If Iran fails to heed it, it is my Government's opinion ~~that~~, come November, there may be no option but to seek the political backing of the Security Council for Iran to co-operate as requested.

## **KOREAN PENINSULAR**

Finally Mr President the Korean Peninsular. The Presidency of the European Union has already set out the OO's position in respect of the situations in North and South Korea. I will not repeat his comments but wish to underline ~~that~~ we fully support them.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Mr President, although I have not specifically commented on the Nuclear Security Fund, I would like to draw particular attention to the Conference on Nuclear Security "Global Directions for the Future" which the Agency will hold in London next March. We believe that this conference will provide an important opportunity to review our response to the threat of nuclear terrorism and to identify future challenges that we face. We look forward to the support of the Agency and of all Member States in helping to make the most of this opportunity.

Mr President, I have focused on only a few issues with which the Agency is engaged. I said at the beginning of my statement that the UK supports a large number of other areas of the Agency's activities. We have highlighted these in the written version of this statement which is being made available by the Secretariat.

Thank you Mr President.

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ANNEX TO STATEMENT BY UNITED KINGDOM

THE KINGDOM AND THE IAEA IN 2003/2004

SAFEGUARDS

The UK has provided a Support Programme (the UKSP) to IAEA safeguards since 1981. The budget of the UKSP is about £100m per year, and at any one time there are generally about 25 to 30 active tasks. The UKSP is also used to provide contributions to IAEA safeguards. Recently, the UK has made contributions in support of the Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit (SIAM) (£150k in January 2004) and the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) Re-engineering Project, IRP (£560k in 2003/04 and £1.1m in September 2004).

The UK Additional Protocol (UKAP) entered into force on 30 April 2004, together with the protocols for the other EU Member States. UK initial Article 2 declarations were sent to the IAEA on 27 July, well within the 180-day deadline specified in the protocol. The first declaration of exports was subsequently sent to the Agency on 20 August. Prior to entry into force of the UKAP, the UK had provided the Agency with

voluntary additional protocol declarations - a total of 41 declarations were provided between October 1999 and May 2004.

Also, in October 2003 the UK funded and hosted a Technical Working Meeting on revised guidelines for the format and submission of additional protocol declarations.  
Support for work in Libya

## NUCLEAR SECURITY

The UK believes that the IAEA has a unique role to play in international work to combat the threat posed by nuclear terrorism. We are a strong and active supporter of its activities in this area and in the last year we have continued to provide support for the Nuclear Security Fund. The UK made two Voluntary Contributions in 2004 - £250k in January and £200k in April. Total UK support for the Fund is now nearly £1 million.

## TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The UK is a major contributor to the Agency's Technical Co-operation Fund and consistently pays 100% of its target figure. It does so because it believes that the Agency can make an important contribution to wider international efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals. We urge the Agency to continue its efforts to ensure ~~that~~ its TC programme focuses, whenever possible, on the major development challenges of its Member States. The UK believes that greater field level co-ordination with country-owned poverty reduction processes, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy

Process (PRSP), will greatly assist the Agency to target its assistance more effectively.

## MANNET FOLLOW-UP

The UK was one of those Member States which provided funding for the study into the management and operation of the Agency's activities carried out by Mannet in 2002. Since then we have supported the Agency in its work to follow up on the report of that study. In March 2004 the UK provided a Voluntary Contribution of \$1 00k to support 2 projects which the Agency proposed. One is addressing leadership issues within the Agency; the other has focused on re-engineering the process of document production for major meetings of the Agency, such as the Board of Governors and the General Conference. We look forward to seeing the results of these projects in due course.

## GENERAL BUDGET

As in previous years, the UK paid its 2004 Regular Budget and target Technical Co-operation Fund payments in full and on time.

This year saw the end of the UK's 8-year term of office as External Auditor - we are grateful to Sir Jolm Bourne and his colleagues at the National Audit Office for their work. We believe that his recommendations have been helpful in improving the efficiency of the Agency and we congratulate the Secretariat on its efforts to implement them.