The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defense programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the obligations of the two States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification under this initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irrevocably removed from nuclear weapon programs.

It is foreseen that the Russian Federation and the United States would submit to IAEA verification weapon-origin fissile material. The United States would also submit to IAEA verification other fissile material no longer required for defense purposes. To begin IAEA verification as early as possible, special technical provisions are being developed that will allow the States to submit dismantled nuclear weapon components or other classified forms of fissile material, with assurance that IAEA inspectors would not gain access to information relating to the design or manufacture of such weapons. The verification arrangements will be in conformity with the obligations of the two States under Article I of the NPT.

In the past year, substantial progress was made in developing and testing verification equipment. Specifically, a prototype verification system for plutonium was built and demonstrated (under conditions expected in the field) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. After reviewing all available technologies, the prototype combined standard non-destructive measurement techniques and a new technology known as "information barriers" designed to allow the inspectors to derive sufficient information for the verification to be credible and independent, while preventing access to classified information. The prototype provided a means to evaluate the previously identified concepts, and the tests showed that verification under the security constraints can be carried out in a way that will meet the security concerns of the States and the verification requirements of the IAEA.

In the last year, further progress was made toward the completion of the model verification agreement that will serve as the basis for implementing the new verification role. A second draft of the agreement has been prepared, which includes the basic obligations of the parties.

Work is underway to develop the verification arrangements for specific facilities identified by the Russian Federation and the United States where the new agreements would apply. In the United States, discussions between US and IAEA experts are well advanced on the methods to be applied at the K-Area Material Storage Facility, located at the Savannah River Site. In the Russian Federation, preparatory arrangements have been completed for the commencement of discussions between Russian and IAEA experts on the verification methods to be applied at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, located at Ozersk.

In conjunction with this meeting, Minister Adamov, Secretary Richardson and Director General ElBaradei also officially opened for delegates to the 1999 IAEA General Conference an exhibit of verification equipment and methods under development for this initiative. The exhibit included information on the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility at Ozersk, Russia, where weapon-origin plutonium from the Russian Federation will be stored; non-destructive neutron and gamma ray assay equipment using information barrier technology to prevent the disclosure of classified nuclear weapons information; remote monitoring via the Internet involving test installations at the Sandia National Laboratories, USA and at Sarov (Arzamas-16), Russia; and integrated radio frequency sensor platforms for inventory monitoring systems at storage facilities.

Minister Adamov, Secretary Richardson and Director General ElBaradei committed their respective organizations to a work programme for the coming year aimed at the adoption of the basic technical measures associated with the verification of fissile material covered by the initiative and approval of an appropriate model verification agreement by the IAEA Board of Governors. The model verification agreement being developed may also be used by other NPT nuclear-weapon States for international verification of fissile material in conjunction with future arms control measures.

Secretary Richardson, Minister Adamov and the Director General agreed to meet again in September 2000 to plan the implementation of this initiative.